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Abstract
This dissertation undertakes three evaluations estimating the impacts of micro-savings, time 
preferences and state-run newspaper bias on individual or household behaviour in the Solomon 
Islands and Sri Lanka. All three evaluations use survey level data. The first evaluation is based in 
the Solomon Islands and follows a quasi-experimental design where 481 people are surveyed across 
19 villages. It asks the question: “Does access to formal savings facilities by rural Pacific Island 
villagers impact on their welfare?” Results show intervention significantly reduces the difficulty 
associated with paying for higher value less frequent items (i.e. ‘lumpier’ items). The second 
evaluation is also based in the Solomon Islands and follows a quasi-experimental design where 499 
people are surveyed across 11 villages. It asks the question: “Do time preferences impact on an 
individual’s decision to maintain an open savings account?” Results show that the average person 
who demonstrates time inconsistency is more likely to maintain an open savings account than the 
average person who demonstrates time consistency. The third evaluation is based in Sri Lanka and 
follows a randomised design where 840 people are surveyed across 56 villages. It asks the 
question: “Does home delivery of state-run newspapers influence the political opinions of 
individuals to conform to the views of the state?” Results show home delivering a state-controlled 
newspaper significantly influences some political opinions of individuals to conform to the views of 
the state.
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Chapter I -  Introduction
Chapter 1 -  Introduction
There has been much debate regarding the effectiveness of development assistance. Sachs 
(cited in Snowdon 2005:53) illustrates the success of development assistance to Bolivia and 
Poland and claims to know “innumerable successful aid programmes of significant scale”. 
Easterly (2007:329) counters that “successful cases of development happening due to a 
large inflow of aid and technical assistance have been hard to find”. He notes that “the top 
quarter of aid recipients ... received 17 percent of their GDP in aid” over the past 42 years 
and “had near-zero per capita growth” (Easterly 2007:329).
The debate regarding the extent to which development assistance has been effective or 
ineffective will undoubtedly continue. Considering this uncertainty and the vast sums of 
money spent on development programs, the need for rigorous evaluations to determine 
effectiveness of program implementation is of critical importance. Indeed Sachs (cited in 
Snowdon 2005:54) argues that “if someone is really serious about the aid issue they should 
take a micro-perspective” to evaluate specific development programs as opposed to using 
“gross over-the-top generalisations”. Given such a need, this dissertation undertakes three 
evaluations of increasing rigor across three topical development issues1 that have been 
unexplored in sufficient detail.
The first evaluation involves estimating the impacts of a program intervention on 
households and occurs a year after the program has begun. In situations where evaluation 
does not begin until project implementation has been completed and prior survey data does 
not exist, a cross-sectional quasi-experimental approach where groups receiving program 
intervention (treatment groups) are compared with non-equivalent groups (control groups) 
represents one of the few viable alternatives (Bamberger, Rugh and Mabrt 2006). In quasi- 
experimental designs of this nature, it is difficult to ensure pre-intervention, the 
characteristics of the average household in treatment and comparisons groups are 
statistically identical. Consequently this approach invariably suffers from omitted variable 
problems; estimated impact of intervention at a cross-sectional level, measured after an
1 The particular development issues investigated will be considered later in this chapter.
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9appropriate intervention period“, may include both the influence of intervention and 
omitted variables. Hence, any evaluation of this nature has to take into consideration 
omitted variable bias in its methodological design.
In addition to evaluating impact of a program on households, donors may want to know 
what types of individuals actually demand programs prior to investing money in large scale 
program expansion. Hence the second evaluation focuses on impact of particular 
individual characteristics on the demand for a program and, like the first evaluation, 
follows a cross-sectional quasi-experimental design. Many organisations undertake basic 
field research including performing interviews of some key stakeholders to determine 
which communities demand particular programs . However there are instances where 
organisations support a more rigorous approach. For example, Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 
(2006) evaluated whether there were individual characteristics of regular savers that may 
encourage take-up of a commitment savings product. If such individual characteristics 
exist and are easily identifiable, development organisations can appropriately target their 
products after initial evaluation. In circumstances where the evaluation cost is a small 
percentage of the overall program cost, such preliminary analysis may benefit organisations 
by saving them both time and money.
A limitation of using a cross-sectional quasi-experimental design to measure characteristics 
of program take-up is that it too suffers from omitted variable bias; there may be more 
characteristics that influence program take-up than those considered in the cross-sectional 
regression.
Similarly to the first evaluation, the third evaluation undertaken in this dissertation also 
focuses on the impact of an intervention. However, as opposed to the first two evaluations, 
the final evaluation follows a more rigorous experimental approach. It involves randomly
2 Intervention period refers to the period from when an intervention began, and when the final survey for the 
evaluation was undertaken. These intervention periods vary and need to be sufficiently long for impact to 
occur. For instance intervention periods can last ten weeks (Gerber, Karlan and Bergan 2009), one year 
(Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 2006) or two and a half years (Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 2008).
3 ANZ bank in the Solomon Islands, Vanwods in Vanuatu and Terre des Hommes Netherlands in Sri Lanka 
are just some examples.
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4assigning targeted individuals to treatment or control groups where only the treatment 
groups are offered intervention. Critically, given a reasonably large sample size4 5, the 
randomisation process assumes characteristics of average individuals in treatment and 
control groups are statistically similar. After an appropriate intervention period, the 
intervention would represent the only difference between the average individual in the two 
groups6 7. Thus, experimental designs are superior to quasi-experimental designs in that they 
do not suffer from omitted variable bias.
Despite the superiority of experimental designs over quasi-experimental designs, they are 
only used on a limited scale by development organisations (Donaldson, Christie and Mark 
2008). This is mainly due to time and budget constraints and because in certain cases, it is 
unethical to randomly provide intervention to some people and not to others (Ravallion
2005) . Further, in most instances, the evaluator is not hired until post program intervention, 
implying it is not possible to randomly select groups pre-intervention (Bamberger et al.
2006) . Indeed, the first evaluation undertaken in this dissertation followed a quasi- 
experimental design as evaluation began one year after initial program implementation.
La Londe (1986) was one of the first proponents of using experimental designs over quasi- 
experimental designs. Bamberger et al. (2006) considers the use of experimental designs 
impractical in many real world situations. Nevertheless, in the last eight years, there has 
been a steady increase in experimental evaluations (see studies undertaken by researchers at 
the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab ). Moreover, it implies in many cases, 
experimental evaluations are practical and feasible if development organisations have the 
funding, foresight and technical assistance to design the evaluation prior to program 
inception.
To be clear, randomisation may not necessarily always be the preferred option. 
Randomised designs may lead to ethical questions such as why certain people should
4 Experimental designs may also involve random assignment of other units such as animals or agricultural 
plots.
5 Experimental designs generally involve surveying more than 800 people (see for example Ashraf et al.
2006).
6 Clearly this assumes external factors, which may influence variables being investigated during the 
intervention period, affect the average treatment and control group member to a statistically identical extent.
7 Refer <http://www.povertyactionlab.com/>.
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8receive intervention while other equally eligible people do not . Further, randomised 
studies generally focus on the average impact of offering intervention on a group of people 
(intent-to-treat effect) and the average impact of intervention on people who accept 
treatment (treatment on the treated effect). Deaton (2009) argues that average impacts are 
rarely enough -  policy makers also want heterogeneous analysis such as demographic 
characteristics of people who experience positive and negative changes. Ravallion (2009) 
contends the impacts of intervention may spillover to other people (not captured in the 
sample) and results from randomised designs may not be applicable to everybody nor may 
be replicable on a large scale.
This dialog suggests that randomised studies should not be considered the only available 
tool for development practitioners. Nevertheless, when focusing on the evaluations 
undertaken for the purposes of this thesis, the randomised approach provides the greatest 
internal validity. Moreover, issues relating to the average effect, neglecting impacts of 
spillover bias and the potential inapplicability of results to other groups of people exist in 
quasi-experimental designs as well. While the randomised approach is not perfect, it is 
more rigorous than the quasi-experimental designs undertaken in this thesis.
Ultimately the methodological designs used in the three studies vary in rigor depending on 
the level of information provided. Birchler and Facchinetti (2007:64) explain the decision 
to acquire information can be considered as a trade-off between quality and cost. They 
mathematically consider whether the additional benefit of a bank acquiring more 
information on the true state of the world would exceed the cost of doing so. Literature is 
flush with other examples such as the trade-offs between quality of information and the 
costs of gathering information faced by firms (James and Lawler 2008), regulators of 
security markets (Mulherin 2007), decision makers (Connolly and Serre 1984) and financial 
market investors (Beneish and Yohn 2008).
The concept of a trade-off between information quality and information cost can readily be 
applied to trade-offs in the three studies undertaken in this dissertation. In relation to the 
first and second evaluations, an experimental approach that addressed issues relating to
8 The counter argument is that intervention should not be administered without knowing its effects and there 
may be inadequate funding for extensive intervention.
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omitted variable bias could have been possible if the intervention had expanded into other 
areas. However waiting for the expansion would have been costly if the organisation 
providing intervention did not decide to collaborate with any future research. Conversely 
in relation to the third study, the information would not have been gained without planning 
the experiment in advance; in this instance the informational benefit gathered from the 
study exceeded the cost of not undertaking the experiment. Further, as the study could be 
designed ex-ante, it would be more beneficial to use a rigorous experimental approach as 
opposed to a quasi-experimental method.
The three evaluations in this dissertation use contrasting methodologies to illustrate some of 
the different approaches to evaluation in literature. As highlighted in chapter 2, each 
subsequent evaluation increases in methodological rigour, demonstrating the benefits of 
using experimental designs over quasi-experimental designs.
Using information gathered from survey data, the three main chapters of this dissertation 
respectively estimate the impacts of micro-savings, time preferences and state-run 
newspaper bias on individual or household behaviour in developing countries. All three 
studies have potential implications on development policy including whether to increase 
access to micro-savings facilities and whether programs to counter or limit bias from state- 
run media should be expanded.
The research question, the motivation for each research question, hypothesis and main 
results of the three evaluations follow.
First Evaluation
There has been an increase in organisations providing micro-savings services to the poor in 
Pacific Island countries (Conroy 2006; Flaming and Mathison 2007). Additionally, 
Australia National Bank (ANZ), Westpac Bank and the largest bilateral donor in the Pacific 
Island countries, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), are 
increasing their funding of micro-savings related initiatives. But is the expense involved in 
supporting the expansion of access to formal savings facilities justified? Given the 
increased investment in micro-savings facilities, evaluating whether there is a welfare 
impact from expanding access to formal savings facilities takes on an added urgency.
14
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In general, literature does not explicitly measure ‘welfare impact’ from access to formal 
savings facilities. For instance, Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2008) undertake a natural field 
experiment in the Philippines to estimate impact when formal savings facilities are used as 
a commitment device. They note that increased access to commitment savings facilities 
increases savings levels. However they caution that this does not necessarily translate to 
increased welfare and as a consequence, additional research is required. Further, Ashraf, 
Karlan and Yin (2004) illustrate money from informal savings can be reallocated into 
formal savings facilities, where formal savings facilities can then be used as a form of 
deposit and withdrawal discipline. Literature also argues formal savings facilities are 
beneficial due to their anonymity (Vonderlack and Schreiner 2002) and when they are used 
as accumulation devices for large payments (Aghion and Morduch 2005). Nevertheless, 
none of this literature provides an actual definition of welfare. The only paper that appears 
to allude to a definition of welfare is Ashraf et al. (2008) that suggests the average woman 
who opens a commitment savings facility achieves a statistical improvement in her feelings 
of empowerment.
Presumably people would only undertake an optional activity, such as increasing their level 
of savings in a formal savings facility, if they believe it improves their welfare. Conversely, 
if they believe it has a negligible welfare impact, people would simply maintain the same 
savings habits they had prior to accessing a formal savings facility. Hence, for the purposes 
of this evaluation, one measure of increased welfare from using formal savings as a 
commitment device will be defined as increases in levels of savings. Further, increased 
welfare due to formal savings facilities being used as reallocation9 tools will be defined as 
the increased discipline savers have over their own savings and expenditure patterns. 
Finally, increased welfare due to formal savings facilities being used as payment tools will 
be defined as decreased difficulty in paying for particular items.
The first evaluation is motivated by wanting to determine whether there is justification for 
increased support of micro-savings facilities in Pacific Island countries. Hence, the first 
evaluation which surveyed 481 people, asks the research question: “Does access to formal
9 This refers to the reallocation of savings from informal options (such as keeping savings at home or with 
friends) to formal savings facilities (such as savings accounts with a financial institution).
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savings facilities by rural Pacific Island villagers impact on their welfare?” This evaluation 
adds to literature by being the first to consider empirically the welfare impact of access to 
formal savings facilities in a Pacific Island country. It is also the first to consider welfare 
impacts from the use of formal savings facilities as payment tools. It is hypothesised that 
welfare will be enhanced when formal savings facilities are used as payment tools and 
commitment devices, making it ‘less difficult’ for people living in households with high 
levels of formal savings to pay for higher value items that fall due periodically, such as 
seasonal gifts and school fees (i.e. lumpier items).
Results show intervention significantly reduces the difficulty associated with paying for 
higher value less frequent items (i.e. ‘lumpier’ items) while it is unlikely to significantly 
influence the difficulty associated with paying for low value more frequent items. Results 
also reveal that the reduction in difficulty is felt greatest amongst the 28 percent of 
households where formal savings facilities have been used as commitment devices to 
increase household savings levels. Hence the results support the hypothesis.
Second Evaluation
What types of people in developing countries actually demand savings facilities? Given the 
increased outreach of micro-savings facilities, directing savings facilities to individuals 
with the strongest demand for such services would be of the greatest benefit. Critically, 
how could these individuals be identified prior to expanding an expensive development 
program? One approach is to differentiate between characteristics of people who open 
savings accounts to those who do not.
A particular characteristic that has been investigated more recently in literature is the 
concept of time preference. Time preference refers to a person’s relative level of patience 
for items (such as money or goods) over time. If their level of patience remains the same 
over time, they are considered time-consistent. If they are impatient for items in the near- 
term but are patient for items in the long-term they are present-biased time inconsistent. If 
they are patient for items in the near-term but impatient for items in the long-term they are 
future-biased time inconsistent.
16
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When investigating the impact of time-preferences on individual behaviour, literature has 
largely focused on the impact of present-biased time inconsistent preferences (Ashraf et al. 
2006; Meier and Sprenger 2008a). Literature largely argues some people with present- 
biased time inconsistent preferences are sophisticated enough to understand their self- 
control problems and take appropriate action. This may involve limiting the amount of 
their credit access (Meier and Sprenger 2008a) or imposing an earlier deadline than 
required to submit academic papers (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002).
A recent paper also demonstrates that existing savers with present-biased time inconsistent 
preferences understand their self-control problems and are more likely to restrict 
withdrawals by agreeing to deposit money into a savings commitment device (Ashraf et al. 
2008). However what if the option to save did not exist? Are people with present-biased 
time inconsistent preferences who do not use formal financial savings facilities likely to 
demand savings accounts? If this is the case and there are a large number of people with 
present-biased time inconsistent preferences in a particular area, then it may be financially 
beneficial for micro-savings organisations to expand access to formal savings facilities into 
such areas.
This study is motivated by wanting to determine whether people who are sophisticated 
enough to understand their commitment problems, as demonstrated by their present-biased 
or future-biased time inconsistent preferences, demand formal savings facilities. If this is 
indeed the case, and such people form a large percentage of the population, results would 
support an expansion of access to formal savings facilities.
Hence the second evaluation, of 449 people, follows a quasi-experimental design and asks 
the research question: “Do time preferences impact on an individual’s decision to maintain an 
open savings account?” This study adds to literature by being the first natural study to 
investigate whether people’s time preferences impact on their decision to maintain an open 
formal savings facility. Further, this study is the first to consider the impact of future- 
biased time inconsistent preferences and time-consistent preferences on any form of human 
behaviour. This is important in the context of recent research that suggests future-biased 
time inconsistent preferences are more prevalent than present-biased time inconsistent 
preferences (Sayman and Onculer 2007; Takeuchi 2008). It is hypothesised that people’s
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present-biased or future-biased time inconsistent preferences, which are indicative of their 
commitment problems, will significantly impact on their decision to maintain an open 
savings account.
Results show that the average person who demonstrates present-biased or future-biased 
time inconsistent preferences is significantly more likely to maintain an open savings 
account respectively. Hence the results support the hypothesis. Further, the study 
demonstrates that people with time-consistent preferences are significantly less likely to 
maintain open savings accounts.
Third Evaluation
That print media influences audience perception is not surprising. Instead, what is of 
interest to researchers is the extent to which print-media influences political opinions of its 
readers and even more critically, how this influences their voting behaviour (Hughes and 
Lawson 2004; Alsem, Brakman, Hoogduin and Kuper 2008). Understanding this impact is 
particularly important in countries where elections are won and lost by the slimmest of 
margins; i.e. would a politician have lost an election if editorial content was slanted more in 
their favour?
In developed countries, studies have shown that particular newspapers are biased towards 
certain candidates and biased against others (Erikson 1976; Dalton, Beck and Huckfeldt 
1998). However in most of these countries, freedom of expression is vigorously protected 
and governments do not have significant editorial control over newspapers10. Hence any 
newspaper endorsements are arguably a reflection of editorial perception of candidate 
suitability* 11. But what of developing countries where state-controlled newspapers have the 
largest daily circulation? Clearly under these circumstances, journalists have a vested 
interest in positively depicting their political masters and as a consequence, state-run 
newspapers can become a propaganda tool for the incumbent government.
10 For example, in the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and Norway, governments do not own 
newspapers.
11 This statement is debatable because newspaper owners may collude with politicians to write articles 
favourable to their candidacy (see for example Hughes and Lawson 2004).
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In countries such as Sri Lanka, where a state-controlled newspaper has the largest 
newspaper circulation, voter perceptions may be significantly influenced and the 
democratic process could be subverted. Determining whether this is the case is important 
considering that prior elections have been very close; for example, the candidate from the 
incumbent government in 2009 won the 2005 presidential election by less than 1 percent of 
the popular vote.
The motivation for this study is to fill a void in literature by determining the extent to 
which a state-run newspaper in a developing country impacts on voter perceptions. Hence 
the third evaluation, of 840 people, follows a rigorous experimental design and asks the 
research question: “Does home delivery of state-run newspapers influence the political 
opinions of individuals to conform to the views of the state?” This study adds to the 
literature by being the first experiment to investigate the impacts of state-run newspaper 
bias in a developing country. It is hypothesised that newspaper bias will significantly 
influence the political opinions of targeted individuals to conform to the views of the state.
Results show that intervention (i.e. home delivery of state-run newspapers) is effective in 
significantly influencing the political opinions of individuals to conform to the views of the 
state across issues that are portrayed positively by state-run newspapers (i.e. successful 
government initiatives) and across issues that are portrayed negatively by state-run 
newspapers (i.e. initiatives by opposition parties and other actors running against 
government policy). Conversely in most cases, people who receive state-run newspapers 
are not significantly influenced by intervention to conform to the views of the state across 
issues that are portrayed defensively by state-run newspapers (i.e. unpopular state actions). 
Hence, the hypothesis is only partially correct.
Summary
Ultimately, the interventions of micro-savings and newspaper bias, illustrated in chapters 3 
and 5 respectively, as well as an individual’s time preference, highlighted in chapter 4, all 
have significant impacts on individual or household behaviour albeit not always to the same 
degree as initially hypothesised. These results may be used as by policy makers involved in 
expansion of micro-savings facilities and those attempting to improve media freedom.
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While the evaluations undertaken in this dissertation contribute to literature across some 
development issues, they only represent an extremely small fraction of evaluations 
necessary to address pressing development concerns. Indeed the more rigorous evaluations 
that are undertaken, and assuming results are understood and recommendations 
implemented, the more likely practitioners will be successful when engaging in particular 
development initiatives.
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 will present a 
literature review of the three topics considered in the dissertation, a literature review of the 
methodological designs of each study and a comparison of these designs. Chapters 3, 4 and 
5 will focus on the first, second and third evaluations respectively. Each of these chapters 
will present an introduction, background information (if applicable), the evaluation design, 
summary statistics, the model used to estimate impact, results, limitations and a conclusion. 
Chapter 6 will summarise the contribution of the dissertation to literature and offer 
suggestions for future research.
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2.0 Introduction
Donor and implementing organisations face many pressing development questions. For 
instance, should aid organisations support the expansion of micro-savings facilities? This 
would partially depend on whether an expansion would enhance beneficiary welfare. If 
formal savings facilities are beneficial, it is important to determine who demands these 
products so resources can be allocated more efficiently. Hence, organisations may want to 
determine the characteristics of formal savers. Additionally, do governments of countries, 
where state-controlled newspapers are circulated most extensively, subvert the democratic 
process by influencing voters’ political opinions using state resources? If yes, aid 
organisations may increase financial support for independent private media institutions.
Literature uses quasi-experimental and increasingly, experimental designs, to address such 
development questions. This chapter illustrates and examines examples of studies in areas 
related to welfare impacts from access to savings facilities, impacts of time preferences on 
human behaviour and impacts of newspapers on political opinions of individuals. This 
review will demonstrate voids in current literature and explain how the evaluations 
undertaken in this dissertation contribute to research.
Further, the more rigorous the methodological designs, the more likely evaluations will 
accurately estimate impact. Hence, this chapter will also briefly describe the evaluations 
undertaken in the dissertation and provide example of similar such designs in literature. 
Importantly, it will also undertake a comparison of the designs to demonstrate the 
superiority of the experimental design in the evaluation process.
Ultimately, as a result of the literature review, the following three research questions will 
be investigated in chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively:
“Does access to formal savings facilities by rural Pacific Island villagers impact 
on their welfare?”
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“ Do time preferences impact on an individual’ s decision to maintain an open 
savings account?”
“ Does home delivery of state-run newspapers influence the political opinions of 
individuals to conform to the views of the state?”
This chapter w ill be separated into three main sections. Section 2.1 w ill review literature 
relating to the three evaluations of this dissertation. Section 2.2 w ill then review literature 
of methodological designs similar to those used when answering the research questions. A 
comparison between these designs w ill then be undertaken in section 2.3.
2.1 Literature Review of the Three Research Questions
The following w ill review literature relating to each of the three evaluations considered in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively.
2.1.1 First Evaluation
This section considers literature relating to welfare impacts of access to formal savings 
facilities.
Literature suggests formal savings facilities can be used as commitment devices, as 
reallocation devices, as anonymous vehicles for savings and as payment devices. However, 
literature largely does not define the welfare implications from such uses of formal savings 
facilities. This review investigates four potential welfare enhancing qualities from using 
formal savings facilities as well as reasons why access to formal savings facilities may not 
be welfare enhancing.
Firstly, when using formal savings facilities as commitment devices, increased welfare is 
defined as increased levels o f savings. Increases in savings levels from using formal 
savings facilities can occur in an environment with lower fees, stronger economy and 
higher levels of income (Beck and De la Torre 2007).
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There have been some empirical studies using survey level data suggesting that access to 
formal savings facilities increases savings levels. Aportela (1999) analyses data from 
between 10,000 and 13,000 households and finds that improved access to savings in certain 
regions in Mexico increases the average household savings rate by almost 5 percent. The 
effect was the highest among poorer households. Arpotela’s (1999) study relies on 
comparing areas where a government institution undertook a formal savings expansion 
program to areas where formal savings was not expanded. Considering that government 
run programs may be expanded into areas based purely on political preference, there may 
be unobservable differences in characteristics between areas receiving formal savings 
facilities and those not receiving formal savings facilities. This may bias results.
A more rigorous study is undertaken by Ashraf et al. (2006). Their natural experiment of 
1777 micro-savings clients reveals that after one year, access to commitment formal 
savings facilities, as opposed to formal savings facilities without commitment features, 
increases savings levels by 81 percent. Given the randomised structure of the study, the 
results can be considered robust.
As demonstrated by Ashraf et al. (2008), another potential welfare implication from using 
formal savings as a commitment device is that female savers, who access a commitment 
savings device, are more likely to experience increased feelings of self-empowerment. This 
is in part demonstrated by a “shift towards female-oriented durables goods purchased in the 
household” (Ashraf et al. 2008:4). The study is an extension of Ashraf et al. (2006) and 
again, due to its randomised nature, can be considered robust.
Access to formal savings facilities may also increase savings levels through an increased 
inflow of remittances as formal savings facilities provide a positive rate of return, thus 
encouraging migrants to remit their money12 (Quinn 2005).
Secondly, when using formal savings facilities as reallocation devices, increased welfare is 
defined as the increased discipline savers have over their own savings and expenditure 
patterns. Due to the temptation to spend money, people may ‘reallocate’ savings from
12 It is uncertain if this applies in situations where interest rates are very low which is generally the case with 
micro-savings institutions.
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informal savings to formal savings facilities to prevent them from accessing money that is 
readily available in the home. This reallocation process encourages deposit discipline 
(Vonderlack and Schreiner 2002) while further discipline could be provided through opting 
for withdrawal restrictions (Ashraf et al. 2004).
Ashraf et al. (2004) use an example of a microfinance institution in the Philippines that 
sells a locked box for a small fee to encourage deposit discipline and withdrawal 
restrictions. Clients periodically go to the bank to deposit money. Withdrawal restrictions 
also impose discipline on clients. For example, clients could opt to restrict withdrawals 
until an important date, such as a birthday or Christmas, or alternatively, restrict 
withdrawals until a certain goal was met, such as accumulating enough for livestock 
purchases. Importantly withdraws can also occur in case of particular emergencies, such as 
medical fees for children, a death in the family or to purchase an important asset.
However while Vonderlack and Schreiner (2002) and Ashraf et al. (2004) provide 
examples of potential benefits from using formal savings facilities as reallocation devices, 
their claims are not founded on rigorous evaluation designs.
Thirdly, when using formal savings facilities as anonymous vehicles for savings, increased 
welfare is defined as the increased financial independence of savers. Specifically, formal 
savings facilities provide the poor with anonymous access to “convenient, liquid and safe 
deposit services which are protected against inflation by positive real rates of interest” 
(Conroy 2006:19). The anonymity provides financial independence as other people are 
unaware of savings balances. Conversely, informal savings facilities suffer from low 
safety, negative returns, limited access to funds and no anonymity (Vonderlack and 
Schreiner 2002). For example, people who save in community groups, such as through 
rotating savings and credit associations, are aware of each others’ balances and may not be 
able to withdraw as and when required (Aghion and Morduch 2005). Further, other assets, 
such as jewellery, radios, cattle, cows, rice and corn kept at home can be stolen and do not 
generate positive interest.
There appears to be no study that empirically evaluates whether using formal savings 
facilities as anonymous vehicles for savings is welfare enhancing.
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Finally, when using formal savings facilities as payment tools, increased welfare is defined 
as the reduced difficulty in paying for household expenses. There are examples in literature 
that claim formal savings facilities are used as payment tools. For instance, Aghion and 
Morduch (2005) propose the poor may accumulate daily inflows into large lump sum 
payments for particular items such as children’s school fees, presents for Christmas, an 
emergency or for other non-monetary assets such as purchase of agricultural equipment. 
They may also “save small amounts at frequent intervals to smooth income” (Ashraf, Gons, 
Karlan and Yin 2003:4) and hence ensure sufficient funds are available to pay for necessary 
consumables when experiencing “income shocks or unexpected increases in expenditures” 
(Zeller and Sharma 2000:160). Examples of rural people who may choose to smooth 
income are those who receive remittances as income ' (Conroy 2006) and farmers who earn 
volatile incomes from crop production and livestock sales (Zeller and Sharma 2000).
There is some empirical evidence to support such claims. A study of financial records kept 
by 42 households in Bangladesh by Rutherford (2002) demonstrates that households save to 
build lump sums of money for immediate expenditure as opposed to accumulating for long­
term savings. Unfortunately, given the small sample size and lack of any comparison 
group, these findings are unlikely to be robust. Further, while literature claims formal 
savings facilities are used as payment tools, there is no empirical study that considers 
whether using formal savings facilities as payment tools improves welfare by reducing the 
difficulty involved in paying for household expenses.
In Pacific Island countries, Flaming and Mathison (2007:iv) argue populations “are eager to 
access savings instruments when they can do so readily and without great cost”. Flaming 
and Mathison (2007) present the example of Vanwods in Vanuatu and ANZ bank in Fiji 
that provide formal savings facilities to rural communities by directly approaching people 
in villages. Flaming and Mathison (2007:11) claim clients of Vanwods are net savers while 
ANZ bank has experienced “robust response to its mobile branch savings initiative in Fiji”.
13 Remittances are transfers of money by foreign workers to their home countries.
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Further, in Pacific Island countries, Cornford (2001) believes access to savings can be 
useful while Conroy (2006:7) argues “the importance of savings is underestimated”. 
Conroy’s study of micro-savings in Pacific Island countries suggests Pacific Islanders 
“demonstrate a surprisingly high propensity to save” (Conroy 2006:23). He uses non­
monetary examples such as tuber crops, which can be harvested over a period of time, can 
be consumed now, or ‘saved’ for future consumption. Conroy (2006:34) concludes “in the 
Pacific, the strongest argument for the extension of savings services is that rural and low- 
income people so manifestly want it”. Nevertheless, despite these claims, there appears to 
be no empirical research in Pacific Island countries investigating whether savings does 
indeed enhance welfare.
There are reasons why rural communities in developing countries may not save despite 
having access to formal savings facilities. One reason is that they may be unable to forgo 
current income for future income (Ashraf et al. 2003) especially in adverse economic 
climates. Additionally there may be cultural and historic reasons why communities chose 
not to save. For example, Dunn and Arbuckle Jr. (2001:184) illustrate a case where 
respondents believed “money shouldn’t be put away” and instead used to purchase 
enterprise inventory. In another instance, Dunn and Arbuckle Jr. (2001) highlight clients 
who lost savings due to banks becoming insolvent. This in turn resulted in a mistrust of 
banks and dissuaded such clients from saving.
Additionally people with formal savings facilities with little formal education may be 
overwhelmed with financial concepts completely foreign to them and fail to understand 
“the possibility of services they have never encountered” (Flaming and Mathison 2007:iv). 
This is particularly relevant to populations in Pacific Island countries who have 
“accumulated wealth and conducted transaction without using financial institutions for 
generations” and as a result “these patterns are ingrained in household money management 
practices” (Flaming and Mathison 2007:4). Hence such people “are likely more influenced 
by their traditional perceptions than by financial calculations” (Flaming and Mathison 
2007:4).
So is access to formal savings facilities welfare enhancing? With the exception of 
investigating welfare impacts when using formal savings facilities as a commitment device,
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there appears to be no natural field study investigating welfare impacts due to formal 
savings being used as reallocation tools, as vehicles for anonymous savings or as payment 
devices. Hence, the study in chapter 3 contributes to literature by being the first to 
undertake a natural field study to determine whether welfare is enhanced when formal 
savings facilities are used as payment tools to reduce the difficulty involved in paying for 
household expenses. It is also the first to consider whether formal savings facilities are 
used mainly as a commitment tool or reallocation tool and is the first micro-savings 
evaluation focusing on a Pacific Island country.
2.1.2 Second Evaluation
This section initially provides a brief explanation of time preferences. It then undertakes a 
review of literature relating to the impact of present-biased time preferences on an 
individual’s behaviour.
Explanation of Time Preferences
Inter-temporal choice behaviour involves consideration of “tradeoffs between current and 
future rewards” (Laibson 2003:2). The components of inter-temporal choice are separated 
into both diminishing marginal utility and the discount function. The discount function is 
used to explain time preferences. Hence, the discussion relating to time preferences will be 
developed after briefly considering inter-temporal choice.
Frederick and Loewenstein (2002) note literature on inter-temporal choice behaviour dates 
as far back as John Rae’s seminal publication of the Sociological Theory of Capital in 
1834. Rae argues differing wealth between nations was perpetuated in part due to 
differences in the effective desire to accumulate (cited in Frederick and Loewenstein 2002). 
He also explains this desire varies over time with immediate pleasures far more desirable 
than delayed pleasures. Böhm-Bawerk (1889) expands on Rae’s work by explaining 
people underestimate future wants and as a result allocate consumption differently across 
periods. Samuelson (1937) formalises this preliminary work by incorporating inter­
temporal choice into the discounted utility module (refer equation 2.1).
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T
U(x) = Y JD(t)u(xt ) Eq 2.1
/=0
U(x) represents the sum in the present period of all of the discounted present values of 
future utilities that will result from a decision today that generates payoffs T ’ periods into 
the future. u(x,) represents the instantaneous utility derived at time ‘t’ when consuming 
bundle ‘x \ The rate at which this utility at time ‘t’ is discounted to the present is captured 
by the discount function, D(t).
There are two main forces in equation 2.1; diminishing marginal utility and the discount 
function. An individual is likely to spread consumption over time due to the concept of 
diminishing marginal utility; that is at any point in time, for every extra unit of 
consumption, utility increases at a decreasing rate. Hence;
u \ x ) > 1 u"(x) < 1
In the discounted utility model (eq 2.1), the discount function {D(t) = S ' ) has a constant 
discount factor ( S ). This discount factor “measures the value of a discounted utility” 
(Laibson 2003:12). The discount factor is in turn a function of the discount rate ‘k’ where
'  1 '
1 +  k
Eq 2.2
Thus “the discount rate measures the rate of decline of the discount function” (Laibson 
2003:12).
Equation 2.1 can be expanded as follows:
T
U(x) = u(xq) + ön(x\) + S 2u(x2) + J 3m(jc3) + ....+ S Tu(xt ) = ^D ( t )u ( x t ) Eq 2.3
t=0
Many economists continue to assume a constant discount factor (O’Donoghue and Rabin 
1999). Hence ‘k’ is constant over time (refer figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Constant Discount Factor
This constant discount rate implies a person’s inter-temporal preference is time-consistent 
where later preferences confirm earlier preferences (Frederick and Loewenstein 2002); 
hence preferences do not change over time. To illustrate, assume an individual has a choice 
between an immediate reward and a relatively larger delayed reward in both the near-term 
and distant-term. Now assume the individual is asked the near-term question “would you 
prefer $400 now or $500 in one month’s time?” and the distant-term question “would you 
prefer $400 in six months time or $500 in seven months time?” where the $400 in each 
question refers to the immediate reward and the $500 in each question refers to the delayed 
reward14. A person who wants the smaller immediate reward in both the near-term and the 
distant-term is impatiently time consistent. Conversely a person who is willing to wait for 
the relatively larger delayed reward in both the near term and distant term is patiently time 
consistent.
However a broad body of literature contends the concept of time consistency is 
oversimplified as people’s actions imply their discount rates change over time (Laibson 
1997; Thaler 1981). In most cases, literature proposes that people are likely to be time 
inconsistent where discount rates generally decrease over time (Laibson 2003; Frederick 
and Loewenstein 2002; Ashraf et al. 2006). In equation 2.3 it implies ‘k’ decreases over 
time and hence S increases over time. This is illustrated in figure 2.2.
14 In quasi-experimental and experimental studies, people may either be asked this question hypothetically or 
provided with actual rewards over time.
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Figure 2.2: Decreasing Discount Factor
Thus the discount factor attaches a greater relative weight to utility over time (Streich and 
Levy 2007). These individuals who want immediate rewards in the near term, but are 
willing to wait for delayed rewards in the distant term are present-biased time inconsistent15 
(Ashraf et al. 2006).
Conversely there is also some evidence that people delay rewards in the near-term for 
larger rewards in the distant term. In equation 2.3 it implies ‘k’ increases over time and 
hence S  decreases over time. Ashraf et al. (2006:647) claim this future-biased
inconsistency may occur if “an individual is flush with cash now, but foresees being 
liquidity constrained in six months”. This is illustrated in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Increasing Discount Factor
15 Note the term hyperbolic time preferences may be used interchangeably with present-biased time 
preferences.
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If a person is time inconsistent they are patient in the near-term and impatient in the distant- 
term (present-biased) or impatient in the near-term and patient in the distant-term (future- 
biased). Refer to table 2.1 for a summary of time preferences.
Table 2.1 - M atrix Outlining Time Preferences
Distant Term Question
Immediate Reward Delayed Reward Selected
Selected
co Immediate Impatiently time Present-biased time
3a
Reward
Selected
consistent inconsistency
E
a i
1—
Delayed Future-biased time Patiently tim e consistent
ro
CD
2
Reward
Selected
inconsistency
Literature Review for Second Evaluation
Strotz (1955) was the first to argue people want immediate rewards in the near term but are 
w illing to wait for delayed rewards in the distant term and as such demonstrate present- 
biased time preferences. Since then many models using available data corroborate the 
concept of present-biased time preferences (see for example Streich and Levy 2007).
Indeed some studies also support the concept o f present-bias. For example, Thaler (1981) 
undertakes a study using data gathered from hypothetical monetary time preference 
questions asked from 80 University of Oregon students. He explains “ the psychophysics of 
time suggests that the difference between today and tomorrow w ill seem greater than the 
difference between a year from now and a year plus one day”  (Thaler 1981:205). Thaler 
(1981) notes this reveals a ‘time effect’ where discount rates decrease over time.
Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil (1989) undertake a similar study using data gathered from 
hypothetical monetary time preference questions asked from 204 students in the University 
of Haifa. Results demonstrate given minor exceptions, the mean discount rates decrease 
over time (Benzion et al. 1989). These results are consistent with findings by Thaler 
(1981).
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More recently, there has been a steady increase in empirical studies illustrating the 
prevalence of future-biased time inconsistency. For instance Sayman and Onculer (2007) 
undertake a series of empirical studies using real rewards in longitudinal analysis and 
hypothetical rewards in cross-sectional analysis to measure discount rates. The sample 
sizes range from 47 subjects to 72 subjects across the studies. They find that the shorter the 
time period between the near term and distant term rewards and between the immediate and 
delayed rewards, the more likely people will be future-biased. Another recent study by 
Takeuchi (2008) investigates discount rates using hypothetical rewards in a longitudinal 
analysis across 56 subjects. He finds that people demonstrate future-bias in approximately 
66.6 percent of cases.
Why this divergence in literature? Takeuchi (2008) argues when using hypothetical 
questions to estimate time preference, the studies advocating future-bias provide multiple 
future options while the studies advocating present-bias only provide an option between 
one immediate reward and one future reward. Further, the distance between the near term 
and distant term rewards is generally greater in the studies advocating present-bias time 
preferences.
While most studies focus on time-inconsistent preferences, there has been one paper 
specifically advocating the prevalence of time consistency over time inconsistency. 
Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukherji (2006) undertake a study estimating the time 
preference of 23 undergraduate students with results rejecting time inconsistency. 
However, a limitation of this study is that it is unlikely 23 subjects represent a sufficiently 
large sample size. The studies undertaken by Thaler (1981) and Benzion et al. (1989) have 
samples of 80 and 204 people respectively. Interestingly, results of other studies have 
indirectly demonstrated that time consistency occurs more frequently than time 
inconsistency however this phenomenon has not been discussed extensively within the 
papers (Read and Van Leeuwen 1998; Meier and Sprenger 2008a).
When considering the ability of time preferences to predict human activities, literature has 
largely confined itself to determine whether people with present-biased time preferences 
are sophisticated enough to act on their self-control problems. This is primarily because
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most literature argues that present-bias time preferences are the most prevalent (Frederick 
and Loewenstein 2002).
The papers by Meier and Sprenger (2008a) and Ashraf et al. (2006) consider the influences 
of present-biased time preferences. For example, Meier and Sprenger (2008a) find people 
with present-biased time preferences have higher credit card borrowing levels. They 
measure the time preference of 541 people in two neighbourhoods in the United States 
using answers to hypothetical time preference questions. Results show that some people 
with time-commitment problems (as demonstrated by their present-biased time preferences) 
are sophisticated and restrict their borrowings while others are naive, and increase their 
borrowing.
Ashraf et al. (2006) undertake an experimental design in the Philippines investigating 
impacts of present-biased time preferences on people’s decision to engage in a commitment 
savings product. Hypothetical time preference questions were asked from a sample of 1777 
existing or former clients of which a randomly selected subset of 710 people were offered a 
commitment product. Analysis on these 710 clients indicates women with present-biased 
time preferences are significantly more likely to open a commitment savings account. 
Further Ashraf et al. (2006) find evidence that the product assisted women to overcome 
self-control problems and led to improved savings practices.
Most studies investigating impacts of time preferences only focus on the influence of 
present-biased time consistency. However this literature review has highlighted examples 
of different studies supporting the prevalence of present-biased time consistency, future- 
biased time consistency and time consistency. Hence the study in chapter 4 adds to the 
literature by being the first to consider the impacts of future-biased time inconsistency and 
time consistency on human behaviour (i.e. maintaining an open savings account). Further, 
the study in chapter 4 is also the first to consider whether people’s present-biased time 
preferences, demonstrating their commitment problems, impact on their decision to 
maintain an open savings account16.
16 Recall Ashraf et al. (2006) investigates whether savers with commitment problems are likely to choose a 
separate savings commitment device.
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2.1.3 Third Evaluation
This section considers literature relating to whether media, and in particular newspapers, 
impact on the political opinions of individuals.
There exist a broad body of literature investigating the impacts of media on political 
opinions. One of the earlier studies suggest that mass media (defined as television, radio, 
film, recorded music, newspapers, magazines and literature by Mankekar 1993) did not 
have a strong effect on changing the opinions of voters (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 
1948). However, most subsequent literature points to a positive relationship between mass 
media and political opinions. For instance, McCombs and Donald (1972:176) suggest “the 
evidence is much stronger that voters learn from the immense quantity of information [from 
the mass media] available during each campaign”. Atkin (1978) concurs, claiming young 
people increase their political knowledge after exposure to mass media. Further, as cited in 
Strongberg (2001), Stromberg (1999a) argues that mass media influences a forward- 
looking electorate as it enables voters to view the promises being made by politicians while 
Stromberg (1999b) claims it also influences a backward-looking electorate as it allows 
voters to assess whether promises have been kept.
Recently, there has been a body of literature focusing on the impacts of television on 
influencing voter opinions. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2006) find the conservative 
Republicans gain 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points in towns that broadcasted the conservative 
Fox News. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) claim people’s opinions on the politics behind 
9/11 vary depending on whether they were exposed to CNN or A1 Jazera. During a 
laboratory experiment, (Ansolabehre and Iyengar 1995) argue political slanted 
advertisements on television influenced 8 percent of subjects to change their views. 
Similarly, Brians and Wattenburg (1996) suggest political advertisements influence the 
opinions of certain people.
There has also been analysis on the impacts of media in developing countries. Johnson 
(2001) shows television generates greater political awareness for people in remote Indian 
villages. In Malaysia and Singapore, access to the internet has encouraged people to 
engage in more politically contentious journalism (George 2005). In Nigeria, Ojo (2003)
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suggests mass media is an important tool to ensure a political culture evolves as people 
become more aware of the government’s past actions and future intentions. Further, Janda, 
Berry and Goldman (1992) argue to support democracy in developing countries “the mass 
media provide the main channels for [a] two-way flow of information and therefore have 
the dual capability of redefining and shaping our political views” (cited in Ojo 2003).
Hence there has been much literature suggesting that media in general influence political 
opinions. Further, it is well known that newspapers influence political opinions of 
individuals (Dalton et al. 1998; Hughes and Lawson 2004; Druckman and Parkin 2005; 
Alsem et al. 2008). Clearly, this is one of the primary objectives of newspapers. Hence 
literature largely investigates to what extent newspapers influence political opinions of 
individuals.
For instance, Besley and Burgess (2002:12) use an economic model in India to find that 
“higher newspaper circulation is associated with government being more responsive to falls 
in food production and flood damage”. They model data between 1958 and 1992 from 
sixteen major Indian states when creating their results.
Besley and Burgess (2002) include a vector of economic, political and media variables that 
may also influence government responsiveness in their analysis. However, they have not 
captured any unobservable variables and are unlikely to have captured all observable 
variables that may influence their dependent variable. Hence, a major weakness with such 
analysis is that it may suffer from omitted variable bias; i.e. the failure to include all 
variables that influence the dependent variable in the regression.
If governments are influenced, it is not surprising literature also demonstrates that 
newspaper content influences political opinions of individual citizens. An early study by 
Miller, Goldenberg and Erbring (1979) find that readers of highly critical newspapers were 
more distrustful of their governments. Further, Erikson (1976) and Robinson (1974) 
document “a direct relationship between newspaper endorsements and the voting patterns 
of readers” (Dalton et al. 1998:112). More recent empirical evidence points to a general 
positive correlation between newspaper bias and political opinions. For example, the study 
by Dalton et al. (1998) involves telephoning 1318 people across 40 United States counties
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regarding their political opinions and what newspapers they read. Results of the study’s 
econometric model, which control for party affiliations, find that “a newspaper’s editorial 
content is significantly related to candidate preferences” (Dalton et al. 1998:111). 
However, like Besley and Burgess (2002), Dalton et al. (1998) may suffer from omitted 
variable bias as it does not control for other media, such as television and radio, which may 
also influence individual’s political preferences.
A study by Druckman and Parkin (2005) also demonstrates editorial content influences 
voter perception. As opposed to Dalton et al. (1998), Druckman and Parkin (2005) focus 
on two competing newspapers in one county in the United States. They measure relative 
slant of each newspaper by “comparing relative coverage of two candidates by a single 
outlet and relative coverage of the candidates by competing outlets” (Druckman and Parkin 
2005:1031). This ‘slant’ is considered by both the space allocated to each candidate and 
the tone of comments, which can be either positive, negative, or neutral in relation to a 
particular candidate.
Unlike Dalton et al. (1998), Druckman and Parkin (2005) illustrate that the average reader 
of each newspapers used in their study are similar across a vector of demographic and 
political characteristics. Nevertheless, by their own admission, Druckman and Parkin 
(2005) concede they may still suffer from omitted variable bias.
While most of the literature points to a positive correlation between newspaper bias and 
political opinions, Gerber, Karlan and Bergan (2009) indicate the influence of newspaper 
bias on viewers’ perception is insignificant. Gerber et al. (2009:35) undertake a 
randomised study “to measure the effect of political news content on political behavior and 
opinions” in a United States county. The study involves selecting a group of households in 
a particular district who were not exposed to home delivered newspapers. It then randomly 
issues liberal newspapers to some households, conservative newspapers to other households 
and no newspapers to remaining households. Ten weeks later, political questions were 
asked from 1081 people in households across these three groups.
Results indicate among all newspaper recipients, that although media slant did not change 
political opinions, greater media exposure resulted in increased support for the Democratic
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candidate. Gerber et al. (2009) justify this result by suggesting while the papers covered 
news differently, all reported on negative political controversies. As opposed to Dalton et 
al. (1998), Besley and Burgess (2002) and Druckman and Parkin (2005), Gerber et al. 
(2009) randomise using a large sample size. Hence the study by Gerber et al. (2009) does 
not suffer from omitted variable bias and the methodology can be considered robust.
While this literature has generally demonstrated that bias from newspapers influences the 
political opinions of individuals, there is little empirical research investigating the impacts 
of state-run newspaper bias. More broadly, non-empirical based literature suggests bias 
due to state-controlled media influences voter perception. For instance, former Russian 
President Putin’s popularity remains high in part because his administration tightly 
monitors the media (Stoner-Weiss 2007) while in Malaysia, the ruling party has created and 
reinforced numerous mechanisms to ensure an obedient media that will not jeopardize the 
status quo (Lim 2007).
All the empirical studies considered in this literature review use more than one newspaper 
to assess impact. Recall, Dalton et al. (1998) analyse newspapers in 40 counties in the 
United States, Besley and Burgess (2002) analyse 16 newspapers in India across 34 years 
while Gerber et al. (2009) use two newspapers in their study. This is generally undertaken 
to demonstrate that different newspapers have varying points of view which in turn 
influence readers in specific ways. Conversely, the study in chapter 5 of this dissertation 
focuses on the impact of home delivery of a newspaper that is state-controlled, and hence 
carries with it an implicit bias to promoting the actions of the state. Hence impact on 
political opinions can be measured through analysing whether various state goals, such as 
security and economic prosperity, have been positively perceived by a group of people who 
have received state-controlled newspapers.
The study in chapter 5 adds to literature by being the first experiment investigating impacts 
of newspaper bias in a developing country. Considering people in developing countries are 
less likely to have access to a variety of points of view in the media relative to developed 
countries, understanding the impact of newspaper bias takes on added importance.
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2.2 Methodological Designs
The following section considers methodological designs similar to those used when 
investigating the three research questions of this dissertation. Section 2.2.1 relates to the 
first evaluation, section 2.2.2 relates to the second evaluation while section 2.2.3 relates to 
the third evaluation.
2.2.1 Methodological Design used in the First Evaluation
Alexander-Tedeschi and Karlan (2009) argue in microfinance impact assessments driven 
largely by cost-factors, it is likely older groups are compared to newer groups at a cross- 
sectional level (see for example MkNelly and Lippold 1998, Copestake, Bhalotra and 
Johnson 2001 and Nino-Zarazua 2007). This approach is also taken when the 
methodological design is developed after program implementation. However in most cases 
the studies cannot prove when older groups were initially offered intervention, the average 
older group member was statistically identical to the average newer group member (who 
had not yet received intervention). Hence any analysis between the average older group 
member and average newer group member a year post-intervention will suffer from omitted 
variable bias. Ultimately, such evaluations trade rigor for pragmatism. The cross-sectional 
quasi-experimental design of the first evaluation follows this structure.
Study Design fo r  First Evaluation
The following provides an example of the post-test only quasi-experimental design similar 
to that used in chapter 3 of the dissertation.
At time 1, an organisation chooses ‘x’ out of ‘(x + n)’ groups to be offered intervention 
(note each ‘group’ represents a cluster of people) based on some observable or 
unobservable characteristic. Thus ‘x’ groups are offered treatment while ‘n’ groups are not. 
As everyone is eligible for intervention within groups, some people within groups ‘x’ 
choose intervention and are considered ‘older clients’ (or treatment group clients) while 
others refuse intervention are considered older ‘non-clients’.
17 ‘x ’ and ‘n’ are positive integers.
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At time 2, the organisation offers intervention to the remaining V  groups. The people 
accepting intervention are considered ‘newer clients’ (or control group clients).
Variations of the model in equation 2.4 are generally used to measure impact and involve 
comparing output variables, controlled by observable characteristics, between treatment 
group clients and control group clients (Aghion and Morduch 2005; Nino-Zarazua 2007).
Ylj = c + aD . + a 2X 2jj + ei} Eq 2.4
In the model, T  denotes the individual observation while ‘j ’ indexes a group T (treatment) 
or C (control). Yy represents an output variable for individual T  in group ‘j ’ at time 2. X2y 
represents the vector of time-invariant observable characteristics for individual T  in group 
‘j’ potentially correlated with output variable Yy. Dj represents a treatment dummy variable 
which equals one for clients in treatment groups. Impact is measured by analysing the 
coefficient of the dummy variable.
Equation 2.4 is mis-specified as it fails to account for omitted variables; unobservable and 
observable characteristics that may be correlated with the dependent variable. If omitted 
variables are positively (negatively) correlated with the dependent variable, it would create 
upward (downward) bias in results.
Review of Literature relating to the Methodology used in the First Evaluation
The bias due to omitted variables largely exists due to problems associated with non-
random program placement and selection bias.
Non-random program placement occurs when, for reasons observable or unobservable to 
the researcher, the organisation chooses particular groups (group ‘x’), but not others (group 
‘n’), for initial intervention. If this reason is correlated with output variables, then impact 
estimation using equation 2.4 will be biased.
Morduch (1998) argues bias evolving from non-random program placement can occur if 
vendors have pre-selected a treatment group over a control group for a particular reason.
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Pitt and Khandker (1998) use the example that microfinance impact would be 
underestimated if vendors select high poverty areas and comparisons are made with low 
poverty areas. Conversely vendors may only fund relatively richer treatment villages, thus 
overestimating microfinance impact if compared to very poor control villages. As a result 
non-random program placement is a “serious issue” (Khandker 2001:6) and has the 
potential to create an upward or downward bias.
Additionally cross-sectional quasi-experimental designs may suffer from selection bias. 
Selection bias would occur if the characteristics of people initially receiving intervention 
(i.e. clients in groups ‘x’) were different from those selected from people receiving 
intervention at a later date (clients in groups ‘n’) and these characteristics were correlated 
with output variables. Selection bias can also be significant. In the Dunn and Arbuckle Jr. 
(2001) study, estimating the impacts of micro-credit, output variables of ‘old clients’ were 
compared to ‘non-clients’ with similar characteristics to older clients. Alexander-Tedeschi 
and Karlan (2009) show that impact in the Dunn and Arbuckle Jr. (2001) study may be 
overestimated as pre-intervention, ‘non-clients’ were poorer than ‘older’ clients.
Observable characteristics can be, to an extent, used to mitigate this non-random program 
placement and selection bias and “overcome the lack of pretest measures” (Cook 1979:99). 
Bamberger et al. (2006:220) concurs, arguing “the analytical power of the design can be 
strengthened through the use of multivariate analysis to statistically control for differences 
between the two groups”. Nevertheless, in cross-sectional quasi-experimental designs it is 
very difficult to account for unobservable characteristics .
There are some examples in literature of cross-sectional quasi-experimental designs 
comparing older groups to newer groups that implicitly considers bias from non-random 
program placement and selection bias. One such study, by Nino-Zarazüa (2007), estimates 
impacts of micro-credit on income poverty in Mexico. The study compares an older group
18 Some unobservable characteristics can be controlled for using appropriate instruments. In longitudinal 
studies, influence of time-invariant unobservable characteristics can be eliminated through a difference in 
difference approach. Note however, if errors in the regressions at time 1 are different to the errors in 
regressions at time 2, measurement error will exist; i.e. the difference in difference estimator has not 
‘differenced’ out identical errors. Measurement errors are a common problem in quasi-experimental panel 
analysis (Wooldridge 2001) and while IV techniques can be used to address this issue (see for example Galvo, 
Jr. and Montes-Rojas 2009), problems may still persist.
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of lenders actively participating in the credit program to a newer group of lenders who have 
sielf-selected to participate and have been accepted by the lender but only received a loan 
after the survey was completed.
To account for non-random program placement, the study selects people from “households 
hiving in the same settlement ... in order to hold constant factors such as infrastructure, cost 
o»f inputs and local prices” (Nino-Zarazüa 2007:5). Selection bias is addressed by 
comparing old lenders actively participating in the credit program to new lenders who ‘self- 
selected’ to participate pre-intervention, and had been accepted by the lender when old 
lenders were given loans, but only received a loan after the survey was completed. 
Consequently pre-intervention, both old and new lenders had similar characteristics (i.e. 
tlhose encouraging them to ‘self-select’ into the program).
However Nino-Zarazüa (2007) fails to address if there was a reason, unobservable to the 
researcher, why the lender chose to initially issue loans to old lenders over new lenders. If 
such a reason exists and it is correlated with the dependent variable (income), results may 
be upwardly biased.
An earlier study by Pitt and Khandker (1998) also undertakes a cross-sectional quasi- 
experimental design. The study estimates the impact of micro-credit by comparing output 
variables from a sample of households in villages where banks were providing micro-loans, 
to output variables of sampled households in villages where these banks were not operating.
To account for non-random program placement, Pitt and Khandker (1998) uses a vector of 
observable characteristics to demonstrate that treatment villages were on average, 
statistically similar to control villages pre-intervention. To reduce bias from selection of 
program participants, Pitt and Khandker (1998) assesses the impact of intervention on 
households that were eligible for loans in treatment and control villages, thus including 
clients and eligible non-clients in the study. Hence theoretically, the study compares 
groups of people with similar characteristics.
However, eligibility requirements in the Pitt and Khandker (1998) study were not strictly 
followed and people who were ineligible for loans (i.e. wealthier people) were receiving
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them (Morduch 1998). Consequently as people selected to newer groups strictly adhered 
with eligibility criteria while people in the older groups did not, comparisons between older 
and newer groups overstated impact. Further, while observable characteristics at village 
level were considered, there may have been reasons unobservable to the researcher why the 
lender chose certain villages over others. If this occurred, then non-random program 
placement would also bias results.
Clearly non-random program placement and selection bias can be problematic in cross- 
sectional field studies. Consequently, the cross-sectional design used in the study in 
chapter 3 considers issues relating to non-random program placement and selection bias in 
the chapter’s methodological design section and demonstrates potential bias in the ensuing 
results.
Additionally, even if these issues are addressed, there may be other omitted variables, such 
as unobservable characteristics and time variant observable characteristics, correlated with 
the dependent variable and not included in the analysis. This is an inherent limitation in 
cross-sectional designs of this nature.
2.2.2 Methodological Design used in the Second Evaluation
The methodological design used for the second evaluation is a cross-sectional quasi- 
experimental design where the characteristics of people who self-selected and opened 
savings accounts (clients) are compared to people who chose not to open savings accounts 
(non-clients).
Study Design for Second Evaluation
The following provides an example of a cross sectional study similar to that used in chapter 
4 of the dissertation. At time 1, an organisation offers a program to all people within a 
group. ‘Clients’ accept this program while ‘non-clients’ choose not to participate in the 
program and remain clients and non-clients respectively at time 2. At time 2, a cross- 
sectional survey is undertaken of clients and non-clients.
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The analysis in chapter 4 focuses on the impact of time preferences on an individual’s 
decision to maintain an open savings facility. The model in equation 2.5 illustrates the 
impact of time-mconsistent preferences on a person’s decision to maintain an open savings 
facility.
P-: —  c + cd ■ 4-  cc^J ■ + (X^X2j "t- £yt Eq 2.5
‘Pi’ is a dummy variable equalling one if individual T  is a client or zero if they are a non­
client. 7,-’ represents a dummy variable which equals one when individual ‘i’ demonstrates 
present-biased time consistency and zero otherwise. ‘7,’ represents a dummy variable which 
equals one when individual Y demonstrates future-biased time consistency and zero 
otherwise. represents a vector of observable characteristics for individual T  potentially 
correlated with *Pj\ Impact of present-biased time consistency and future-biased time 
consistency is measured by analysing the coefficient of the dummy variables 7,’ and 7 ,’ 
respectively.
The model in equation 2.6 illustrates the impact of time-consistent preferences on an 
individual’s decision to maintain an open savings facility.
P- = c aL: + oc^X li + Eq 2.6
All variables are as previously indicated. ‘L,’ represents a dummy variable which equals 
one when individual T  demonstrates time consistency and zero otherwise.
Critically, as all clients and non-clients were eligible to participate in the program, non- 
random program placement is not problematic. Further, as clients and non-clients self- 
selected their respective position, selection bias is also not problematic.
Nevertheless, as the analysis uses observable characteristics gathered at time 2, it can only 
include time-invariant observable characteristics in the analysis, thus failing to capture all 
observable characteristics that may encourage program acceptance. Additionally, the 
regression fails to consider other unobservable characteristics that may encourage program
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acceptance. This is a limitation faced by other studies using similar cross-sectional designs 
(see for example Meier and Sprenger 2008b).
Review of Literature relating to the Methodology used in the Second Evaluation
There are few studies investigating the impact of hyperbolic time preferences on behaviour.
The study by Ashraf et al. (2006) uses a randomised approach to estimate the impact of
hyperbolic preferences on take up of commitment devices. However the selection of
participants in the study in chapter 4 is non-random and is consequently similar in design to
two cross-sectional studies by Meier and Sprenger (in particular to Meier and Sprenger
2008b).
Meier and Sprenger (2008a) initially select 606 low to moderate income earners with 
subprime borrowings from two Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) sites in Boston, 
Massachusetts to determine whether people with present-biased time preferences can 
partially explain credit card behaviour. Critically while authors claim the study is a “large 
field experiment” (Meier and Sprenger 2008a:2), there is nothing to suggest these 606 
participants were randomly selected from a group of people within the two VITA sites. 
Further, there is no explanation as to why these sites were selected over the other 20 VITA 
sites in Boston. Hence as examination of hyperbolic preferences only focuses on these 
non-randomly selected 606 participants, the study more likely resembles a field quasi- 
experimental study as opposed to an experimental study.
The design of another study by Meier and Sprenger (Meier and Sprenger 2008b) most 
closely resembles the evaluation design used in chapter 4 of this dissertation. Meier and 
Sprenger (2008b) offered free credit card counselling advice to approximately 870 
individuals who attended a VITA site in Boston, Massachusetts. Of these people, 55 
percent self-selected and accepted counselling. Results demonstrate hyperbolic preferences 
impacts on a person’s decision to accept credit card counselling advice.
Importantly while the 870 individuals represent all people who entered the VITA site 
during the time of study, only one out of 22 potential VITA sites was selected. Hence 
people used in the study are only representative of a small section of Boston,
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Massachusetts. Such inability to emphatically generalize findings to other regions is a 
limitation of other quasi-experimental designs (see for example Nino-Zarazüa 2007).
2.2.3 Methodological Design used in the Third Evaluation
The methodological design used for the third evaluation is an experimental design that is 
planned in advance (ex-ante) and impact is measured ex-post.
Broadly, literature argues given a choice between quasi-experimental and experimental 
designs, the latter present the most rigorous choice. Trochim (2006) contends experimental 
designs are often cited as the strongest method for determining the net impact of a specific 
treatment or intervention. Lipsey and Cordray (2000:345) concur, claiming in many 
cases19, “experimental design is the method of choice for establishing whether social 
interventions have ... intended effects”.
Study Design for Third Evaluation
The following provides an example of an experimental study similar to that used in chapter 
5 of the dissertation. At time 1, from a sample of potential groups, some groups are 
randomly selected for an intervention (these become treatment groups) while intervention is 
withheld to other groups (these can become control groups). As program placement is 
randomly selected, on average, the characteristics of treatment and control groups are 
statistically similar pre-intervention. Further, within these treatment and control groups, 
individuals are randomly selected for intervention. The randomisation process suggests 
that the average person in treatment groups is statistically similar to the average person in 
control groups pre-intervention. Hence selection bias is also not problematic. A survey is 
taken of treatment and control group members at times 1 and 2.
The randomisation process in experimental designs is designed to ensure pre-intervention at 
time 1, observable and unobservable characteristics of the average participant in treatment 
groups are the same as those in control groups. Post-intervention at time 2, the only 
difference, on average, between treatment and control groups should be due to intervention.
19 Clearly, there are limitations to randomised designs (see for example Deaton 2009 and Ravollian 2009). 
However, they are superior to quasi-experimental designs in reference to their internal validity.
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Thus, controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics is unnecessary as they are 
statistically similar between the average control and treatment member.
To measure impact, the following fixed effects OLS equation is regressed:
Yjvt — a jv + TiTimet X Treatmentv+ ß1Timet + Eq 2.7
In the model, ‘j ’ denotes the individual observation, V  indexes a group T (treatment) or C 
(control) and ‘t’ denotes the time period which equals 1 or 2. ‘Y* represents output
variables. ‘Time’ is a dummy variable that equals zero for time 1 and one for time 2. 
‘Treatment’ is a dummy variable that takes value one if the group is a treatment group and 
zero if the group is a control group. Impact is measured by analysing y1.
Review of Literature relating to the Methodology used in the Third Evaluation 
The following illustrates two randomised designs of a nature similar to that used in chapter 
5. Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro (2007) undertake a randomised experiment to determine if 
intervention of an information program assists Kenyan farmers adopt and market export 
crops. From 36 pre-existing self help groups (each of which contained an average of 28.7 
farmers), 24 were randomly assigned to two treatment groups and the remaining 12 to a 
control group. Baseline and second round survey data was gathered for farmers within 
each of these groups. Impact of intervention across a range of dependent variables was 
measured by running a fixed effects OLS regression similar to equation 2.7.
A study by Banerjee, Cole, Duflo and Linden (2006) also resembles the methodological 
design applicable to the chapter 5 study. A section of Banerjee et al. (2006) investigate 
whether intervention of a remedial education program improves numeracy and literacy 
skills of low-achieving Indian students. Initially 5,945 grade 4 students in 111 schools 
were provided with a pre-test to estimate their academic competency. 58 schools were 
then randomly assigned a computer assisted learning program while the remaining 57 were 
not (and were consequently considered the control group). A second round survey was 
administered one year post-initial intervention to again estimate academic competency.
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Impact of intervention on normalized test scores is measured over the intervention period 
using the fixed effects regression illustrated in equation 2.7.
Note, as opposed to Ashraf et al (2007), the study in chapter 5 only considers one 
treatment group. Hence it is more similar to the design of Banerjee et al (2006) than to 
Ashraf et al (2007).
2.3 Comparison of Methodological Designs
The first evaluation, which asks the question, “Does access to formal savings facilities by 
rural Pacific Island villagers impact on their welfare?”, is a classic example of a situation 
where evaluation of a program intervention is not undertaken until program completion and 
thus, analysis involves comparing older participants to newer participants. To improve 
methodological rigour, the analysis must argue why non-random program placement into 
older groups prior to newer groups, is not correlated with dependent variables. Further, the 
analysis must also demonstrate that at the time of initial program implementation the 
average newer participant, who self-selects into the program approximately a year after 
initial intervention, is statistically similar to the average older participant who self-selects 
into the program initially. This would address issues relating to selection bias. The first 
evaluation considers these concerns while illustrating potential bias from the ensuing 
results.
Nevertheless, even if non-random program placement and selection bias are addressed, 
failure to include other omitted variables, relating to unobservable characteristics and other 
observable characteristics that may be correlated with the dependent variable, may still 
create bias. As explained in section 2.2.1, this is an inherent limitation in cross-sectional 
designs of this nature (Nino-Zarazua 2007; Meier and Sprenger 2008b).
The second study which asks the question, “Do time preferences impact on an individual’s 
decision to maintain an open savings account?” is an example of an evaluation 
investigating characteristics of individuals who actual demand programs by comparing
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‘clients’ to ‘non-clients’ in the same villages. The study is quasi-experimental as people 
offered savings facilities were not randomly selected.
The second study suffers from some similar limitations to the first study. In particular, the 
study fails to control for all omitted variables, such as time variant observable 
characteristics and unobservable characteristics, which may be correlated with the 
dependent variable (i.e. take-up of formal savings facilities).
However, unlike the first evaluation, it does not suffer from non-random program 
placement as all clients and non-clients were offered savings facilities at the same time. 
Recall, in the first evaluation people in older groups were offered savings facilities before 
people in newer groups. Further, it does not suffer from selection bias as clients and non­
clients self-select at the same time. Also recall in the first evaluation, clients in older 
groups self-selected before clients in newer groups self-selected. Hence, when considering 
non-random program placement and selection bias, the second evaluation is more rigorous 
than the first evaluation.
The third study, which asks the question, “Does home delivery of state-run newspapers 
influence the political opinions of individuals to conform to the views of the state?”, is an 
example of a study designed prior to the administering of an intervention. It follows a 
rigorous experimental design where some villages, from a larger sample of villages, were 
randomly selected to receive newspapers (treatment villages) while other were randomly 
selected not to receive newspapers (control villages). Hence the design does not suffer 
from non-random program placement. Further, as households within both treatment and 
control villages were also randomly selected, the study does not suffer from selection bias. 
Thus, when considering issues involving non-random program placement and selection 
bias, evaluating program impact using an experimental design is more rigorous than 
administering a quasi-experimental design similar to that used in the first evaluation.
Additionally, the randomisation process assumes that on average, characteristics of 
treatment group members are identical to control group members. This is supported by 
data gathered from the baseline survey. Hence, on average, the only difference between the 
two groups after an intervention period would be attributed to the intervention. Thus unlike
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the first and second evaluations, the third evaluation does not suffer from omitted variable 
bias.
Clearly the final experimental evaluation is more rigorous than the quasi-experimental 
designs. If organisations can design experimental evaluations prior to program 
implementation, they would have a stronger estimation of impact. Note, other potential 
limitations of the three designs are considered separately within subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 3 -  Welfare Impacts from Access to Formal 
Micro-Savings Facilities
3.0 Introduction
Comford (2001) and Conroy (2006) suggest that increasing household savings in Pacific 
Island countries, in particular formal savings, is welfare enhancing. However there is little 
empirical evidence to support such claims. For policy makers to seriously consider whether 
they should financially support micro-savings organisations in the Pacific, a critical 
question needs to be empirically addressed; does access to formal savings facilities by rural 
communities in a Pacific Island country impact on their welfare? The question takes on 
added urgency when considering the largest bi-lateral aid donor in the Pacific region, 
AusAID, has increased its support for microfinance in 2009.
This chapter investigates the question: “ Does access to formal savings facilities by rural 
Pacific Island villagers impact on their welfare?” Access to savings facilities may 
encourage people to commit more money into savings (Aportela 1999) and/or reallocate 
savings from informal savings facilities to formal saving facilities (Vonderlack and 
Schreiner 2002). The improvement in welfare due to access to formal savings was 
previously defined (refer to chapter 2) as increased levels of savings, the increased 
discipline savers have over their own savings and expenditure patterns, the use of formal 
savings facilities as anonymous vehicles for savings and reduced difficulty in paying for 
household expenses.
In this study, welfare impact is considered in two stages; firstly whether people who access 
formal savings facilities use them as payment tools, thus improving welfare by reducing the 
difficulty involved in paying for particular items~ . Secondly, whether formal savings 
facilities are used as commitment devices, which improves welfare by increasing savings 
levels, or as tools to reallocate money from informal to formal savings facilities, which 
improves welfare by increasing deposit discipline and reducing the ‘temptation’ to 
withdraw money.
20 These ‘ items’ relate to educational items, items relating to particular events (such as Easter, Christmas, 
birthdays, etc.), clothes, kitchen utensils and tools used to harvest and sell produce. Refer section 3.3 for 
further details.
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It is hypothesised that welfare will be enhanced when formal savings facilities are used as 
payment tools and commitment devices, making it ‘less difficult’ for people living in 
households with high levels of formal savings to pay for higher value items that fall due 
periodically, such as seasonal gifts and school fees (i.e. lumpier items).
The ANZ rural banking program in the Solomon Islands presented a unique opportunity to 
answer the research question. Importantly, ANZ began offering a formal savings facility, 
designed as a commitment device, to rural clients in December 2005 and did not offer 
credit facilities until after this study was completed. Hence impacts of offering a formal 
savings facility can be considered without having to tease out the influence of credit.
A cross-sectional quasi-experimental design is used to estimate whether ‘access to the ANZ 
rural savings account’ by ANZ client households, impacted on their ‘perceptions of 
difficulty involved in paying for particular items’. The dependent variable used in this 
study is ‘not experiencing difficulty involved in paying for particular items’. To measure 
impact, output variables“ gathered from 231 ‘control village’ clients, whose villages were 
just offered intervention , are compared to output variables gathered from 268 ‘treatment 
village’ clients, whose villages were offered intervention a year prior to control village 
clients. Issues relating to non-random program placement and selection bias are considered 
while equality between treatment village client households and control village client 
households is estimated by comparing time-invariant observable characteristics between the 
two groups. Additionally, treatment village clients are asked if, as a result of access to the 
ANZ savings facilities, the household saves ‘more’, implying savings facilities are used as 
a commitment device, or experiences ‘no change’, suggesting formal savings facilities are 
used as a reallocation tool.
This study is the first to consider empirically the welfare impact of access to formal savings 
facilities in a Pacific Island country. It is also the first to consider welfare impacts from the
1 Output variables are subjectively measured as ‘perceived levels of difficulty involved in paying for selected 
items’ by household members and are described in detail in section 3.3. This ‘subjective’ approach is not new 
in academic literature. For instance Karlan and Zinman (2008) estimate welfare using perceptions of health, 
stress, depression and optimism across different numerical scales.
2” In chapter 3, ‘access to the ANZ rural savings account’ is used interchangeably with the ‘intervention’.
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use of formal savings facilities as payment tools and reallocation tools. Results show 
intervention reduces the difficulty associated with paying for higher value less frequent 
purchases. Results also demonstrate intervention does not significantly influence the 
difficulty associated with paying for low value more frequent items. Hence formal savings 
facilities appear to be used as a payment tool to reduce the difficulty relating to payments 
on ‘lumpier’ items.
Further, after accessing formal savings accounts for approximately a year, 28 percent of 
households with treatment village clients use formal savings accounts as commitment 
devices. Conversely 68 percent of households with treatment village clients use formal 
savings facilities to reallocate funds. Interestingly, the 28 percent of households that 
committed to saving more, experience less difficulty when paying for particular items 
relative to the 68 percent of households that reallocated their cash. Thus welfare impacts 
from using formal savings facilities as a payment tool is greater for those people in 
households that use savings as commitment devices.
The rest of this chapter is outlined as follows; section 3.1 provides background information 
on the Solomon Islands, the community being investigated and the ANZ rural banking 
program. Section 3.2 explains the evaluation design and section 3.3 explains the model. 
Section 3.4 illustrates the summary statistics and section 3.5 presents the results. Section 
3.6 highlights some limitations to the study and section 3.7 concludes.
3.1 Background
23The following provides background information on the Solomon Islands , the community 
being researched and ANZ’s rural banking program.
3.1.1 The Solomon Islands
The Solomon Islands is an archipelago of islands located in the Southwest Pacific 
approximately 1900 kilometres northeast of Australia. These islands stretch approximately 
1450 kilometres and constitute both mountainous and low lying terrain. The climate is
23 Background information sourced from the United States Department of State 2008 website, viewed 19-12- 
08, <http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/2799.htm>.
52
Chapter 3 -  Welfare Impacts from Access to Formal Micro-Savings Facilities
tropical monsoon. The capital of the country is Honiara, situated on the island of 
Guadalcanal.
The population of the Solomon Islands in 2006 was approximately 552,438 people. The 
majority of these people are Melanesian (93 percent), while the other main ethnic groups 
are Polynesian (4 percent) and Micronesian (1.5 percent). The official language is English, 
however Solomon Islands Pidgin and approximately 118 other languages are also spoken. 
Almost 80 percent of children attend primary school and life expectancy is 62.3 years. 
Approximately 95 percent of the people follow a denomination of Christianity.
The government is a 50 member parliamentary democracy with the prime minister as the 
head of the government and a governor general acting as the representative of the British 
Monarch.
The GDP in 2007 was 270 million Solomon Dollars with an annual growth rate of 10 
percent. The average weekly household expenditure is 449 Solomon Dollars (Darcy, 
Gagahe and Lahari 2006), reflecting an economy largely built on subsistence crops of 
yams, taro, bananas and pineapples. Trade largely comprises of exporting agricultural 
products such as copra, cocoa and palm oil as well as fish and timber and importing fuels, 
food, machinery and transport equipment. The major trading partners are Australia, China, 
South Korea, Thailand and Singapore.
3.1.2 The Community
The community researched consists of 19 similar villages located between 37 and 43 
kilometres east of Honiara, Guadalcanal. There is only one main road in Guadalcanal and 
roads leading into rural villages, which are made from sand, largely diverge from this road. 
The villages have houses with roofs and walls largely made from timber or sago palms. 
Water is sourced from rivers and wells and kerosene lamps are the major form of lighting. 
Vehicle ownership is very rare and people travel predominately on foot or take a van 
(which acts as a bus) from the main road.
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Men engage in agricultural farming and fishing within the area, using the produce for both 
consumption and sale in the Honiara market. Transport of produce to the market is 
undertaken in a communal van or truck. Women generally remain at home and look after 
the house, elderly family members and children. Some assist with the farming while others 
work at small food outlets scattered sparsely throughout the community.
Shopping for daily food that is not harvested is undertaken at small local stores within the 
community while larger consumables are purchased from Honiara. The consumption of 
rice, taro, coconut, kasava, bananas and fish is very common while meat, and to a lesser 
extent consumption of dairy products, is rare.
Clothes are shared between people in the village and purchased second hand from Honiara. 
Any amenities, such as musical instruments or soccer balls are first purchased from Honiara 
and then also shared within the community. The people within the communities are 
religious and attend church on a weekly basis.
In the Solomon Islands there is an informal collective system of responsibility known as the 
‘won-tok’ system. This loosely translates into ‘one-talk’, where people assist other people 
within the same family group, trading area and political persuasion (Meltzoff and LiPuma 
1983). Results from the pilot survey and field interviews with both ANZ clients and ANZ 
staff indicated that the won-tok system is strong within the community and is strongest 
within the immediate family unit, where household expenditure and savings are largely 
designed to benefit the group as opposed to the individual.
3.1.3 ANZ Rural Banking Program (background of the intervention)
The following provides a brief description of the ANZ savings program considered in this 
study. ANZ bank is Australia’s third largest bank and has over 30,000 employees. It 
operates in 27 countries and is the largest bank operating throughout the Pacific Island 
countries.
Rural Banking differs from microfinance as it focuses primarily on providing savings and 
loans for general consumption purposes. Conversely the majority of microfinance
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institutions have focused on issuing credit for entrepreneurial purposes. At the time of the 
survey, there were no other organisations providing rural banking or microfinance services 
to rural communities.
In December 2005 ANZ expanded its rural banking program into the Solomon Islands. 
This initially involved provision of formal savings facilities however in mid-April 2007 
eligible clients were permitted to apply for credit facilities. The bank requires people 
demonstrate a pattern of continuous deposits during a minimum period of 6 months before 
credit will be issued.
This study focuses on the intervention of ANZ’s rural banking savings scheme. At the time 
of the survey, approximately 2500 people held rural banking savings accounts that earn 
interest at 0.5 percent per annum. The total value of deposits was uncertain as ANZ bank 
was unwilling to divulge this information.
The savings account is designed as a commitment device. It encourages people to actively 
save by charging no minimum opening balance or monthly fee while discouraging them to 
withdraw by imposing a withdrawal cost of 6 Solomon Dollars (which represents 
approximately 1.34 percent of the average weekly rural household expenditure24). Funds 
can only be accessed through the rural banking truck or at the ANZ branch in Honiara. 
Critically, the rural bank only comes into the village once every two weeks, and as villages 
are located in remote areas, rural clients are unlikely to have the time or resources to 
transport themselves to the ANZ branch in Honiara. This reduces the probability that a 
person will withdraw cash every time they have an immediate desire, further encouraging 
clients to use the scheme as a commitment device. Nevertheless, clients are free to 
withdraw funds as they wish.
The rural banking scheme operates by using a mobile bank which travels into the village.
9 SThis ‘mobile’ bank is an ANZ truck carrying deposit slips, loan request forms and daily
24 Per the official Solomon Island Household Income and Expenditure Survey (2005/6), the average weekly 
rural household expenditure was 449 Solomon Dollars (Darcy et al. 2006). Average weekly household 
expenditure was used in this calculation as the data is considered more reliable than average weekly income 
(Abbott 2008).
2:1 Loan request forms were only provided to clients in the Solomon Islands after April 2007.
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cash takings. It reaches villages fortnightly and operates as a bank with bank tellers sitting 
inside the truck and serving clients waiting outside the truck. After transactions are 
completed, the truck moves onto the next village. The number of villages a truck visits in a 
day depends on the distance of villages from the truck’s base of operations. At day’s end, 
tellers manually enter the day’ s transactions into the ANZ computer system.
Given village life generally revolves around subsistence agriculture, many clients are 
farmers who are likely to be located near the family home. Hence ANZ’s rural banking 
program is convenient as clients can deposit funds or receive loans when the truck arrives 
at the village.
3.2 Evaluation Design
This evaluation follows a post-test only cross-sectional quasi-experimental approach. The 
data used in the study was gathered through an independent survey (from mid-April 2007 to 
mid-May 2007) o f 268 participants in 11 villages who were offered and opened savings 
accounts between January 2006 and mid-March 2006 (time 1) and 213 participants in 8 
villages who were offered and opened savings accounts between March 2007 and mid- 
April 2007 (time 2). Refer figures 3.1 and 3.2 for details o f village location.
The 213 participants in the 8 villages are considered control village clients living in control 
villages as they accepted intervention (access to formal savings facilities) just prior to the 
survey. Intervention w ill not have had an immediate impact (across the dependent 
variables measured26) on these control village clients. The 268 participants in 11 villages 
are considered treatment village clients who live in treatment villages as they accepted 
intervention approximately a year prior to control village clients.
26 The dependent variable is “not experiencing difficulty involved in paying for particular items” during the 
12 months prior to the survey. Refer Section 3.3 for more details on dependent variables.
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Figure 3.1: Map of Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands
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Figure 3.2: Surveyed Villages in Guadalcanal
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27 Figure 3.2 provides a map of the approximate locality of treatment and control villages relative to each 
other. T1 to T il denotes treatment villages 1 to 11 respectively. Cl to C8 denotes control villages 1 to 8 
respectively. The distance between the turn off to treatment villages and control villages is 6km.
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Analysis is undertaken by comparing household data gathered from clients in treatment 
villages to household data gathered from clients in control villages. Ideally, information 
relating to non-client households in treatment and control villages would also have been 
gathered enabling comparison of all households between treatment and control villages 
(thus allowing consideration of spillover effects and reducing issues related to selection 
bias). However, due to budgetary constraints, non-client data was not gathered for people 
in control villages. This approach of not considering characteristics of non-clients is 
similar to the approach taken in other studies that compare treatment group clients to 
control group clients (see for example Nino-Zarazüa 2007).
Villages are located in the same region of Guadalcanal. During the survey process, it was 
confirmed that all interviewees lived at the same place since March 2006. Furthermore, as 
interviewers selected survey respondents directly from their own homes, treatment village 
clients do not include people who move from other villages to treatment villages to access 
formal savings facilities.
As data is collected in one time period, this cross-sectional design may suffer from bias due 
to non-random program placement. Hence, to validate the study’s design, it must be 
illustrated to a reasonable degree that treatment and control villages were statistically 
similar pre-intervention and selection of treatment villages by ANZ at time 1 were not due 
to any observable or unobservable characteristics that are correlated with the dependent 
variable. Thus, section 3.2.1 considers the potential bias from the non-random placement 
of micro-savings into villages.
Cross-sectional studies may also suffer from bias due to selection bias28. Hence, it must 
also be illustrated that clients within control villages who accepted savings facilities at time 
2 would also have accepted savings facilities at time 1 and that non-clients in control 
villages who did not accept savings facilities at time 2 would not have accepted savings 
facilities at time 1. Thus section 3.2.2 suggests reasons as to why clients and non-clients in 
control villages at time 2 are likely to have remained clients and non-clients at time 1 
respectively.
28 i.e. bias due to the process involved in selecting clients.
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The dependent variable used in this study is ‘not experiencing difficulty involved in paying 
for particular items’ during the 12 months prior to the survey.
3.2.1 Considering Potential Bias from Village Selection
The 19 treatment and control villages were selected for analysis in this study as they were 
most likely to form a natural quasi-experiment. For example, the approximately one year 
time frame between when people in treatment and control villages were offered formal 
savings facilities is sufficiently long to estimate impacts from access to formal savings 
facilities. Additionally, none of the villages were offered formal savings by another 
institution, hence reducing possible substitution bias.
Given the cross-sectional nature of the study, where the survey was undertaken at time 2, 
there was no possibility to gather information at time 1. Nevertheless, it is important to 
illustrate that pre-intervention (time 1), village level characteristics are statistically similar 
between the average control and treatment village. Hence, there was a concerted attempt to 
gather time 1 observable data from external sources to no avail“ . In the absence of other 
data, another option is to use time-invariant observable characteristics to show that this 
similarity exists at both time 1 and time 2. Table 3.1 uses balancing tests to demonstrate 
that time-invariant observable characteristics collected from survey respondents are 
statistically similar between the average control and treatment village' . Indeed, there was 
only 1 variable from a total of 19 that was statistically different (at the 10 percent level) 
when undertaking analysis using t-tests. Variables analysed include household 
demographic composition (such as age and number of people, children and workers), 
educational levels and proxies for wealth (such as quality of household walls, roofs and 
bedrooms)' .
29 Refer Appendix 3A for investigation undertaken to source relevant information.
30 Note that table 3.2 considers the similarity between the average treatment and control village client at the 
individual level while a review of table 3.2a illustrates the similarity in the distribution of answers provided 
by treatment and control village clients. These tables are considered in section 3.2.2.
31 Note some of these characteristics might be time-variant. Refer limitations section 3.6. Also note that 
while table 3.1 highlights the change in income is statistically the same between the average treatment group 
member and average control group member, there is a strong positive correlation between those people who 
stated they saved more (illustrated in section 3.5.2) and those people who experienced a greater change in 
their income (R2 of 0.7961).
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Clearly, using only time-invariant observable characteristics to estimate similarity between 
control and treatment villages is not ideal. Specifically, the inability to test similarity of all 
observable characteristics and unobservable characteristics between control and treatment 
groups pre-intervention is an inherent limitation experienced by other cross-sectional 
studies (MkNelly and Lippold 1998; Nino-Zarazüa 2007).
The close proximity of these villages increases the possibility that village level 
characteristics were on average, similar across treatment and control villages pre­
intervention. For example, villages contain consumable items purchased from the same 
market, consist of people employed in the same industries and two large schools are located 
within both treatment and control villages. This approach of using “geographical criterion” 
to suggest homogeneity of groups is used in other cross-sectional studies (see for example 
Nino-Zarazüa 2007). Additionally, some observable village level characteristics (such as 
distance to markets, access to services and the number of houses) are unlikely to change 
over the short-term.
The analysis of time-invariant characteristics and the close proximity of the villages suggest 
similarity exists between the average treatment and control village pre-intervention. 
Nevertheless, there is no time 1 data available to corroborate this claim. Hence, if 
treatment villages have characteristics that make it more (less) difficult for people to pay 
for particular items relative to control villages, then results will be downwardly (upwardly) 
biased.
If ANZ are taken at their word, there is no unobservable reason why certain villages were 
selected for intervention before others. Indeed, ANZ stated that the only observable reason 
why treatment villages were offered formal savings facilities before control villages was 
because the road leading into treatment villages was upgraded prior to initial intervention, 
enabling the road to then support the ANZ truck. The road leading into control villages 
was upgraded approximately seven months after initial intervention. The road leading to 
treatment villages was upgraded first due to its closer proximity to Honiara (37km) relative 
to the control villages (43km). Note that there is only one main road in Honiara and most 
roads in rural areas diverge from this road (refer figures 3.1 and 3.2).
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Unobservable reasons (such as people in treatment villages having better political 
connections to local government) for the road upgrade to treatment villages before control 
villages appears improbable as the only reason certain roads were upgraded by the 
government prior to others was due to their closer proximity to Honiara. Moreover, roads 
leading into villages closer to Honiara were upgraded prior to roads leading into treatment 
villages and roads leading into villages further away from Honiara were upgraded after 
roads leading into control villages.
Bias could occur if the road upgrade raised incomes or savings and hence influenced 
dependent variables (i.e. through resulting in lower perceived difficulty in paying for 
particular items in treatment villages relative to control villages)'\ To consider this, 
treatment and control village clients were asked “Did household income decrease, 
experience no change or increase between January 2006 and March 2007 relative to the 
period between January 2005 to January 2006?” Results in table 3.1 (see ‘income change’ 
variable) highlight answers were statistically similar between the average treatment village 
and average control village. Admittedly, it might be difficult for people to accurately recall 
income levels from a year prior to the survey33. However, given the lack of income data 
pre-intervention at time 1, this was the most practical approach to show that the road 
upgrade in treatment villages has not resulted in increased income among the average 
treatment village household relative to the average control village household.
The road leading into treatment villages is 37km from Honiara while the road leading into 
control villages is 43km from Honiara. The range of distances to treatment villages from 
the main road is 550 metres to 1700 metres while the range of distances to control villages 
from the main road is 800 metres to 1550 metres (refer figures 3.1 and 3.2).
32 It is possible that better roads could intluence non-income related activities such as improving the ability of 
people to keep in regular contact with friends who own shops and can provide discounts on gifts. This may 
in-turn reduce the difficulty involved in paying for particular gifts at Easter, Christmas or for Birthdays. If 
this is the case, then treatment group members may find it easier to pay for particular items relative to control 
group members and results will be upwardly biased.
3 As the income change figures are based on retrospective analysis, these figures should be interpreted with 
caution. Indeed, literature shows that retrospective levels and changes in income may be different to actual 
changes in income (Nakata, Sawada and Tanaka 2009). A paper by Gibson and Kim (2009) also suggests that 
changes are more difficult to recall than levels of income. Hence, if the income change figures recorded in 
this study are inaccurate and the average treatment group member actually experienced a higher change in 
income than the average control group member during the intervention period, the impact of intervention 
would be upwardly biased.
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When considering the impact that proximity to Honiara from villages may have on 
dependent variables, it is time rather than distance that matters. For instance, village elders 
explained trucks (similar to the ANZ truck) and normal sedans do not use roads leading 
into villages. Instead people in these villages travel predominately on foot between their 
village and the main road. Conversely, if a villager has to travel into town, they take a van 
which passes along the main road and is easily accessible to all clients. Clearly the time 
taken to walk is longer than the time taken to travel on a van34.
The impact that proximity to Honiara from villages has on the dependent variables can be 
considered in two stages. Firstly, bias could occur if the travel time from treatment and 
control villages to the main road influences the difficulty involved in paying for particular 
items '. An average person walks at approximately 5 km per hour. Hence the travel time 
to the closest and the farthest treatment village from the main road is approximately 7 
minutes and 20 minutes respectively' . The travel time to the closest and the farthest 
control village from the main road is approximately 10 minutes and 19 minutes 
respectively . The distance (and hence time) between the average treatment village and 
the main road is statistically similar to the distance between the average control village and 
the main road (refer table 3.1). Further, when considering control and treatment villages 
separately, regression analysis undertaken in Appendix 3B illustrates distance (and hence 
time) to the main road from the village does not significantly influence the large majority of 
dependent variables .
Bias could also occur if the time taken to travel the 6 kilometres between the turn offs to 
treatment villages and control villages on the main road influences the difficulty involved 
in paying for particular items (refer figure 3.2). Assuming a van travels at an average
34 The van costs the same regardless of whether a person is picked up at the cut off point leading into 
treatment villages or into control villages.
35 Refer figure 3.2.
36 Calculated as 550 metres/(5000metres/60 minutes) for the closest control village and calculated as 1700 
metres/(5000metres /60) for the farthest treatment village.
7 Calculated as 800 metres /(5000 metres/60 minutes) for the closest treatment village and calculated as 1550 
metres/(5000 metres/60 minutes) for the farthest control village.
3K Distance only influenced the difficulty involved in paying for 4 out of the 25 items.
39 Recall, the treatment villages are located 37km from Honiara and control villages are located 43km from 
Honiara.
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speed of 80km/h on the main Honiara Road, the travel time between the turn offs to 
treatment and control villages is approximately 6 minutes40. If the distance (and hence 
time) from the treatment villages and control villages to the main road does not influence 
the majority of dependent variables (as illustrated in appendix 3B) between a margin of 7 
minutes to 20 minutes and a margin of 10 minutes to 19 minutes respectively, then it is 
reasonable to assume the additional 6 minutes it takes to travel between the turn offs to the 
treatment and control villages on the Honiara road would also not influence the dependent 
variable. Further, it would be easier to travel on a van (for the 6 minutes) between the turn 
off points than travel by foot between the main road and the village. Hence the difference 
in distance between the control and treatment villages from Honiara is unlikely to influence 
the difficulty involved in paying for particular items.
Given the only reason why certain villages were chosen over others was due to a seven 
month gap in road development, that differences in the large majority of time-invariant 
observable characteristics between treatment village clients and control village clients at the 
village level are statistically insignificant and that villages are within very close proximity 
to each other and pay the same local prices, the likelihood of bias from non-random 
program placement is reduced. However, if the slightly higher quality of roads leading into 
treatment villages over control villages during the seven month period, the closer proximity 
of treatment villages to Honiara relative to control villages, or any other differences, 
reduces the difficulty associated with paying for selected items in household in treatment 
villages, results will be upwardly biased.
3.2.2 Considering Potential Bias from Selection of Individuals within Villages
During the survey, clients in control villages were asked if given the option, whether they, 
or any other household member, would have opened savings accounts a year ago. Only 
respondents who answered ‘yes’ were included in the survey, thus reducing the likelihood 
of selection bias. As opposed to accepting credit facilities, there is no cost in opening a 
rural banking savings account. Hence it is reasonable to assume someone who indicated 
they would have opened a savings account a year ago, would in-fact have opened a savings 
account a year ago. However if clients in control villages would not have opened savings
40 Calculated as 80km/60minutes x 6 km, where the 6 km represents the difference in distance between the 
turn-off points on the main Honiara road to the control and treatment villages.
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accounts a year ago, and they experience greater (lower) difficulty paying for particular 
items, then results may be downwardly (upwardly) biased.
There is the possibility people who did not open a savings account in control villages (non­
clients) may have opened a savings account a year earlier. Again the likelihood of selection 
bias is reduced as there is no financial or time cost involved in opening a savings account 
(recall that the ANZ truck comes directly to the village). Nevertheless, if non-clients in 
control villages would have opened formal savings facilities if given the option a year ago, 
and they experience greater (lower) difficulty paying for particular items, then results will 
likely be upwardly (downwardly) biased.
To support the argument that selection bias is unlikely to be problematic, table 3.2 
demonstrates time-invariant observable characteristics, including wealth proxies, are 
insignificantly different at a household level in treatment and control villages41. Further, a 
review of table 3.2a shows similarities in the distribution of the time-invariant observable 
characteristics between the average treatment and control village household. Hence, due to 
their time-invariant nature, these characteristics are also likely to be insignificantly different 
between the average treatment and control village household at time 1.
It is unlikely that more control village clients would open a savings account because they 
had greater time to hear about ANZ rural banking than treatment village clients. Recall 
people considered ‘clients’ in control and treatment villages were those that opened a 
savings account during the period approximately two and half months after initial 
intervention. Importantly, very few people in treatment villages (those in only 17 
households42) became clients between two and half months to approximately a year after 
initial intervention. This period of time should be sufficient to convince any other potential 
clients to open savings accounts. Consequently, it is unlikely that many more people in 
control villages, relative to people in treatment villages, would become clients in the two 
and half months post initial intervention into their villages, because they had greater time to 
hear about ANZ rural banking.
41 Arguably some of these characteristics may be time variant; refer limitations, section 3.7. 
12 These households are not included in the 268 treatment village clients.
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Is it possible people in control village had more time to hear about the ANZ rural banking 
and hence would be less likely to open a savings account? Given ANZ’s high demand for 
micro-savings products, illustrated in part through an expansion of similar services across 
other areas of Guadalcanal, this is also unlikely.
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Further, the ‘sales pitch’ ANZ uses to attract clients is similar across all target villages. 
Initially the village elders are informed about the program. Subsequently, the ANZ rural 
banking team leader (who was the team leader since initial intervention) outlines the 
benefits of saving with ANZ bank. Villagers are then given the option to open savings 
accounts. Consequently, people in control villages are unlikely to have received a more 
refined marketing strategy than people in treatment villages.
Importantly, ANZ confirmed none of the treatment village clients closed a bank account 
during the one year intervention period. Hence there were no program dropouts amongst 
the treatment village client households. As such, it is reasonable to assume if control 
village clients were offered savings accounts pre-intervention, they would also not close 
their bank accounts. Thus bias from program dropouts is unlikely to be problematic.
3.2.3 Summary
As in any cross-sectional study, it is difficult to eliminate bias related to non-random 
program placement and selection bias. In particular, given the lack of time 1 data, it is 
difficult to prove that all observable village level characteristics were similar pre­
intervention between the average treatment village and control village and non-clients in 
control villages at time 2 would have been non-clients at time 1. This section has 
considered these issues and highlighted potential bias in the ensuing results.
3.3 Model
Given multiple household members may hold a savings account, enumerators followed a 
survey sequence where they interviewed the eldest male account holder. If male account 
holders were unavailable, a female savings account holder was interviewed43. There was a 
bias towards obtaining male responses over female responses as the Solomon Islands is a 
patriarchal society (Scales 2003) and hence males are considered to have the most 
household power. Other studies have also focused on particular genders if they are more 
likely engaged in the decision making process (Ashraf et al. 2007). The age and sex of 
survey respondents as well as the age of the household head were, on average, statistically
43 All savings account holders were not interviewed due to financial constraints.
69
Chapter 3 -  Welfare Impacts from Access to Formal Micro-Savings Facilities
similar between answers provided by clients in treatment and control villages (refer table 
3.1).
This study first investigates whether access to formal savings facilities reduces the 
perception of difficulty involved in paying for particular items. These ‘items’ were 
identified through analysis of literature and interviews with ANZ staff and clients and were 
considered areas where household members are most likely to spend savings. This study 
tests whether the ‘perceived levels of difficulty’ involved in paying for selected items 
varies between treatment and control village client households.
The set of selected ‘k’ items were categorised into four modules. These are highlighted in 
table 3.3.
Table 3.3 - Items Considered in the Survey (Categorised by Module)
Module Selected 'k' Items
Education School fees, school shoes, school books, 
school clothes, stationary, children’s pocket m oney
Events Easter, C hristm as, birthdays, church activities
Other Kitchen utensils, too ls  used to harvest and sell produce
Clothing Clothes fo r friends, clothes fo r fam ily m em bers, 
C lothes fo r the survey respondent
During the survey, treatment village clients and control village clients were asked if their 
household44 spent money on items in table 3.3. If they answer no, the observation was not 
included in any analysis45. If the answer was yes, they were asked how difficult it was for 
household members to pay for them. For example after asking the survey respondent “In 
the last 12 months, did the household spend money on school fees?”, assuming the answer 
was yes, the next questions was “Have household members experienced difficulty paying 
for school fees?”. Potential answers include ‘yes’, ‘sometimes’ and ‘no’. To generate a 
greater sense of magnitudes, and because a very small percentage of people answered ‘no’ 
(refer figures 3.3 to 3.646), answers to ‘sometimes’ and ‘no’ were combined to provide a
44 Overall household expenditure was considered due to the ‘won-tok’ system in the Solomon Islands.
4:1 Hence the number of observations varies depending on which ‘item’ is considered. Note, a person who did 
not purchase an item either does not want the item or cannot afford the item (i.e. has 100 percent difficulty). 
The results section considers this possibility.
46 Refer section 3.4 for figures 3.3 to 3.6.
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binary outcome47. Hence in the data set, a ‘yes’ answer equals 0, implying payments were 
more difficult, and a ‘sometimes or no’ answer equals 1, implying payments were less 
difficult.
An OLS model is used to analyse the majority of results. For comparative purposes, a 
binary probit model is also used. The binary probit model is a linear probability model that 
can be used to calculate the probability of a change in the dependent variable due to 
intervention.
To measure impact, the following equation is regressed:
Div = c + y±xvl + Y2x iv2 + u iv Eq 3.1
Div represents the difficulty relating to the payment of item ‘k’, as perceived by survey 
respondent ‘i’ in village V  and equals 0 if payments are ‘more difficult’ and 1 if payments 
are ‘less difficult’. Hence the dependent variable is ‘did not have difficulty paying for item 
k’ as perceptions of difficulty are ordered in decreasing difficulty. xvl is a dummy variable 
representing the intervention and equals 1 for treatment villages and 0 for control villages.
x iv2 represents a vector of observable characteristics potentially impacting on the difficulty 
involved in paying for items as perceived by survey respondent ‘i’ in village V . Some 
variables include those directly related to the interviewee (i.e. the interviewee’s age, sex 
and level of education). These were primarily included to control for the possibility that a 
person’s characteristics may influence how they answer questions. For example, a person 
with higher education may answer questions differently to a person with lower education. 
Similarly, a male or older person may answer questions differently to a female or younger 
person. A-priori, there is no evidence to conclude whether the signs of these variables will 
be positive or negative when regression equation 3.1.
17 The ratio of the Os, Is and 2s across all answers is 7:53:41. When the Os are collapsed into the Is, the ratio 
is 60:41. If the Is are collapsed into the 2s, the ratio would be 7:94. Clearly, the ratio of 60:41 more closely 
resembles the original ratio of 7:53:41 relative to the ratio of 7:94. Hence, to construct a binary variable, the 
Os were collapsed into the Is as opposed to the Is being collapsed into the 2s
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Proxies for wealth are also included as variables within x iv2. It is expected these variables 
would be positive, implying wealthier households will find it less difficult to pay for 
particular items than poorer households. Changes in income experienced by the household 
in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period 24 months to 12 months prior to 
the survey were also included. Households that experience an overall increase in income 
are expected to have less difficulty paying for particular items relative to households that 
have not had an overall increase in income. Clearly, the influence of this variable is 
dependent on other factors such as the magnitude of the change and a household’s level of 
income relative to the income of other households. Unfortunately, due to the cross- 
sectional nature of the study, such information could not be gathered.
Distance from the villages to the main road was included within xiv2 as people who have a 
shorter distance to walk may find carrying particular items easier than people who have a 
longer distance to walk.
Additionally, when considering specific modules, other variables are sometimes included 
within xiv2. In relation to the education module, the number of children and the number of 
children attending school are included as variables. In regards to payments relating to 
Easter, Christmas and birthday expenditure, the number of children is included as a 
variable. It is expected that due to a higher financial burden, the greater the children, and 
greater the children attending school (in relation to the education module), the less difficult 
it is to pay for particular items48.
Note, assuming there is no significant bias relating to non-random program placement and 
from selection bias, the possibility of significant differences between unobservable and 
observable household and village level characteristics of the average treatment and control 
village client are reduced. Nevertheless, as previously noted, the failure to include all other 
potential observable characteristics and unobservable characteristics that influence the 
dependent variable in equation 3.1 (i.e. omitted variable bias) is an inherent limitation 
experienced by cross-sectional studies (see for example MkNelly and Lippold 1998).
4X Clearly this may not hold true in every case as wealthier households can more easily afford costs involving 
children than poorer households.
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Finally, this study determines whether treatment village client households save more, 
experience ‘no change’ or save less due to access to a formal savings account, by asking the 
following question: “Has opening a savings account with ANZ encouraged the household 
to save more, less, or hasn't changed the amount the household normally would save?”.
3.4 Summary Statistics
The following notes some key summary statistics relating to treatment and control village 
client households illustrated in tables 3.2 and 3.2a.
The average age of the survey respondent is 37 years and 56 percent of respondents are 
male. Approximately 80 percent of households have more than 4 people living in their 
homes and 88 percent of households have at least 2 or more working adults49. Over 92 
percent of households have 1 or more children and over 90 percent of households have at 
least 1 child enrolled at school. The average distance from the main road to control villages 
that each person had to travel was 1089 metres while the average distance from the main 
road to treatment villages was 1100 metres. Refer tables 3.2 and 3.2a for other statistics.
The following considers whether the majority of survey respondents in treatment and 
control villages answered ‘yes’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘no’ across all modules when asked 
whether they had difficulty paying for items in table 3.3.
The majority of survey respondents in treatment and control villages answered ‘yes’ when 
asked whether paying for items in the educational module was difficult. For instance, 78 
percent, 74 percent and 75 percent of treatment village clients answered ‘yes’ when asked 
whether paying for school fees, stationary and children’s pocket money was difficult 
(figure 3.3). In comparison, across clients in control villages (figure 3.3), the percentage of 
people answering ‘yes’ was slightly greater across all these items (86 percent for school 
fees, 76 percent for stationary and 80 percent for children’s pocket money).
49 Work is defined as any form of employment, be it part-time or full-time, that provides a source of income.
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Figure 3.3: Perceptions of Difficulty Involving Payments for Educational Items across Treatment (T) and Control 
(C) Groups50
100%
School Fees School Fees School Shoes School Shoes School Books School Books School School Stationary (T) Stationary Children’s Children's 
(T) (C) (T) (C) (T) (C) Clothes (T) Clothes (C) (C) pocket pocket
money (T) money (C)
The high level of difficulty associated with paying for school fees is understandable as they 
are expensive (UNICEF 2006). Similarly pocket money for children, who may use money 
to buy lollies and food, may also be expensive. This expense becomes more pronounced if 
lunch is purchased from the canteen on a regular basis. However the high level of 
difficulty associated with paying for stationary related items is surprising. It is possible 
children continuously require pens and pencils in addition to the more expensive calculators 
and hole punchers.
Approximately 60 percent and 62 percent of survey respondents in treatment villages 
respectively answered ‘yes’ when asked whether payments relating to school shoes and 
school books was difficult (figure 3.3). This percentage in control villages increases to 66 
percent for school shoes, and 72 percent for school books (figure 3.3). Relative to school 
fees and children's pocket money, the percentage of people answering ‘yes’ to these items 
may be lower because text books and shoes are shared and sold second hand between 
students and members of the same family. This explanation is plausible due to the ‘won- 
tok' system prevalent in the Solomon Islands.
50 Figure 3.3 illustrates the percentage of treatment (T) and control village (C) respondents who answered 
“yes”, “sometimes” and “no” when asked, “did your household experience difficulty paying for educational 
related items in the last 12 months”.
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While the majority of people answered ‘yes’ when asked was it difficult to pay for items in 
the education module, an exception appears to be that approximately 63 percent of all 
respondents stated that it was ‘sometimes’ difficult paying for school clothes (figure 3.3). 
People may find purchases of school clothes relatively easier as they occur largely through 
second hand dealings within the community51 such as being purchased or gifted from a 
friend who no longer requires them. Further, school clothing items, such as t-shirts, socks 
and shorts are not very expensive.
Similar to the education module, the majority of survey respondents in treatment and 
control villages answered ‘yes’ when asked whether paying for items in the events module 
was difficult. To illustrate, 74 percent, 72 percent and 75 percent of survey respondents in 
treatment villages answered ‘yes’ when asked whether paying for Easter, Christmas and 
birthday related activities was difficult (figure 3.4). For survey respondents in control 
villages, the percentage of people answering ‘yes’ was greater across all these items by 
between 5 and 10 percent relative to people in treatment villages. An exception appears to 
be that survey respondents are approximately evenly split between answering ‘yes’ and 
‘sometimes’ when asked whether payments relating to church related activities was 
difficult.
The difference in difficulty involved with payments related to Easter, Christmas and 
birthday related activities compared with church related activities may be due to differences 
in costs and frequency of payments. Church activities represent low monetary value 
voluntary contributions; if people are short of money they can forgo contributing money for 
a week. Conversely, due to the ‘won-tok’ system, people are expected to provide gifts to 
friends and family. This requires a fixed price commitment, and hence, Christmas, Easter 
and birthday related expenses involve a greater cost. Consequently, it is reasonable to 
expect more people answer ‘yes’ when asked if it is difficult to pay for Christmas, Easter 
and birthday related presents relative to church related activities.
51 This was verified during the pre-survey research phase.
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Figure 3.4: Perceptions of Difficulty Involving Payments for Event Related Activities across Treatment (T) and 
Control (C) Groups52
100%
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As opposed to the education and events modules where people generally answered ‘yes’ 
when asked was it difficult paying for particular items, approximately 74 percent of survey 
respondents in treatment and control villages suggested that it was ‘sometimes’ difficult to 
pay for kitchen utensils and tools used to harvest and sell produce (figure 3.5). This is 
reasonable as relative to other payments, expenditure on kitchen utensils, such as infrequent 
purchases of cutlery or plates is inexpensive. Similarly payments relating to tools used to 
harvest and sell produce appear predominately to be for inexpensive items . It is likely 
costs largely relate to those involved in transporting items into town; such costs are shared 
between members of the community.
52 Figure 3.4 illustrates the percentage of treatment (T) and control village (C) respondents who answered 
“yes”, “sometimes” and “no” when asked, “did your household experience difficulty paying for events 
related items in the last 12 months”.
r ' Tools used to harvest and sell produce involve items such as shovels, picks and spades. Additionally the 
cost of transporting produce was also included as an answer to this question. Hence it would have been more 
appropriate to describe this item as costs involved in harvesting and selling produce. Nevertheless, 
interviewers were asked to ensure transport costs were included in the definition of tools used to harvest and 
sell produce. The ambiguity in the definition makes it difficult to ascertain whether payments largely related 
to inexpensive or expensive items.
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Figure 3.5: Perceptions of Difficulty Involving Payments for Kitchen Utensils and Tools across Treatment (T) and 
Control (C) Groups54
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Finally, approximately 80 percent and 76 percent of survey respondents in treatment and 
control villages respectively suggested that it was ‘sometimes’ difficult to pay for items in 
the clothing module (figure 3.6). This can at least partly be attributed to the fact that most 
items of clothing in the Solomon Islands are second hand and relatively inexpensive^3.
Figure 3.6: Perceptions of Difficulty Involving Payments for Clothes across Treatment (T) and Control (C) 
Groups'6
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90%
Clothes for Survey Clothes for Survey Clothes for a Family Clothes for a Family Clothes fora Friend Clothes for a Friend
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M Figure 3.5 illustrates the percentage of treatment (T) and control village (C) respondents who answered 
“yes”, “sometimes” and “no” when asked, “did your household experience difficulty paying for kitchen 
utensils and tools used to harvest and sell produce in the last 12 months”.
^  There was no shop in the Solomon Islands that sold new clothes.
Ml Figure 3.6 illustrates the percentage of treatment (T) and control village (C) respondents who answered 
“yes”, “sometimes” and “no” when asked, “did your household experience difficulty paying for clothing 
items in the last 12 months”.
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3.5 Results
This section first considers aggregate results (tables 3.4 to 3.6a), then considers whether 
access to formal savings facilities has encouraged households to commit to saving more 
(tables 3.7 and 3.8) and finally analyses heterogeneous results (tables 3.11 to 3.13)57. 
Further, tables 3.Cl to 3.Clb, illustrated in Appendix 3C, highlight the aggregate results
c o
when undertaking regressions using ordered probit specifications . Note the number of 
observations (or data used) varies depending on whether survey respondents (interviewees) 
answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ when asked whether household members spent money on a particular 
item (illustrated in table 3.3) in the last 12 months.
3.5.1 Aggregate Results
Results demonstrate welfare impacts of intervention59 are mixed across and within different 
modules60. On average, intervention appears to have a positive significant impact by 
reducing the difficulty involved in paying for some items in the education module, most 
items in the events module and tools used to harvest and sell produce. On average, 
intervention fails to have a significant impact on the difficulty involved in paying for 
kitchen utensils and purchase of clothes.
Table 3.4 indicates intervention significantly decreases the difficulty involved in paying for 
school fees, school shoes and school books by 7.7 percent, 7.2 percent and 10.8 percent 
respectively. Note a positive coefficient change implies the difficulty associated with 
paying for items is lower61. Table 3.4a illustrates the treatment variables maintain similar 
levels of significance, directional impact and magnitudes when using a binary probit model.
51 Tables 3.9 and 3.10 represent the results of balance tests (discussed later in this section).
58 Under these specifications, D ki in equation 3.1 equals 1 if a survey respondent answered ‘yes’, 2 if a survey 
respondent answered ‘sometimes’ and 3 if a survey respondent answered ‘no’ when asked, in the last 12 
months, did household members have any difficulty paying for a particular item listed in table 3. The levels 
of significance for the treatment dummies across all items are similar between the ordered probit and probit
models.
59 When testing the effects of time exposed to treatment, results suggest that the impact of intervention was 
not consistently different among people who opened savings accounts earlier than those who opened savings 
accounts later. Instead, impact of intervention across items was at times more and at times less significant 
among people who opened savings accounts earlier relative to those who opened savings accounts later. 
f>0 If all people who answered no when asked “did the household had purchased an item in the last 12 months” 
had 100% difficulty, the majority of variables will retain a similar level of significance and directional impact 
(only two variables became insignificant). Refer Appendix 3D for further details.
61 As ordered responses for the dependent variable increase from 0 to 1, perceptions of difficulty are reduced.
78
Chapter 3 -  Welfare Impacts from Access to Formal Micro-Savings Facilities
Table 3.4 - Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Education
OLS
All Survey Respondents
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
School Fees School Shoes School Books School Clothes Stationary Children's 
pocket money
Treatment Dummy 0 .077* 0 .072 * 0 . 108** -0.011 0.016 0.043
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033)
Number of Children -0.014 0.031 -0.003 0.013 0.031 -0.001
(0.023) (0.032) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.017)
Number of Children Going to School 0.039 -0.003 -0.003 -0.029 -0.016 -0 .049* *
(0.029) (0.041) (0.038) (0.049) (0.045) (0.023)
Food Consumed " 0 .025* * * -0.002 0.005 0.007 -0.009 -0.006
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005)
Roof Quality AA 0 .083* 0 . 138* 0.082 0.032 0.035 -0.005
(0.040) (0.071) (0.062) (0.055) (0.047) (0.043)
Wall Quality AA 0.022 -0.050 0.006 -0.030 -0.052 0.048
(0.038) (0.068) (0.054) (0.051) (0.046) (0.033)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.069 0.036 0.068 -0.054 -0.009 -0.050
(0.045) (0.055) (0.077) (0.051) (0.071) (0.050)
Interviewee's Age -0.001 0 .007 * * 0 . 005** 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Male 0.008 0 . 132* * 0.091 -0.009 -0.008 0.032
(0.054) (0.054) (0.071) (0.072) (0.053) (0.047)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.010 -0.002 -0.018 -0.052 0.010 0 .056**
(0.026) (0.036) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.017)
Income Change'" (self reported) 0 . 102** 0 .069 * 0 . 137* * 0 . 132* * 0.044 0.039
(0.026) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.041) (0.031)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.013 0.025 -0.040 0.024 -0.002 -0.005
(0.055) (0.066) (0.067) (0.048) (0.055) (0.049)
Data UsedA 449 425 442 449 449 449
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.183 0.374 0.337 0 668 0 254 0 227
Adjusted RA2 0.053 0.027 0.030 0.011 0.016 0.040
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered at the 
village level.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult to 
pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it less difficult 
to pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls 
are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms in 
the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the higher 
the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and are 
hence denoted 0,1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
a a a a Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 
3.2 for further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, panna, 
banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more valuable, if 
any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded 
for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence the higher the value 
of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
'" Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months to 12 
months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0,1 and 2 respectively in the data set. 
An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
** Significance at the 5 percent level.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.4a - Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Education 
Binary Probit 
All Survey Respondents
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
School Fees School Shoes School Books School Clothes Stationary Children's
pocket money
Marginal Effects (Treatment Dummy) 0.084** 0.073* 0.109** -0.011 0.016 0.045
Treatment Dummy 0.355** 0.196* 0.303** -0.029 0.050 0.159
(0.160) (0.107) (0.115) (0.095) (0.110) (0.112)
Number of Children -0.066 0.087 -0.006 0.040 0.097 -0.006
(0.105) (0.087) (0.081) (0.100) (0.084) (0.053)
Number of Children Going to School 0.158 -0.011 -0.010 -0.085 -0.050 -0.172**
(0.119) (0.110) (0.106) (0.140) (0.128) (0.083)
Food Consumed " 0.103*** -0.006 0.013 0.020 -0.028 -0.019
(0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.023) (0.032) (0.019)
Roof Quality AA 0.342** 0.381* 0.245 0.088 0.109 -0.022
(0.163) (0.197) (0.180) (0.149) (0.149) (0.146)
Wall Quality AA 0.112 -0.129 0.024 -0.087 -0.167 0.159
(0.154) (0.186) (0.153) (0.141) (0.142) (0.114)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.270 0.095 0.188 -0.155 -0.035 -0.194
(0.185) (0.145) (0.208) (0.138) (0.220) (0.206)
Interviewee's Age -0.003 0.020*** 0.014** -0.001 -0.002 0.003
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Male 0.021 0.368** 0.264 -0.023 -0.023 0.109
(0.209) (0.146) (0.198) (0.201) (0.167) (0.157)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.039 -0.003 -0.048 -0.147 0.033 0.191**
(0.107) (0.096) (0.078) (0.090) (0.096) (0.059)
Income Change'" (self reported) 0.418*** 0.192** 0.389*** 0.375** 0.139 0.139
(0.107) (0.094) (0.102) (0.119) (0.126) (0.115)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.080 0.068 -0.110 0.064 -0.004 -0.002
(0.215) (0.180) (0.185) (0.135) (0.172) (0.165)
Data UsedA 449 425 442 449 449 449
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.183 0.374 0.337 0.668 0.254 0.227
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row fin parentheses) represents the standard error clustered at the 
village level.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult 
to pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient makes it more likely that the average household finds 
it less difficult to pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls 
are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms in 
the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the higher 
the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and are 
hence denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
a a a a Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer 
section 3.2 for further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, panna, 
banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more valuable, if 
any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded 
for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence the higher the value 
of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
”' Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months to 12 
months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0,1 and 2 respectively in the data set. 
An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
** Significance at the 5 percent level.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level.
80
Chapter 3 -  Welfare Impacts from Access to Formal Micro-Savings Facilities
Table 3.5 highlights intervention significantly decreases the difficult involved in paying for 
Easter, Christmas and birthday related presents by 6.6 percent, 10.0 percent and 9.6 percent 
respectively. However influence of intervention is insignificant regarding difficulty 
associated with payments for church activities. Table 3.5a illustrates the treatment 
variables maintain similar levels of significance, directional impact and magnitudes when 
using a binary probit model.
While intervention had a positive significant impact on some items in the schooling and 
events modules, table 3.6 demonstrates when estimating welfare impacts of intervention 
across clothes, impact is insignificant. This insignificance also applies to payments relating 
to kitchen utensils. However intervention significantly decreases the difficulty associated 
with paying for tools used to harvest and sell produce by 8.5 percent. Table 3.6a illustrates 
the treatment variables maintain similar levels of significance, directional impact and 
magnitudes when using a binary probit model.
Results suggest people save to pay for less frequent higher value items. For instance, 
payments relating to children’s school fees, school books, Christmas, Easter and birthdays 
generally represent one-off annual payments and are of higher perceived value due to the 
emphasis placed on education and religion in the Solomon Islands. The focus on less 
frequent higher value items is not surprising considering each withdrawal costs 6 Solomon 
Dollars thus imposing an explicit cost from withdrawing money frequently.
Conversely, for payments relating to lower value more frequent items, intervention does not 
appear to have the same impact. To illustrate, influence of intervention is insignificant 
when involving purchases of kitchen utensils, expenditure on school stationary, children’s 
pocket money and the almost weekly payment of church activities. Similarly intervention 
does not appear to influence difficulty associated with paying for school clothes and other 
clothing items62.
62 Note, people in the Solomon Islands generally sell second hand clothing items.
81
Chapter 3 -  Welfare Impacts from Access to Formal Micro-Savings Facilities
Table 3.5: Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Events
OLS
All Survey Respondents
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Easter related Christmas related Birthday related Church related
expenses expenses expenses expenses
Treatment Dummy 0.066* 0.100** 0.096** 0.044
(0.034) (0.033) (0.042) (0.044)
Number of Children -0.031** -0.002 -0.006 -0.006
(0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.019)
Food Consumed " 0.002 0.006 -0.010 -0.005
(0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Roof Quality AA 0.037 0.033 0.008 0.001
(0.028) (0.035) (0.029) (0.039)
Wall Quality AA 0.067 0.097** 0.050 -0.013
(0.040) (0.041) (0.038) (0.063)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.035 -0.047 0.048 0.024
(0.066) (0.070) (0.060) (0.085)
Interviewee's Age 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.022 -0.020 0.000 0.073
(0.048) (0.050) (0.047) (0.057)
Interviewee’s Education Level AAA -0.012 -0.037 0.004 -0.053*
(0.023) (0.027) (0.020) (0.026)
Income Change'" (self reported) 0.015 0.033 0.037 0.008
(0.031) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.135** 0.113** 0.005 0.011
(0.043) (0.051) (0.047) (0.051)
Data UsedA 470 471 473 475
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.232 0.242 0.211 0.495
Adjusted RA2 0.021 0.023 -0.001 -0.011
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered at 
the village level.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more 
difficult to pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it 
less difficult to pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls 
are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms 
in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the 
higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and are 
hence denoted 0,1  and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAAA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer 
section 3.2 for further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, 
panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more 
valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 
2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence the 
higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months to 
12 months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0,1 and 2 respectively in the 
data set. An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
** Significance at the 5 percent level.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.5a: Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Events 
Binary Probit
_____________________ All Survey Respondents________________________________________
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Easter related Christmas related Birthday related Church related
expenses expenses expenses expenses
Marginal Effects (Treatment Dummy) 0 .068* * 0 .099* * 0 .096* * 0.0441
Treatment Dummy 0 .232* * 0 .329* * 0 .349* * 0.111
(0.118) (0.110) (0.161) (0.110)
Number of Children -0 . 109* * 0.000 -0.018 -0.016
(0.051) (0.024) (0.049) (0.047)
Food Consumed " 0.012 0.024 -0.037 -0.012
(0.039) (0.026) (0.027) (0.021)
Roof Quality AA 0.129 0.106 0.034 0.004
(0.094) (0.117) (0.105) (0.097)
Wall Quality AA 0 . 224* 0 . 320* * 0.190 -0.033
(0.135) (0.135) (0.129) (0.157)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.149 -0.163 0.157 0.059
(0.254) (0.256) (0.203) (0.215)
Interviewee's Age 0.008 0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Male -0.074 -0.057 -0.007 0.184
(0.156) (0.166) (0.162) (0.142)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.046 -0.121 0.011 -0 . 134* *
(0.075) (0.086) (0.069) (0.065)
Income Change’" (self reported) 0.067 0.111 0.138 0.020
(0.108) (0.100) (0.096) (0.069)
Distance to Village AAAA 0 .457* * 0 .339* * 0.009 0.029
(0.148) (0.159) (0.160) (0.127)
Data UsedA 470 471 473 475
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.232 0.242 0.211 0.495
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered 
at the village level.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more 
difficult to pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient makes it more likely that the average 
household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if 
walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 
bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, 
and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and are 
hence denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAAA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer 
section 3.2 for further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, 
panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more 
valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value 
of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for ’food consumed’. Hence 
the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months to 
12 months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0,1 and 2 respectively in the 
data set. An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
** Significance at the 5 percent level.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.6: Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Kitchen Utensils, Tools and Clothes
OLS
All Survey Respondents
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Kitchen Tools used to Clothes for the Clothes for Clothes for a
utensils harvest and sell survey family friend
produce respondent member
Treatment Dummy 0.016 0 .085** 0.042 0.021 0.034
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.030)
Food Consumed " -0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Roof Quality AA 0.053 0 .057* -0.005 0.014 0.008
(0.034) (0.029) (0.032) (0.021) (0.035)
Wall Quality AA -0.010 0.000 0.040 0.003 0.000
(0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.028) (0.039)
Number of Bedrooms AA 0.003 -0.022 0.004 -0.037 -0.012
(0.047) (0.037) (0.048) (0.042) (0.046)
Interviewee's Age 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.014 -0.006 -0.012 0.020 0.042
(0.033) (0.034) (0.041) (0.034) (0.036)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.018 -0.017 -0.026 -0.016 -0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
Income Change'" (self reported) 0.009 -0.003 -0.026 -0.026 0.002
(0.024) (0.018) (0.034) (0.030) (0.028)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.045 0.049 0.005 0 .087* 0.068
(0.026) (0.030) (0.042) (0.044) (0.051)
Data UsedA 477 478 479 478 467
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.883 0.889 0.879 0.897 0.891
Adjusted RA2 -0.008 0.011 -0.007 0.000 -0.010
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error 
clustered at the village level.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it 
more difficult to pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average 
household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 
1 if walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater 
than 3 bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of 
roofs and walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively 
and are hence denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAAA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. 
Refer section 3.2 for further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, 
taro, panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are 
considered more valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey 
was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a 
number for 'food consumed'. Hence the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
"" Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 
months to 12 months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0 ,1  and 2 
respectively in the data set. An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
** Significance at the 5 percent level.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.6a: Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Kitchen Utensils, Tools and Clothes
Binary Probit
___________________________________ All Survey Respondents________________________________________
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Kitchen Tools used to Clothes for the Clothes for Clothes for a
utensils harvest and survey family friend
sell produce respondent member
Marginal Effects (Treatment Dummy) 0.020 0 .087** 0.043 0.023 0.036
Treatment Dummy 0.102 0 .477* * * 0.214 0.134 0.195
(0.109) (0.119) (0.112) (0.144) (0.161)
Food Consumed " -0.008 -0.001 -0.024 0.013 -0.010
(0.034) (0.035) (0.026) (0.031) (0.035)
Roof Quality AA 0 .280* 0 .323** -0.026 0.095 0.037
(0.163) (0.156) (0.155) (0.118) (0.184)
Wall Quality AA -0.051 -0.019 0.213 0.021 0.005
(0.157) (0.182) (0.173) (0.163) (0.204)
Number of Bedrooms AA 0.018 -0.099 0.005 -0.192 -0.064
(0.248) (0.174) (0.234) (0.202) (0.226)
Interviewee's Age 0.004 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Male -0.061 -0.040 -0.047 0.120 0.233
(0.170) (0.182) (0.199) (0.209) (0.195)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.093 -0.087 -0.125 -0.080 -0.006
(0.101) (0.105) (0.082) (0.101) (0.083)
Income Change'" (self reported) 0.035 -0.034 -0.140 -0.142 0.012
(0.121) (0.106) (0.157) (0.155) (0.147)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.227 0.297 0.041 0 .514** 0.383
(0.152) (0.192) (0.223) (0.243) (0.274)
Data UsedA 477 478 479 478 467
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.883 0.889 0.879 0.897 0.891
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error 
clustered at the village level.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more 
difficult to pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient makes it more likely that the 
average household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 
if walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 
3 bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and 
walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5, 10 and 15 years respectively and 
are hence denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAAA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. 
Refer section 3.2 for further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, 
taro, panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are 
considered more valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey 
was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number 
for ’food consumed1. Hence the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
"" Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 
months to 12 months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0, 1 and 2 
respectively in the data set. An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level. ** Significance at the 5 percent level. *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Results indicate intervention reduces the difficulty associated with payments related to 
tools used to harvest and sell produce. As the value of these tools vary, they cannot be 
categorised as either high value infrequent items, such as shovels and carts, or lower value 
items such as spades or transport into town.
Other variables, in addition to intervention, also appear to influence difficulty involved in 
paying for particular items. Results in table 3.4 show the average interviewee living in 
wealthier households, as suggested by the food consumed, believes household members 
find it significantly less difficult to pay for school fees by 2.5 percent. Further, tables 3.4 
and 3.6 reveal that the average interviewee living in wealthier households, as suggested by 
higher roof quality, believes household members find it significantly less difficult to pay for 
school fees, school shoes and tools used to harvest and sell produce by 8.3 percent, 13.8 
percent and 5.7 percent respectively. Finally table 3.5 suggests that the average interviewee 
living in wealthier households, as demonstrated by higher wall quality, believes household 
members find it significantly less difficult to pay for Christmas related expenses by 9.7 
percent. It is reasonable that wealthier households find it easier to pay for certain items.
The average household that experienced increased income in the 12 months prior to the 
survey relative to the period between 24 months to 12 months prior to the survey, finds it 
significantly less difficult to pay for the majority of the items in the education module (refer 
table 3.4). However such a correlation is not applicable to items in the other modules. 
Presumably this is because the indicator only illustrates the directional change in household 
income over time; it does not demonstrate the magnitude or relative change. Thus a 
household with ‘increased’ income in one year relative to the previous year does not 
necessarily imply its income has increased considerably or is higher relative to other 
households.
Results in table 3.5 reveal the average interviewee living in a household with more children 
believes household members find it insignificantly more difficult to pay for birthday, 
Christmas and Easter related expenses by 2.0 percent, 6.0 percent and 6.0 percent 
respectively, and significantly so for Easter related expenses by 3.1 percent. This is 
plausible due to the extra cost in paying for presents in households with more children.
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The interviewee’s age, sex and education level do not appear to significantly influence the 
difficulty associated in paying for most items. Exceptions, illustrated in table 3.4, are that 
the average older interviewee believes household members find it significantly less difficult 
to pay for school shoes and school books by 0.7 percent and 0.5 percent respectively and 
the average male interviewee believes household members find it significantly more 
difficult to pay for school shoes by 13.2 percent. As highlighted in table 3.5, the average 
interviewee with a higher level of education believes household members find it 
significantly more difficult to pay for church related expenses by 13.4 percent. Considering 
these variables do not significantly influence payments of any other items, the uncertain 
economic rationale for such a correlation is considered immaterial.
Distance from the main road to the village does not appear to influence the dependent 
variables significantly across the majority of items. A few exceptions, illustrated in tables 
3.5 and 3.6 are that on average, the greater the distance from the main road, the 
significantly less difficult it is to pay for Easter related expenses, Christmas related 
expenses and purchases of clothes for a family member by 13.5 percent, 11.3 percent and 
8.7 percent respectively. This is surprising as it is expected that a greater distance between 
the main road and a village would make it more difficult to pay for certain items. As the 
distance to the main road does not appear to influence difficulty involved in paying for the 
large majority of items, the influence of distance overall is considered immaterial.
As explained in chapter 2 (literature review), there appears to be no empirical study that 
considers welfare impact of access to savings facilities from a similar subjective perceptive. 
Hence comparisons of these results with literature were not undertaken.
3.5.2 Commitment Savings vs Reallocation Savings
The following results consider whether treatment village households have ‘saved more’ 
(i.e. used formal savings facilities as commitment devices), experienced ‘no change’ (i.e. 
used formal savings facilities as reallocation devices) or ‘saved less’ due to access to formal 
savings facilities. As displayed in figure 3.7, 68 percent of treatment village clients 
(representing 184 people) stated that intervention made no difference to the amount of 
money the household saved. This likely implies that most people have re-distributed their
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savings from traditional methods, such as keeping money ‘under the mattress’, to bank 
deposits without generating an overall net increase in savings. Indeed given this relatively 
large figure, and results suggesting savings is welfare enhancing across payments for higher 
value less frequent items, it may appear that savings maintained formally may be more 
welfare enhancing than savings maintained informally.
Figure 3.7: Has opening a savings account with ANZ encouraged the household to save more, less, or has not 
changed the amount the household normally would save?
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
t—  o c
Less (Decreased) No Change More (Increased)
Also in figure 3.7, 28 percent of treatment village clients (representing 74 people) claimed 
the household saved more money due to intervention while 4 percent claimed the 
household saved less money due to intervention. As the 4 percent only relate to 10 
households, they represent a small minority and are unlikely to be reflective of overall 
program impact.
Interestingly, the formal savings facility appears of greater benefit to the 28 percent of 
treatment village households that have ‘committed’ by saving a larger amount as opposed 
to the 68 percent that simply ‘reallocated’ their initial cash. Consider the second last 
column in table 3.7; among people who stated their household saved ‘more’ with ANZ (i.e. 
used formals savings facilities as commitment devices), across items where access to 
formal savings facilities had an impact, 35 percent found it less difficult to pay for items. 
This number drops to 26 percent for people who stated there was ‘no change’ in their 
household savings patterns (i.e. used formal savings facilities as reallocation devices) and 
10 percent for people who stated their household saved ‘less’.
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Indeed, across items where access to savings did not have an impact, the percentage of 
people who stated their household found it less difficult to pay for particular items also 
drops progressively from those who stated their household saved ‘more’ with ANZ to those 
who stated their household saved ‘less’ with ANZ (refer second last column, table 3.8), 
albeit to a smaller degree.
Note, there was an insignificant difference between the wealth proxies in households that 
saved ‘more’ and experienced ‘no change’ (refer table 3.9).
The finding that commitment savers experience greater welfare gains is similar to the 
finding in Ashraf et al. (2008) that female commitment savers feel more empowered. The 
magnitudes of results are not directly comparable as Ashraf et al. (2008) focuses on 
comparing commitment savers to normal savers while this study compares welfare of 
people with formal savings accounts to people who do not access formal savings accounts.
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Table 3.9 - Balance Test of Wealth Characteristics across Treatment Group Members Only 
Sample Frame: Commitment Savers (74) and Reallocation Savers (184)
___________________________________ T-test_______________________________________________
Reallocation Savers Commitment Savers Balance Test
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. T-Test P-Value
Food QualityA 12.337 2.126 12.216 2.089 0.415 0.679
RoofAA 0.505 0.501 0.486 0.503 0.274 0.784
WallAA 0.413 0.494 0.432 0.499 0.284 0.776
BedroomAA 1.103 0.305 1.108 0.313 0.115 0.909
A Food Quality compares 16 food items consumed within a week before the survey between reallocation savers and commitment savers. If any 
member of the household consumed any of the following items within a week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, panna, banana, 
sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more valuable, if any member of 
the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken within a week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded for each item 
consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence the higher the value of food consumed, 
the wealthier the household.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls are 
made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms in the house 
and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the higher the number of 
bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
Why is the ANZ savings facility, which is designed as a commitment device, used mainly 
to reallocate funds as opposed to increase savings? This is potentially because Pacific 
Islanders generally use savings to reallocate wealth across different items as opposed to 
accumulating wealth. For instance, Liew (1997:3) contends “demand for cash is primarily 
to meet emergencies, for schooling, to meet traditional and religious obligations and for 
other basic necessities ... it is rarely for starting a microenterprise or income earning 
activity”. More recently Shaw and Eversole (2008:16) has also stated “most savings were 
destined for ... education expenses, housing improvements and as a cushion for 
emergencies”.
Results demonstrate that access to formal savings facilities reduces difficulty involving 
payments across lumpier items. Further, welfare impact is felt greater across households 
that commit to saving more relative to those that reallocate cash. Hence, the results support 
the hypothesis.
3.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects
The summary statistics by gender in table 3.10 illustrates female survey respondents are on 
average 29 years old and male survey respondents are on average 43 years old, female 
survey respondents are more educated than male survey respondents and there are a greater 
number of bedrooms in households with male survey respondents. These differences 
between males and females are significant at the 5 percent level. Further, at the 10 percent 
level, households with males as survey respondents have a slightly higher number of
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children going to school. The difference in age is reasonable due to the survey 
methodology where enumerators targeted older males while the difference in education 
levels is also reasonable as education became more freely available over time. The reason 
why households with male respondents have more bedrooms and have slightly more 
children attending school is uncertain. All other differences between males and females are 
statistically insignificant.
To consider whether gender influences survey responses, the treatment dummy variable is 
interacted with the dummy variable for gender (which equals 1 if male). This approach to 
measuring heterogeneous effects is used throughout literature (Ashraf et al. 2006; Gerber et 
al. 2009). Due to their potential correlation with the dependent variable, the survey 
respondent’s age, the survey respondent’s education level, the number of bedrooms in a 
household and the number of children attending school are also interacted with the 
treatment dummy variable.
Results in tables 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 illustrate that the sex of the survey respondent does not 
appear to influence the majority of answers to survey questions relating to the perceptions 
of difficulty involved in paying for particular items. The only exception is that male survey 
respondents in treatment villages suggest that the average household finds it less difficult to 
pay for school books by 22.2 percent at the 10 percent significance level (table 3.11).
Additionally, on average, across most items within treatment villages, the survey 
respondent’s age, the survey respondent’s education level, the number of bedrooms in a 
household and the number of children attending school do not significantly influence the 
dependent variables.
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Table 3.11 - Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Education (Gender Analysis)
__________________________________________ OLS___________________________________________________
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
School Fees School Shoes School Books School Clothes Stationary Children's
pocket money
Treatment Dummy -0.075 -0.112 -0.230 0.066 0.204 0.163
(0.207) (0.270) (0.259) (0.259) (0.241) (0.230)
Male * Treatment Dummy 0.020 -0.157 -0.222* -0.148 0.005 0.117
(0.097) (0.126) (0.121) (0.121) (0.113) (0.108)
Interviewer's Age * Treatment Dummy 0.001 0.006 0.010* 0.007 0.004 -0.009*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Interviewer's Education Level * Treatment Dummy 0.122** 0.026 -0.011 -0.030 -0.009 0.036
(0.054) (0.071) (0.067) (0.067) (0.063) (0.060)
Number of Children Going to School * Treatment Dummy -0.067* -0.062 -0.015 -0.024 -0.046 0.006
(0.034) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038)
No. of Bedrooms * Treatment Dummy 0.112 0.149 0.141 -0.119 -0.190 0.077
(0.108) (0.143) (0.137) (0.135) (0.126) (0.120)
Number of Children -0.014 0.031 -0.001 0.013 0.030 -0.001
(0.028) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031)
Number of Children Going to School 0.080** 0.032 0.001 -0.018 0.012 -0.050
(0.037) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046) (0.043) (0.041)
Food Consumed " 0.023** -0.004 0.003 0.007 -0.009 -0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Roof Quality AA 0.085** 0.136** 0.075* 0.030 0.035 0.001
(0.036) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.040)
Wall Quality AA 0.016 -0.059 -0.002 -0.031 -0.047 0.048
(0.036) (0.048) (0045) (0045) (0042) (0 040)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.122 -0.045 -0.010 -0.007 0.071 -0.072
(0.076) (0.101) (0.096) (0.096) (0.089) (0.085)
Interviewee's Age -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.006*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male -0.028 -0.048 0.040 0.093 -0.002 -0.102
(0.075) (0.097) (0.093) (0.094) (0.087) (0.083)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.086** -0.020 -0.011 -0.037 0.012 0.035
(0.042) (0.056) (0.052) (0.053) (0.049) (0.047)
Income Change"' (self reported) 0.110*** 0.074 0.136*** 0.134*** 0.048 0.041
(0.031) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.023 0.033 -0.035 0.031 0.005 -0.008
(0.054) (0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.063) (0.060)
Data UsedA 449 425 442 449 449 449
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.183 0.374 0.337 0.668 0.254 0.227
Adjusted RA2 0.062 0.026 0.030 0.008 -0.009 0.014
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard errors not corrected for 
robustness. Robust standard errors produce the same reported levels of significance as standard errors not corrected for robustness.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult to pay for a 
particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular 
item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls are made from 
Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are 
equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier 
the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5 ,10  and 15 years respectively and are hence denoted 
0,1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAAA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 3.2 for 
further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, panna, banana, 
sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more valuable, if any member of the 
household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The 
total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the 
Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months to 12 months prior 
to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0 ,1  and 2 respectively in the data set.
* Significance at the 10 percent level, ** Significance at the S percent level, * Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.12: Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Events (Gender Analysis)
________________________________________OLS________________________________________________________
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Easter related Christmas related Birthday related Church related
expenses expenses expenses expenses
Treatment Dummy 0.046 0.032 -0.195 0.037
(0.220) (0.222) (0.213) (0.264)
Male * Treatment Dummy -0.084 0.129 -0.023 0.029
(0.106) (0.107) (0.102) (0.127)
Interviewer's Age * Treatment Dummy 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Interviewer's Education Level * Treatment Dummy -0.043 0.008 0.063 -0.005
(0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.069)
Number of Children Going to School * Treatment Dummy 0 .057* 0.019 -0.023 -0.034
(0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.040)
No. of Bedrooms * Treatment Dummy -0.059 -0.105 0.136 0.167
(0.124) (0.124) (0.119) (0.147)
Number of Children -0 .052* -0.042 -0.016 -0.013
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0 036)
Number of Children Going to School -0.007 0.041 0.027 0.029
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.046)
Food Consumed " 0.003 0.007 -0.012 -0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Roof Quality AA 0.039 0.035 0.005 0.001
(0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.047)
Wall Quality AA 0 .068* 0 . 101** 0.045 -0.016
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.047)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.002 0.000 -0.022 -0.058
(0.087) (0.088) (0.084) (0.104)
Interviewee's Age 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Male 0.080 -0.055 0.012 -0.096
(0.082) (0.082) (0.079) (0.098)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA 0.013 -0.043 -0.033 -0.050
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.054)
Income Change'" (self reported) 0.010 0.028 0.038 0.008
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.041)
Distance to Village AAAA 0 . 133** 0 .114* 0.008 0.007
(0.058) (0.059) (0.057) (0.070)
Data UsedA 470 471 473 475
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.232 0.242 0.211 0.495
Adjusted RA2 0.014 0.022 -0.005 -0.017
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard errors not corrected for 
robustness. Robust standard errors produce the same reported level of significance as standard errors not corrected for robustness.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult to 
pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it less difficult to 
pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls are 
made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms in the 
house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the higher the 
number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and are hence 
denoted 0 ,1  and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAAA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 
3.2 for further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, panna, 
banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more valuable, if any 
member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded for 
each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence the higher the value of 
food consumed, the wealthier the household.
'" Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months to 12 
months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0 ,1  and 2 respectively in the data set.
* Significance at the 10 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.13: Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Kitchen Utensils, Tools and Clothes (Gender Analysis)
__________________________________________________ OLS__________________________________________________
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Kitchen Tools used to Clothes for the Clothes for Clothes for a
utensils harvest and sell survey family friend
produce respondent member
Treatment Dummy 0.180 0.207 0 .357* * * 0.145 0.158
(0.169) (0.163) (0.173) (0.158) (0.165)
Male * Treatment Dummy 0.086 0.000 0.061 0.043 -0.071
(0.081) (0.078) (0.081) (0.076) (0.079)
Interviewer's Age * Treatment Dummy -0.004 0.000 -0 .006* -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Interviewer's Education Level * Treatment Dummy -0.030 0.018 0.061 0.018 0.065
(0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043)
Number of Children Going to School * Treatment Dummy -0.012 -0.025 -0 .044* -0.022 -0.015
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
No. of Bedrooms * Treatment Dummy -0.005 -0.063 -0.092 0.002 -0.032
(0.094) (0.090) (0.094) (0.088) (0.091)
Number of Children Going to School -0.016 -0.005 0.018 -0.004 -0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Food Consumed " 0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Roof Quality AA 0 .054* 0 .058* * -0.001 0.016 0.013
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
Wall Quality AA -0.007 0.001 0.038 0.003 -0.004
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
No. of Bedrooms AA 0.029 0.027 0.064 -0.017 0.025
(0.067) (0.063) (0.066) (0.062) (0.064)
Interviewee's Age 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.037 0.003 -0.034 -0.049 -0.006
(0.062) (0.060) (0.063) (0.058) (0.062)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA 0.000 -0.029 -0 .065 * -0.027 -0.043
(0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033)
Income Change"’ (self reported) 0.018 0.007 -0.015 -0.016 0.014
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.036 0.051 0.012 0 .085* * 0 .077 *
(0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.044)
Data UsedA 477 478 479 478 467
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.883 0.889 0.879 0.897 0.891
Adjusted RA2 (0.009) 0.009 0.005 -0.004 -0.001
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard errors not corrected for 
robustness. Robust standard errors produce the same reported level of significance as standard errors not corrected for robustness.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult to 
pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it less difficult to 
pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls are 
made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms in the 
house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the higher the 
number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and are hence 
denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAAA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 3.2 
for further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, panna, 
banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more valuable, if any 
member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded for each 
item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence the higher the value of food 
consumed, the wealthier the household.
Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months to 12 
months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
* Significance at the 10 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, * Significance at the 1 percent level.
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3.6 Limitations
Limitations relating to non-random program placement and selection of program 
participants as well as potential bias from omitted variables have been discussed. Further, 
as no other microfinance or rural banking operations are undertaken in the surveyed 
villages, and as no clients have closed their bank accounts, substitution bias and bias 
relating to program dropouts will not be problematic.
Another possible limitation is that some demographic characteristics considered time- 
invariant in tables 3.1 to 3.13 may be time variant. For example, during the intervention 
period but before the survey was taken, the number of total household members may 
change due to births or deaths, more people may turn 55, or people who are over 55 may 
have passed away. Similarly, the number of working adults may also change due to new 
adults deciding to work and due to existing adults entering or exiting the work force. 
Further, some children may die or become adults while others may enter or exit educational 
institutions. Ideally more questions to ascertain whether such characteristics were time 
variant should have been asked when undertaking the survey.
Levels of education may change and the age of survey respondents will change during the 
intervention period. The change in age is unlikely problematic as it occurs uniformly over 
all respondents. Additionally, as most of the survey respondents are over 25 years of age, it 
is unlikely the levels of education will change greatly over the intervention period. Finally, 
in relation to household quality, respondents were asked to confirm household 
characteristics existing now were the same as those that existed pre-intervention, between 
January 2006 and mid-March 2006.
Ultimately, it is difficult to account for potential time variance of all observable 
characteristics in a cross-sectional setting. It is assumed that changes to observable 
characteristics over time, if they occur, will be on average statistically similar between 
treatment and control villages. Note, some of the potential time variant variables used in 
this study are assumed as time invariant in other cross-sectional evaluations (see for 
example Nino-Zarazüa 2007).
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Additionally there are other potential limitations relating to fungibility of money and 
spillovers. Firstly, the fungibility of money implies that savings can be used for many 
different purposes and influence many different activities. Consequently, it is likely that 
the dependent variables used in the study do not comprehensively capture all welfare 
impacts from access to savings accounts, potentially upwardly or downwardly biasing 
results. Failing to account for all potential uses of savings is a limitation of this study and 
other studies in literature . Secondly, opening formal savings accounts may also have 
spillover effects. For instance, this intervention may reduce the reliance on informal 
savings such as deposits with friends and family. This may create welfare gains, as people 
are not burdened with ensuring the safety of savings, or may create welfare losses, as it 
reduces the social interaction between people.
Finally the study does not focus on other regions. This is a limitation of most quasi- 
experimental designs that evaluate an existing program focusing on a particular area (see 
for example MkNelly and Lippold 1998). Nevertheless, a-priori, there appears to be no 
reason why such results are not representative of those across other areas of Guadalcanal.
3.7 Conclusion
This study is the first to test welfare impacts from access to formal savings facilities in a 
Pacific Island country. Results suggest welfare impact across payments relating to high 
value low frequency items supports theoretical literature suggesting access to formal 
savings accounts is indeed welfare enhancing. Conversely, for payments relating to lower 
value more frequent items, access to formal savings accounts does not appear to have the 
same impact.
Further, the majority of households with treatment village clients appear to use formal 
savings facilities to reallocate funds (68 percent) while a large minority of households with 
treatment village clients appear to use formal savings facilities as commitment devices (28 
percent). Across items that have a welfare impact, the households that use formal savings
For example, the dependent variables used by Ashraf et al. (2006) are also unlikely to capture all potential 
uses of savings.
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as commitment devices find payments relating to particular items less difficult relative to 
households that use formal savings facilities as reallocation devices.
Hence, results suggest welfare will be most greatly enhanced when formal savings facilities 
are used as commitment devices and payment tools for lumpier items.
There are some important caveats to the above results. Firstly, bias from non-random 
program placement may occur if any differences between the average treatment and control 
village pre-intervention, the slightly higher quality of roads leading to treatment villages 
relative to control villages during a seven month period, and the slightly closer proximity of 
treatment villages to Honiara relative to control villages, influences the difficulty associated 
with paying for selected items in treatment and control village client households. Secondly, 
selection bias would occur if control village clients refused to open savings accounts if 
given the option to open savings accounts at time 1 (when treatment village clients opened 
their savings accounts). Selection bias would also occur if non-clients in control villages, 
who were not included in the analysis, would have opened savings accounts when treatment 
village clients opened their savings accounts. While these issues relating to non-random 
program placement and selection bias were considered, given the cross-sectional nature of 
the study, they cannot completely be eliminated.
Additionally, all potential welfare impacts from access to formal savings facilities may not 
have been considered. For example, given the fungibility of money, savings could have 
been used for multiple purposes not considered as part of this study’s dependent variables. 
Similarly, there may be spillover effects influencing the community that were not 
considered.
Hence instead of providing conclusive evidence of positive welfare impacts from access to 
formal savings facilities, this study should complement more rigorous multi-period 
longitudinal studies. Ultimately results of this study should encourage policy makers to 
consider focusing more resources on evaluating the influence of access to formal savings 
facilities across other areas in the Solomon Islands and other Pacific Island countries. If 
such analysis supports results presented in this study, a variety of policy options could 
follow.
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For instance, a possible policy option may involve encouraging microfinance institutions to 
require that their clients actively and regularly save for a particular period of time before 
providing loans. ANZ’s rural banking team in the Solomon Islands argue their requirement 
that clients actively and regularly deposit money for six months prior to issuing an initial 
loan is one of the main reasons why bad debts are kept at less than 2 percent. Hence if 
opening up formal savings facilities can reduce long-term cost through ensuring high loan 
repayment rates and improve the welfare of its clients, then it may be prudent to encourage 
such actions.
Another potential policy option is to increase public/private partnerships. In this study, 
upgrading roads leading into villages had the immediate effect of supporting the ANZ 
truck. Hence the road upgrade inadvertently increased access to financial services by 
program participants. Similar public/private partnerships in other areas of Guadalcanal 
may also prove beneficial.
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Appendix 3A -  Attempts Made to Source 2006 Village Level Data
The following illustrates the extent to which attempts were made to source 2006 data on the 
villages investigated as part of this dissertation:
• The 2006 RAMSI survey (RAMSI 2006) and the 2005 Provincial Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (Darcy et al. 2006) targeted a total of 262 and 570 
people in the whole of Guadalcanal in 2006 respectively, so any information 
collected from these documents will not sufficiently cover a breakdown of the area 
surveyed.
• The 1999 Solomon Islands census has the most information but even it separates 
Guadalcanal into various areas and not at village level which is unhelpful for this 
thesis (Census 1999).
• Attempts were made to gather the 1995/1996 Village Resources Survey data 
directly from the Solomon Islands Statistics Office, Australian Libraries and authors 
who have previously referenced such data without success. The fact that the 
Solomon Islands Statistics Office may not have the available data is not surprising 
given that an OECD report stated “a January 2003 mission revealed that the 
National Statistics Office (NSO) was barely functional, having suffered severe 
losses of resources and records in previous years” due to the civil unrest (OECD 
2007).
• The 1970 Solomon Islands survey is dated and substantial population and economic 
changes would have occurred over the almost 40 year period to 2007.
• ANZ bank was unwilling to provide any private information gathered from 
treatment villages pre-intervention and in any case, it is uncertain as to whether they 
would have information related to control villages pre-intervention (which is one 
year prior to when control villages were offered intervention).
• Attempts were made to gather data from people in the Solomon Islands statistics 
office and academic researchers.
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Note, even if data could have been located from the 1995/1996 survey, it is impossible to 
conclude (or develop a comfortable degree of certainty) that similarity of control group 
villages to treatment group villages in 1995/1996 would imply similarity of villages in 
2007.
Moreover, there have been significant economic and social changes during the 10 year 
period. This is largely due to the 1998/1999 civil unrest where militants on the island of 
Guadalcanal commenced a campaign of intimidation and violence towards Malaitan 
settlers. During the next year, thousands of Malaitans fled back to Malaita or to the capital, 
Honiara. One website suggests 20,000 people were forced off Guadalcanal during this 
period of unrest (Paul and Spirit 1998). This may result in a decrease in the populations of 
rural villages after 1999.
As explained by DFAT, “violent clashes involving rival militant groups destabilised the 
Solomon Islands government and undermined national institutions and coherence. This 
situation persisted for more than four years” (DFAT 1010) and also adversely influenced 
the economy with GDP contracting by approximately 1.3 percent and 14.3 percent in 1999 
and 2000 respectively (IMF 2010). Note also that “the Asian Development Bank estimates 
that the crash of the market for tropical timber” contributed to the slump in GDP, 
eliminating “about one-half of all jobs in the timber industry” (US STATE DEPARTMENT 
2010). A positive growth rate was only recorded after 2002 (IMF 2010). Hence, any 
economic characteristics of villages are most likely to have changed during the period from 
1995/96 to the time when the survey was undertaken for this thesis.
Further, the Solomon Islands, along with Kiribati and Vanuatu have the largest rate of 
urban growth among the Pacific Island countries, at over 4 percent per annum between 
1995 and 2000 alone (UNFPA 2006). Importantly, in the Solomon Islands, this 
“urbanization is mostly the result of rural-urban migration” (UNFPA 2006). This may also 
influence population demographics in surveyed villages.
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Finally, according to the IMF, the “data quality” of Solomon Islands Statistics remains 
weak (IMF 2006), implying the reliability of the 1995/96 survey if it was available would 
be questionable.
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Appendix 3B -  Influence of Distance on Dependent Variables
Distance does not appear to influence the majority of dependent variables when considering 
control and treatment villages separately (refer tables 3.B1 to 3.B2b). The only exceptions 
are that the average control village client finds it significantly less difficult to pay for 
clothes for a family member and clothes for a friend by 22.7 percent and 21.9 percent 
respectively (refer table 3.B 1 b) the greater the distance from the main road. Further, the 
average treatment village client finds it less d ifficult to pay for Easter and Christmas related 
expenses by 12.3 percent and 12.9 percent respectively (refer table 3.B2a) the greater the 
distance from the main road.
Table 3.B1: Impact of Distance (from the Main Road to Villages) on Dependent Variables Relating to Education
OLS
Control Group Respondents
School Fees
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for 
School Shoes School Books School Clothes Stationary Children's 
pocket money
Distance from the Main Road to the Village
A A
0.090 0.168 -0.049 0.111 0.100 -0.146
(0.108) (0.153) (0.142) (0.147) (0.135) (0.126)
0.407 0.276 0.732 0.451 0.460 0.248
Data UsedA 196 182 195 196 196 196
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.183 0.374 0.337 0.668 0.254 0.227
RA2 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.007
The first row represents the coefficient, the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error of the independent variable (not 
corrected for robustness) and the third row (in italics) represent the P-Value. Robust standard errors produce the same reported level of 
significance as standard errors not corrected for robustness.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more 
difficult to pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it 
less difficult to pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer 
section 3.2 for further details.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
* *  Significance at the 5 percent level.
** *  Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.Bla: Impact of Distance (from the Main Road to Villages) on Dependent Variables Relating to Events
OLS
Control Group Respondents
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Easter related Christmas related Birthday related Church related
expenses expenses expenses expenses
Distance from the Main Road to the Village AA 0.165 0.030 -0.171 0.075
(0.120) (0.118) (0.111) (0.151)
0.173 0.801 0.124 0.619
Data UsedA 205 210 209 210
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.232 0.242 0.211 0.495
RA2 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.001
The first row represents the coefficient, the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error of the independent variable (not 
corrected for robustness) and the third row (in italics) represent the P-Value. Robust standard errors produce the same reported level of 
significance as standard errors not corrected for robustness.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult to 
pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it less difficult 
to pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies betw een the dependent variables.
AA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 
3.2 for further details.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
** Significance at the 5 percent level.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level.
Table 3.Bib: Impact of Distance (from the Main Road to Villages) on Dependent Variables Relating to Kitchen Utensils, Tools and Clothes
OLS
______________________________________________Control Group Respondents______________________________________________
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Kitchen Tools used to Clothes for the Clothes for Clothes for a
utensils harvest and survey family friend
sell produce respondent member
Distance from the Main Road to the Village AA -0.052 0.073 0.052 0 . 2 2 7 ** 0 . 2 1 9 **
(0.100) (0.110) (0.105) (0.094) (0.101)
0.606 0.510 0.621 0.017 0.031
Data UsedA 209 210 211 210 204
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.883 0.889 0.879 0.897 0.891
RA2 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.027 0.023
The first row represents the coefficient, the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error of the independent variable (not corrected 
for robustness) and the third row (in italics) represent the P-Value. Robust standard errors produce the same reported level of significance as 
standard errors not corrected for robustness.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult to pay 
for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it less difficult to pay for a 
particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 3.2 for 
further details.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
** Significance at the 5 percent level.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.B2: Impact of Distance (from the Main Road to Villages) on Dependent Variables Relating to Education
OLS
Treatment Group Respondents
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for 
School Fees School Shoes School Books School Clothes Stationary Children's
pocket money
Distance from the Main Road to the Village AA
-0.025 -0.050 -0.066 0.005 -0.039 0.009
(0.065) (0.079) (0.077) (0.075) (0.070) (0.068)
0.701 0.523 0.396 0.945 0.572 0.892
Data UsedA 253 243 247 253 253 253
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.183 0.374 0.337 0.668 0.254 0.227
RA2 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000
The first row represents the coefficient, the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error of the independent variable (not corrected 
for robustness) and the third row (in italics) represent the P-Value. Robust standard errors produce the same reported level of significance as 
standard errors not corrected for robustness.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult to pay 
for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it less difficult to pay for 
a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 3.2 for 
further details.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
** Significance at the 5 percent level.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level.
Table 3.B2a: Impact of Distance (from the Main Road to Villages) on Dependent Variables Relating to Events
OLS
________________________________ Treatment Group Respondents________________________________
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Easter related Christmas related Birthday related Church related
expenses expenses expenses expenses
Distance from the Main Road to the Village AA 0 . 123* 0 . 129* 0.041 0.002
(0.067) (0.069) (0.067) (0.077)
0.068 0.063 0.539 0.976
Data UsedA 265 261 264 265
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.232 0.242 0.211 0.495
RA2 0.013 0.013 0.001 0.000
The first row represents the coefficient, the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error of the independent variable (not corrected 
for robustness) and the third row (in italics) represent the P-Value. Robust standard errors produce the same reported level of significance as 
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult to pay for 
a particular item. Hence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it less difficult to pay for a 
particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 3.2 for 
further details.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
** Significance at the 5 percent level.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.B2b: Impact of Distance (from the Main Road to Villages) on Dependent Variables Relating to Kitchen Utensils, Tools and Clothes
OLS
Treatment Group Respondents
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Kitchen Tools used to Clothes for the Clothes for Clothes for a
utensils harvest and survey family friend
sell produce respondent member
Distance from the Main Road to the Village AA 0.064 0.037 -0.004 0.052 0.024
(0.048) (0.040) (0.047) (0.044) (0.045)
0.183 0.363 0.933 0.246 0.605
Data UsedA 268 268 268 268 263
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.883 0.889 0.879 0.897 0.891
RA2 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.001
The first row represents the coefficient, the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error of the independent variable (not 
corrected for robustness) and the third row (in italics) represent the P-Value. Robust standard errors produce the same reported level of 
significance as standard errors not corrected for robustness.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult to 
pay for a particular item. Hence, an independent variable w ith a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it less difficult 
to pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 
3.2 for further details.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
** Significance at the 5 percent level.
* * *  Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Appendix 3C -  Ordered Probit Analysis
Table 3.Cl - Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Education 
Ordered Probit
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
School Fees School Shoes School Books School Clothes Stationary Children's
pocket money
Treatment Dummy 0 . 3 5 5 * * 0 . 3 0 6 * * 0 . 3 6 6 * * -0.001 0.070 0.159
(0.151) (0.124) (0.126) (0.116) (0.131) (0.137)
Number of Children -0.066 0.087 0.012 0.061 0.100 -0.006
(0.118) (0.092) (0.095) (0.090) (0.097) (0.105)
Number of Children Going to School 0.158 -0.041 -0.046 -0.110 -0.056 -0.172
(0.126) (0.101) (0.103) (0.098) (0.106) (0.116)
Food Consumed ’ 0 . 1 03 * * 0.003 0.011 0.008 -0.034 -0.019
(0.032) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.030)
Roof Quality AA 0 .3 4 2 * * 0 . 3 9 9 * * 0 . 2 4 9 * * -0.006 0.105 -0.022
(0.149) (0.123) (0.125) (0.116) (0.130) (0.136)
Wall Quality AA 0.112 -0.170 -0.006 -0.144 -0.185 0.159
(0.147) (0.123) (0.124) (0.116) (0.131) (0.136)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.270 0.045 0.211 -0.149 -0.055 -0.194
(0.230) (0.182) (0.184) (0.174) (0.195) (0.221)
Interviewee's Age -0.003 0 . 0 1 9 * * 0 .0 1 2 * 0.000 -0.002 0.003
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Male -0.021 -0 . 3 4 5 * * -0.231 -0.007 0.048 -0.109
(0.192) (0.160) (0.163) (0.152) (0.171) (0.178)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.039 -0.002 -0.046 -0.115 0.042 0 . 1 9 1 *
(0.108) (0.087) (0.088) (0.084) (0.094) (0.100)
Income Change" (self reported) 0 .4 1 8 * * 0.166 0 . 3 6 4 * * 0 . 3 6 6 * * * 0.147 0.139
(0.130) (0.107) (0.107) (0.102) (0.112) (0.121)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.080 0.009 -0.126 0.060 -0.014 -0.002
(0.214) (0.178) (0.180) (0.173) (0.194) (0.201)
Data UsedA 449 425 442 449 449 449
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error of the 
independent variable not corrected for robustness. Robust standard errors produce the same level or higher level of significance as 
standard errors not corrected for robustness.
The ordered values equal 1 if a survey respondent answered 'yes’, 2 if a survey respondent answered 'sometimes' and 3 if a survey 
respondent answered 'no' when asked, in the last 12 months, did household members have any difficulty paying for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls 
are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms 
in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the 
higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5, 10 and 15 years respectively and are 
hence denoted 0,1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAAA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer 
section 3.2 for further details.
1 If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, panna, 
banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 was recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more 
valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken a week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 2 
was recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for ’food consumed’. Hence the 
higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
" Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months to 12 
months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0 ,1  and 2 respectively in the data 
set. An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.Cla: Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Events 
Ordered Probit
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for 
Easter related Christmas related Birthday related Church related
expenses expenses expenses expenses
Treatment Dummy 0.327** 0.404** 0.386** 0.111
(0.131) (0.130) (0.134) (0.117)
Number of Children -0.122** 0.003 -0.038 -0.016
(0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.045)
Food Consumed ’ 0.018 0.027 -0.029 -0.012
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025)
Roof Quality AA 0.115 0.153 0.019 0.004
(0.128) (0.127) (0.130) (0.117)
Wall Quality AA 0.202 0.294** 0.151 -0.033
(0.128) (0.127) (0.130) (0.117)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.125 -0.143 0.157 0.059
(0.217) (0.208) (0.198) (0.183)
Interviewee's Age 0.011 0.003 -0.001 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Male 0.001 0.080 0.056 -0.184
(0.167) (0.167) (0.168) (0.153)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.011 -0.093 0.073 -0.134
(0.092) (0.090) (0.094) (0.085)
Income Change" (self reported) 0.029 0.143 0.083 0.020
(0.113) (0.111) (0.115) (0.103)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.480** 0.311* 0.077 0.029
(0.187) (0.183) (0.190) (0.174)
Data UsedA 470 471 473 475
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error of the 
independent variable not corrected for robustness. Robust standard errors produce the same level or higher level of significance as standard 
errors not corrected for robustness.
The ordered values equal 1 if a survey respondent answered 'yes', 7 if a survey respondent answered 'sometimes' and 3 if a survey 
respondent answered 'no' when asked, in the last 12 months, did household members have any difficulty paying for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
A A Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls 
are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms in 
the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the higher 
the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and are 
hence denoted 0,1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAAA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 
3.2 for further details.
’ If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, panna, 
banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 was recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more valuable, if 
any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken a week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 2 was recorded for 
each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for ’food consumed1. Hence the higher the value of 
food consumed, the wealthier the household.
" Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months to 12 
months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0,1 and 2 respectively in the data set. 
An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.Clb: Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Kitchen Utensils, Tools and Clothes
_____________________________________ Ordered Probit______________________________________
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Kitchen
utensils
Tools used to 
harvest and sell 
produce
Clothes for the 
survey 
respondent
Clothes for 
family 
member
Clothes for a 
friend
Treatment Dummy -0.060 0 .340** 0.072 -0.047 0.068
(0.112) (0.116) (0.116) (0.118) (0.118)
Food Consumed ' 0.017 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.001
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Roof Quality AA 0 .216* 0 .209* -0.051 0.038 -0.076
(0.113) (0.115) (0.116) (0.118) (0.118)
Wall Quality AA 0.000 0.097 0.146 0.055 0.027
(0.113) (0.115) (0.116) (0.119) (0.119)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.214 -0.213 -0.140 -0.226 -0.210
(0.169) (0.170) (0.172) (0.174) (0.174)
Interviewee's Age 0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.010 -0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Male 0.218 0.183 0.206 0.230 0.213
(0.147) (0.150) (0.151) (0.155) (0.155)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.038 -0.066 0.022 0.052 0.133
(0.080) (0.082) (0.083) (0.084) (0.085)
Income Change" (self reported) 0.000 -0.062 -0.159 -0.164 -0.131
(0.097) (0.098) (0.100) (0.102) (0.102)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.099 0.173 -0.074 0.177 0,087
(0.168) (0.171) (0.173) (0.176) (0.176)
Data UsedA 477 478 479 478 467
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error of the 
independent variable not corrected for robustness. Robust standard errors produce the same level or higher level of significance as 
standard errors not corrected for robustness.
The ordered values equal 1 if a survey respondent answered 'yes', 2 if a survey respondent answered 'sometimes' and 3 if a survey 
respondent answered 'no' when asked, in the last 12 months, did household members have any difficulty paying for a particular 
item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 
if walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 
3 bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and 
walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and 
are hence denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAA a orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. 
Refer section 3.2 for further details.
1 If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, 
panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 was recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered 
more valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken a week before the survey was undertaken, a 
value of 2 was recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food 
consumed'. Hence the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
" Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months 
to 12 months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0, 1 and 2 respectively 
in the data set. An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Appendix 3D -  Impact of Intervention (including people who 
answered no)
The following considers impact of intervention assuming all people who said no had 100% 
difficulty when asked “did the household had purchased an item in the last 12 months”
Table 3.D1 - Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to  Education
OLS
All Survey Respondents
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
School Fees School Shoes School Books School Clothes Stationary Children's
pocket money
Treatment Dummy 0.077* 0.051 0.119** -0.0110 0.0160 0.043
(0.039) (0.036) (0.039) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033)
Number of Children -0.014 0.035 -0.004 0.013 0.031 -0.001
(0.023) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.017)
Number o f Children Going to School 0.039 -0.007 -0.004 -0.029 -0.016 -0.049**
(0.029) (0.039) (0.038) (0.049) (0.045) (0.023)
Food Consumed " 0 .025*** -0.001 0.004 0.007 -0.009 -0.006
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005)
Roof Quality AA 0.083* 0.155** 0.074 0.032 0.035 -0.005
(0.040) (0.071) (0.064) (0.055) (0.047) (0.043)
Wall Quality AA 0.022 -0.045 0.003 -0.030 -0.052 0.048
(0.038) (0.066) (0.055) (0.051) (0.046) (0.033)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.069 0.042 0.092 -0.054 -0.009 -0.050
(0.045) (0.058) (0.080) (0.051) (0.071) (0.050)
Interviewee's Age -0.001 0.008** 0.005** 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Male 0.008 0.165** 0.101 -0.009 -0.008 0.032
(0.054) (0.054) (0.073) (0.072) (0.053) (0.047)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.010 -0.014 -0.020 -0.052 0.010 0.056**
(0.026) (0.034) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.017)
Income Change’" (self reported) 0.102** 0.062* 0.138** 0.132** 0.044 0.039
(0.026) (0.034) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.031)
Distance to  Village AAAA 0.013 -0.003 -0.036 0.024 -0.002 -0.005
(0.055) (0.070) (0.062) (0.048) (0.055) (0.049)
Data UsedA 449 449 449 449 449 449
Mean Value o f Dependent Variable 0.183 0.408 0.347 0.668 0.254 0.227
Adjusted RA2 0.053 0.034 0.034 0.011 0.016 0.040
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered at the 
village level.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay fo r a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more difficult to 
pay fo r a particular item. Hence, an independent variable w ith a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it less difficult 
to  pay fo r a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from  Copper and 0 if the roof is made from  Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls 
are made from  Timber and 0 if walls are made from  Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms in 
the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the higher 
the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to  be 5 ,10  and 15 years respectively and are 
hence denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAAA Orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to  the main road, to  the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer section 
3.2 for further details.
"  If any member of the household consumed any of the follow ing items in the week prior to  the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, panna, 
banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded fo r each item consumed. As they are considered more valuable, if 
any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded 
for each item consumed. The total o f the numbers recorded is used to  calculate a number fo r 'food consumed'. Hence the higher the value 
of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
'"  Refers to  whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to  the survey relative to the period between 24 months to  12 
months prior to  the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0,1  and 2 respectively in the data set. 
An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level, * *  Significance at the 5 percent level, * * *  Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.D2: Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Events
OLS
All Survey Respondents
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Easter related Christmas related Birthday related Church related
expenses expenses expenses expenses
Treatment Dummy 0.044 0.106** 0.090* 0.041
(0.046) (0.032) (0.048) (0.043)
Number of Children -0.025* 0.002 0.002 -0.007
(0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.019)
Food Consumed " -0.001 0.007 -0.011 -0.005
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Roof Quality AA 0.043 0.032 0.018 -0.004
(0.029) (0.034) (0.028) (0.038)
Wall Quality AA 0.066 0.112** 0.064 -0.016
(0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.061)
Number of Bedrooms AA -0.023 -0.043 0.025 0.027
(0.064) (0.071) (0.064) (0.084)
Interviewee's Age 0.002 0.00 0.00 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.037 -0.042 0.002 0.08
(0.052) (0.048) (0.046) (0.054)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.007 -0.027 0.014 -0.048*
(0.022) (0.026) (0.017) (0.025)
Income Change’" (self reported) 0.006 0.028 0.022 0.01
(0.031) (0.029) (0.021) -0.03
Distance to Village AAAA 0.138** 0.121** 0.012 0.00
(0.049) (0.049) (0.054) (0.052)
Data UsedA 481 481 481 481
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.249 0.258 0.225 0.501
Adjusted RA2 0.014 0.028 -0.002 -0.011
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered at 
the village level.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it more 
difficult to pay for a particular item. Flence, an independent variable with a positive coefficient implies that the average household finds it 
less difficult to pay for a particular item.
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls 
are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms 
in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and walls, and the 
higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA Years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and are 
hence denoted 0,1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
a a a a orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. Refer 
section 3.2 for further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, 
panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more 
valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 
2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed’. Hence the 
higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 months to 
12 months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0,1 and 2 respectively in the 
data set. An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, * * *  Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3.D3: Impact of Intervention on Dependent Variables Relating to Kitchen Utensils, Tools and Clothes
OLS
____________________________________All Survey Respondents____________________________________
Dependent variables: Did not experience difficulty paying for
Kitchen Tools used to Clothes for the Clothes for Clothes for a
utensils harvest and sell survey family friend
produce respondent member
Treatment Dummy 0.014 0.083** 0.04 0.019 0.029
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.029)
Food Consumed " -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Roof Quality AA 0.053 0.056* -0.005 0.014 0.006
(0.033) (0.029) (0.032) (0.020) (0.033)
Wall Quality AA -0.01 0.00 0.038 0.002 0.004
(0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.038)
Number of Bedrooms AA 0.007 -0.023 0.007 -0.038 -0.014
(0.045) (0.037) (0.048) (0.041) (0.046)
Interviewee's Age 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.011 -0.007 -0.01 0.019 0.04
(0.033) (0.034) (0.041) (0.034) (0.036)
Interviewee's Education Level AAA -0.017 -0.018 -0.023 -0.016 -0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016)
Income Change"’ (self reported) 0.009 -0.004 -0.027 -0.026 0
(0.023) (0.018) (0.034) (0.030) (0.028)
Distance to Village AAAA 0.045 0.047 0.004 0.086* 0.07
(0.026) (0.030) (0.042) (0.044) (0.049)
Data UsedA 481 481 481 481 481
Mean Value of Dependent Variable 0.884 0.890 0.879 0.898 0.894
Adjusted RA2 -0.008 0.010 -0.008 -0.001 -0.010
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error 
clustered at the village level.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a household finds it less difficult to pay for a particular item and 0 if the household finds it 
A As some households did not spend money on certain items, the data used varies between the dependent variables.
AA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 
1 if walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater 
than 3 bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of 
roofs and walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA years 0f primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively 
and are hence denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
AAA a orders villages, in kilometres, from the village closest to the main road, to the village furtherest away from the main road. 
Refer section 3.2 for further details.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, 
taro, panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are 
considered more valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey 
was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a 
number for 'food consumed'. Hence the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
Refers to whether household income has increased in the 12 months prior to the survey relative to the period between 24 
months to 12 months prior to the survey. A decrease, no-change and increase in household income are denoted as 0 ,1  and 2 
respectively in the data set. An increase, decrease or no-change in income was self-reported by the survey respondent.
* Significance at the 10 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Chapter 4 -  Impact of Time Preferences on an Individual’s 
Decision to Maintain an Open Savings Account
4.0 Introduction
Have you ever postponed saving for a car or holiday or left credit card repayments to a later 
date? Assuming you have a fixed monthly disposable income, this would imply 
discretionary expenditure would be greater now than it would be later. In other words, you 
have more money in the immediate future to go out for a special dinner, watch that play and 
buy some good clothes. Saving for credit card repayments can be done later. This 
phenomenon, where we are impatient now (in regards to spending money) and patient later 
is defined as present-biased time inconsistency64. But what happens when later comes? 
Some of us would still want to go out for nice dinners, further postponing planned savings. 
Under these circumstances, the decisions made by our future selves are inconsistent with 
those made by us in the present. This does not represent an optimal level of welfare.
To rectify this situation, an option is to engage in a commitment savings device that may 
encourage savings by penalising us for not continuously saving (by charging a fee) and/or 
reward us for continuously saving (by issuing a higher interest rate). Now consider the case 
in a developing country where there is little or no access to formal commitment savings 
facilities. A household head in a village may like to save for an unforeseen medical 
emergency and for birthday presents however they may also have the immediate desire to 
spend money on alcohol. In such instances, if the household head is sophisticated enough 
to understand their own self-control problems (i.e. that they are present-biased time 
inconsistent) but does not have access to a commitment savings device, they may spend 
excess money in the near-term thus reducing the amount available for important and 
unexpected long-term expenditure. If such occurrences are widespread, then expanding 
access to commitment savings facilities in developing countries may improve welfare by 
encouraging continuous savings and hence reducing time inconsistent behaviour.
64 Present-biased time inconsistency is not confined to monetary examples (see for example O’Donochue and 
Rabin 1999).
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This study focuses on a particular region in a developing country. It is designed to fill a 
void in literature by asking: “Do time preferences impact on an individual’s decision to 
maintain an open savings account?” The hypothesis is that an individual’s present-biased 
or future-biased time-inconsistent preferences, which highlight their commitment problems, 
impact on their decision to maintain an open savings account. Note this study does not 
focus on savings levels.
A recent study by Ashraf et al. (2006) most closely resembles the investigation undertaken 
in this study. However while it focuses on whether existing savers with present-biased time 
preferences engage in commitment savings facilities this study considers whether people 
with present-biased time preferences maintain open savings accounts. Further, Ashraf et al. 
(2006) only paint part of the picture; this study also adds to literature by being the first to 
consider the impact of future-biased time inconsistent preferences and time consistent 
preferences on maintaining an open savings account65. This additional focus is important 
given the steady increase in literature presenting examples of situations where future-biased 
time inconsistency is more prevalent than present-biased time inconsistency (Sayman and 
Onculer 2007; Takeuchi 2008; Attema, Bleichrodt, Rohde and Wakker 2009).
A natural field study in collaboration with ANZ bank in the Solomon Islands was 
undertaken to investigate the research question. Independent of ANZ bank, hypothetical 
time preference questions were administered to 268 rural ANZ ‘clients’ and 231 rural ‘non 
clients’ from the same 11 villages who were offered rural banking savings accounts 
between January 2006 and mid-March 200666. Only the ‘clients’ accepted savings facilities 
when offered. The survey was undertaken from mid-April 2007 to mid-May 2007 implying 
ANZ clients have maintained open savings accounts for just over one year.
Results show present-biased time preferences significantly impact on the average survey 
respondent’s decision to maintain an open savings account by approximately 13 percent. 
Results also indicate future-biased time preferences significantly impact on the average 
survey respondent’s decision to maintain an open savings account by approximately 34
65 Future-biased time consistent preferences refer to instances where a person is patient now and impatient 
later. Time consistency refers to instances where a person has the same level of patience now and in the 
future. Refer chapter 2 section 2.1.2 for a more detailed definition.
66 The rural banking savings account is a commitment savings account.
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percent. This study provides the first field evidence that time-inconsistent preferences 
influences a person’s decision to maintain an open formal savings facility.
Additionally, the summary statistics demonstrate, on average, clients answer hypothetical 
time preference questions with present-bias. However when answers are categorised into 
(impatiently and patiently) time consistent and (present-biased and future-biased) time 
inconsistent, results overwhelmingly indicate clients answer questions time consistently. 
Data analysed from studies by Ashraf et al. (2006) and Meier and Sprenger (2008a) 
demonstrate a similar pattern. That most people demonstrate time consistency is important 
when considering results of this study also show time-consistent preferences significantly 
impact on the average survey respondent’s decision not to maintain an open formal savings 
facility by approximately 18 percent. Critically, such findings contradict literature that 
suggests the “assumption of time consistency is importantly wrong” (O’Donoghue and 
Rabin 1999:303).
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 explains the evaluation design while 
section 4.2 highlights the determinants of time preference and section 4.3 discusses the 
summary statistics. Section 4.4 describes the model used to assess impact. Section 4.5 
examines the results of the study, section 4.6 considers some limitations and section 4.7 
concludes.
4.1 Evaluation Design
The following section explains the evaluation design used in this study. The data used was 
gathered through an independent survey of 268 ANZ clients and 231 non-clients in 11 
villages from mid-April 2007 to mid-May 2007 (time 2). Clients represent people who 
opened formal savings facilities when initially offered between January 2006 and mid- 
March 2006 (time 1), while non-clients represent people who refused to open formal 
savings facilities during this same period. Hence during the period between time 1 and 
time 2, clients remained clients and non-clients remained non-clients. As the survey was 
undertaken at time 2 and clients opened savings accounts at time 1, comparing 
characteristics of clients to non-clients should reveal those that suggest why people 
maintained an open savings account for approximately a year.
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The 11 villages used in the study are located in the same region in Guadalcanal and were 
selected for two main reasons. Firstly, none of the villages were offered formal savings by 
another institution, hence reducing possible substitution bias. Secondly, selecting these 
villages was cost effective as they represent the same ‘treatment’ villages surveyed for the 
study undertaken in chapter 367.
To select clients and non-clients, enumerators visited every household in the village. As 
multiple people in a client household may hold a savings account, enumerators followed a 
survey sequence where they interviewed the eldest male account holder. If a male account 
holder was unavailable, a female savings account holder was interviewed. As in chapter 3, 
in both client and non-client households, there was a bias towards obtaining male responses 
over female responses as males are considered to have the most household power in the 
Solomon Islands (Scales 2003).
To ensure groups were comparable, people in non-client households were surveyed using a 
similar sequence. First the enumerator interviewed the eldest male in the household and if 
a male was unavailable, a female in the household was interviewed. The sex and age of the 
survey respondents is statistically similar between the average client and non-client (refer 
summary statistics section 4.3).
Importantly, as the survey is undertaken at time 2 and not at take-up at time 1, the analysis 
focuses on whether time preferences impact on maintaining an open savings account as 
opposed to whether time preferences influence savings take-up. Moreover, it is possible 
time preferences of clients at time 2 have changed from time 1 due to their access to 
savings facilities between times 1 and 2. Nevertheless, Ashraf et al. (2008) show that 
access to a commitment savings device has no significant affect on the average person’s 
perception of self-control (i.e. patience) one year after initial intervention. Their study 
appears to be the only paper that investigates this relationship.
Unlike the study in chapter 3, this study does not suffer from non-random program 
placement as all people in the village were eligible for program participation. Further,
67 Hence the background information on the Solomon Islands and the community surveyed in chapter 3 is 
applicable to this study.
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selection bias is mitigated as clients self-selected into the program while non-clients did 
not.
4.2 Determinants of Time Preference
The following section highlights the approach used to estimate time preference.
Frederick and Loewenstein (2002) claim ‘choice tasks’ are the most common method of 
asking hypothetical time preference questions in experiments. He explains in “a typical 
choice task, subjects are asked to choose between a smaller, more immediate reward and a 
larger, more delayed reward” (Frederick and Loewenstein 2002:47).
Three different hypothetical time preference ‘choice’ questions were asked to all survey 
respondents. Borrowing a phrase from Ashraf et al. (2006:647), more than one question 
was asked “to test whether the context of these questions influences the prevalence and 
predictive power of hyperbolic preferences”68. Table 4.1 reveals the questions asked during 
the survey.
Table 4.1: Hypothetical Time Preference Questions
Group ’N' Question Answer
1 1 a) Would you prefer $400 now or $500 in one month’s time?
Immediate
(Impatient)
now
Delayed 
(Patient) 
1 month
1b) Would you prefer $400 in six months or $500 in seven months time? 6 months 7 months
2a) Would you prefer two pigs now or three pigs in one month's time? now 1 month
2 ^  Would you prefer two pigs in six months or three pigs in seven month’s time?
6 months 7 months
 ^  ^ Would you prefer a bag of rice now or two bags of rice in one month’s time?
now 1 month
3 Would you prefer a bag of rice in six month’s time or two bags of rice in seven 
month’s time? 6 months 7 months
In table 4.1 there are 3 different groups. Each group is broken down into the ‘near-term 
question’ ‘Na’ and the ‘distant-term question’ ‘Nb’ where N = 1, 2 or 369. For each near-
<>s Hyperbolic preferences are the same as present-biased time preferences.
69 The survey was undertaken between mid-April and mid-May which implies that, at the latest, the 6 to 7 
month period refers to mid-November to mid-December. There is the possibility that people who answered 
the survey in mid-May will want more money in 7 months as Christmas is approaching. Conversely, people 
may want more money immediately as Easter has just concluded and they may be short of cash. It is assumed 
any seasonality effects will be on average similar across both treatment and control group members. If this is
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term and distant-term question, there is the option of choosing an immediate reward or a 
delayed reward. If a person chooses the immediate reward they are considered impatient; if 
they chose the delayed reward they are considered patient. For any ‘N’ group, answers can 
be patiently or impatiently time consistent or can be present-biased or future-biased time 
inconsistent. These options are illustrated in table 4.2.
Table 4.2 - Matrix Outlining Time Preferences
Distant Term Question NbA
Immediate reward Delayed reward selected
selected
Immediate impatiently time present-biased time
£  ro reward consistent inconsistency
c selected
ro to Delayed future-biased time patiently time consistent
2  q  reward inconsistency
selected 
A N = 1, 2 or 3
Questions in group 1 are monetary goods questions. The amounts of 400 and 500 Solomon 
Dollars were selected as they represent very good fortnightly wages for villagers.
Questions in group 2 are luxury goods questions as eating pork is not undertaken regularly 
in the Solomon Islands. Indeed, information gathered during the survey process 
demonstrates that only 7.36 percent and 8.96 percent of people in non-client and client 
households respectively, consumed pork one week prior to the survey. This implies that the 
killing and consumption of pigs is likely to be rare. Hence, the distant reward of three pigs 
is likely to represent a strong enough incentive for some people to demonstrate patience.
Questions in group 3 relate to normal goods as rice is a staple eaten by many people in the 
Solomon Islands70. Hence answers to this question provide a contrast to the luxury goods 
question and the monetary question.
not the case, then results may be upwardly or downwardly biased. Note that other peer reviewed papers have 
also not considered this distinction (see for example Ashraf 2006)
70 A bag of rice refers to a 5kg bag of rice which was valued at approximately 38 Solomon Dollars at the time 
of the survey.
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4.3 Summary Statistics
The following section considers the demographic characteristics of survey respondents. It 
also analyses answers to hypothetical time preferences questions and compares data 
gathered in this study with those in literature.
4.3.1 Demographic Characteristics
As illustrated in tables 4.3 and 4.3A, demographic characteristics are largely similar across 
clients and non-clients. For instance, the average age of the survey respondents is 
approximately 37 years, the percentage of male respondents is approximately 57 percent 
and the average age of the household head is approximately 45 years. Approximately 94 
percent of households have 1 or more children and over 92 percent of households have at 
least 1 child enrolled at school.
There are some noticeable differences in characteristics between client and non-client 
households. To illustrate, 91 percent of client households have more than one working 
adult while this number is slightly lower at 85 percent for non-client households71. 
Additionally, the level of education of both the household head and the survey respondent 
is higher among client households relative to non-client households. Almost 78 percent of 
household heads in client households were enrolled in primary school while this number 
drops to 72 percent in non-client households. Further, 22 percent of household heads in 
client households had no education compared to 28 percent in non-client households. In 
relation to survey respondents, 47 percent of those in client households have been enrolled 
in secondary school or higher while this number drops to 35 percent for non-client 
households.
As was the case in chapter 3, due to the survey approach undertaken, females are on 
average 29 years old, males are on average 42 years old and these younger females have a 
higher level of education than older males at a 5 percent level of significance (refer table 
4.3B). Further, male survey respondents live in ‘wealthier’ households as demonstrated by
71 Work is defined as any form of employment, be it part-time or full-time, that provides a source of income.
121
Chapter 4 -  Impact of Time Preferences on an Individual’s Decision to Maintain an Open Savings Account
higher value roofs at a 10 percent level of significance. There are no other significant 
differences between males and female survey respondents.
Refer tables 4.3, 4.3A and 4.3B for further summary statistics. The data was gathered over 
the same observable characteristics as those used in chapter 3.
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4.3.2 Analysis of Time Preference
The following sub-section illustrates and analyses answers to hypothetical time preference 
questions. Comparisons with literature are also undertaken.
For non-clients, a simple t-test is used to estimate time preference by comparing answers to 
the near term question ‘Na\ to answers of the distant term question ‘Nb\ for all N. Results 
in column J of table 4.4 demonstrates that there is no significant difference between the 
answer to question 2a and 2b as well as between the answer to question 3a and 3b. Hence 
across the majority of questions (i.e. questions in groups 2 and 3), the average non-client is 
time consistent.
Table 4.4 - Estimation of Time Preference Using Answers to Hypothetical Time Preference Questions among Non-Clients
Sample Size: 231 
T-Test
Answers to Near Term Questions 
(Na)
Answers to Distant Term Questions 
(Nb)
DifferenceA
A B C D E F G H 1 J
Question N Patiently Impatiently S.E. Patiently Impatiently S.E. Percentage T-Statistic P-Value
Question 1 46% 54% 0.499 55% 45% 0.499 9% 1.864* 0.063
Question 2 43% 57% 0.497 48% 52% 0.501 5% 1.119 0.264
Question 3 48% 52% 0.501 55% 45% 0.499 7% 1.489 0.137
Average 46% 54% 53% 47% 7%
** Significance at the 5 percent level 
* Significance at the 10 percent level
A The difference determines if the answer to the near term question is statistically different to the distant term question. Hence 
the percentage of people answered patiently in the near term (column B) are subtracted from the percentage of people 
answered patiently in the distant term (column C) when calculating the t-statistic.
If a respondent answers impatiently (it equals 1 in the data set) and if a respondent answers patiently (it equals 0 in the data set)
For clients, results in column J of table 4.4a demonstrates that there is a significant 
difference between the answer to question la and lb as well as between the answer to 
question 2a and 2b. Hence across the majority of questions (i.e. questions in groups 1 and 
2), the average client is present-biased time inconsistent.
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Table 4.4a - Estimation of Time Preference Using Answers to Hypothetical Time Preference Questions among Clients
Sample Size: 268 
T-Test
A n s w e r s  t o  N e a r  T er m  Q u e s t io n s  
(N a )
A n s w e r s  t o  D is t a n t  T er m  Q u e s t io n s  
(N b )
D if f e r e n c e
A B C D E F G H 1 J
Question N Patiently Impatiently S.E. Patiently Impatiently S.E. Percentage T-Statistic P-Value
Question 1 54% 46% (0.499) 65% 35% (0.479) 10% 2 .3 8 4 * * 0.018
Question 2 52% 48% (0.500) 62% 38% (0.486) 10% 2 .2 7 6 * * 0.023
Question 3 51% 49% (0.501) 53% 47% (0.500) 1% 0.259 0.796
A v e r a g e 53% 47% 60% 40% 7%
** Significance at the 5 percent level 
* Significance at the 10 percent level
A The difference determines if the answer to the near term question is statistically different to the distant term question. Hence 
the percentage of people answered patiently in the near term (column B) are subtracted from the percentage of people 
answered patiently in the distant term (column C) when calculating the t-statistic.
If a respondent answers impatiently (it equals 1 in the data set) and if a respondent answers patiently (it equals 0 in the data set)
Nevertheless, when categorising this client data according to the four different options for
72time preferences, results in table 4.5 “ reveal the majority of clients exhibit time 
consistency.
Table 4.5 - Answers to Hypothetical Questions Categorised According to  Time Preference for Clients
Sample Size: 268
A B C D E F
Patient now, Patient Impatient now, Impatient now, patient Patient now, Impatient
later (patiently time Impatient later later (present-biased later (future-biased
Total
consistent) (impatiently time time inconsistent) time inconsistent)
consistent)
Question 1 47% 28% 18% 7% 100%
Question 2 46% 32% 16% 6% 100%
Question 3 44% 40% 9% 8% 100%
Average 46% 33% 14% 7% 100%
Table 4.5 shows on average, across question groups 1, 2 and 3, 46 percent of all clients 
answered questions with patient time consistency (refer column B) and approximately 33 
percent of all clients answered questions with impatient time consistency (refer column C). 
Hence approximately 79 percent of clients answer questions with time consistency.
72 When comparing table 4.5 to a similar table for non-clients, highlighted in table 4.A1 (Appendix 4A), the 
results show that the largest difference between clients and non-clients are that non-clients are more 
consistently impatient than clients. Intuitively, this is reasonable; people who are more consistent with their 
time preferences have more self-control and are hence less likely to require commitment devices.
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Conversely fewer clients demonstrate time inconsistency when answering hypothetical time 
preference questions. Table 4.5 shows on average, across question groups 1, 2 and 3, 14 
percent of clients answered questions with present-biased time inconsistency (column D) 
while 7 percent of clients answered questions with future-biased time inconsistency (column 
E). Thus, only approximately 21 percent of clients answered questions with time 
inconsistency.
Current literature largely focuses on the importance of time inconsistency, and in particular, 
present biased time inconsistency, on individual behaviour (Frederick and Loewenstein 
2002). However, given the ratio of time consistency to time inconsistency of 79:21 in table 
4.5, the summary statistics of this study suggest there should be a greater focus on time 
consistent preferences.
To investigate this divergence from literature it is interesting to analyse results from the 
survey of 1777 existing or former savings clients by Ashraf et al. (2006). Their results 
indicate 25.7 percent of all people demonstrated hyperbolic characteristics while 14.6 
percent demonstrate future-biased inconsistency . This equates to approximately 60 
percent of people who demonstrate time consistency. Hence these results alone suggest the 
majority of people already demonstrate time consistency.
Additionally if the approach taken in this chapter was replicated by Ashraf et al. (2006), 
their results are likely to suggest even more people demonstrate time consistency than time 
inconsistency. Specifically, this study’s approach involved asking a person to answer either 
‘patiently’ or ‘impatiently’. Conversely Ashraf et al. (2006) allow people to answer either 
‘patiently’, ‘impatiently’ or ‘somewhat impatiently’. To compare results from this study to 
those of Ashraf et al. (2006), answers people have given to ‘somewhat impatiently’ were 
eliminated and reallocated evenly as if those people only had a choice between answering 
‘patiently’ and ‘impatiently’. Thus it is assumed 50 percent of the people who answered 
‘somewhat patiently’ would answer ‘patiently’ while the remaining 50 percent would 
answer ‘impatiently’. Admittedly this approach provides only an estimate and is unlikely to 
convey actual answers.
73 These figures were calculated from Ahraf et al. (2006:648).
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With these modifications, results from Ashraf et al. (2006) would be similar to results from 
this study. Further, the data from a more recent study by Meier and Sprenger (2008a) 
provide similar findings with 25 percent of credit card borrowers demonstrating present-bias 
and 2 percent demonstrating future-bias, implying an overwhelming 73 percent of 
borrowers demonstrate time-consistency. Results from this study, the study by Meier and 
Sprenger (2008a) and non-modified and modified figures from Ashraf et al. (2006) are 
illustrated in table 4.6.
Table 4.6 - Comparison of Answers to Hypothetical Time Preference Questions with Literature
This study Ashraf et al (2006) Difference Meier and Ashraf et al (2006) original
modified results Sprenger
(2008a)
results
Time Consistency
Patiently Time Consistent 46% 47% 1% N/A 34%
Impatiently Time Consistent 33% 27% -6% N/A 17%
Somewhat Impatiently Time Consistent N/A N/A N/A N/A 8%
Time Consistent 79 % 74 % -5% 73 % 60%
Time Inconsistency
Present-Biased Time Inconsistent 14% 17% 3% 25% 26%
Future-Biased Time Inconsistency 7% 9% 2% 2% 15%
Time Inconsistent 21 % 26% 5% 27% 40 %
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
All three studies suggest answers to hypothetical time preferences questions generate 
responses that are generally time consistent and not hyperbolic.
Why this divergence from literature? A potential reason is that models demonstrating 
present-bias correlation with a particular action do not necessarily suggest that the number 
of people with present-biased time preferences is particularly high. For instance, that Shui 
and Ausubel (2004) find evidence of hyperbolic discounting in people with high levels of 
credit-card debt is not surprising; by definition an impatient person takes out a larger 
amount of credit as they are impatient for cash. However it does not necessarily imply that 
most of the people investigated demonstrate present-biased time preferences. Hence, while 
time-inconsistency may be suggestive of certain actions, literature should also consider 
investigating influences of time consistency in greater detail.
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4.4 Model
The following model is used to test whether present-biased or future-biased time- 
inconsistent preferences impact on an individual’s decision to maintain an open savings 
account.
= Cj + YiXu + Y2*2 i + Y3 X31 + ßu  Eq 4.1
D\ represents a dummy variable and equals 1 if respondent ‘i’ is an ANZ client and 0 if 
respondent T  is a non-client of ANZ. x lt represents a dummy variable and equals 1 if 
respondent T  answers with present bias and equals 0 otherwise. x2i also represents a 
dummy variable and equals 1 if respondent ‘i’ answers with future bias and equals 0 
otherwise. This regression is undertaken for all three questions illustrated in table 4.1. 
Regression analysis follows both OLS and binary probit specifications.
x3i represents a vector of other observable characteristics that may also indicate take up of 
savings facilities for individual ‘i’. As with the regression in chapter 3, some variables 
include those directly related to the interviewee (i.e. the interviewee’s age, sex and level of 
education) to control for the possibility that a person’s characteristics may influence 
whether they take-up savings facilities. A-priori, there is no evidence to conclude whether 
the signs of these variables are positive or negative when regressing equation 4.1.
Proxies for wealth are included as variables within x3i as wealthier households may want to 
keep any excess wealth in formal savings accounts. Additionally, the number of working 
adults in a household is included as households with more working adults may have more 
money to place in a formal savings account. The number of children in a household is also 
considered as people may want to save money in a formal institution to cater to the future 
needs of children. Finally, the number of people over 55 years old in a household was 
included as these people may have excess money collected throughout their life that they 
want to save to donate to other family members.
To test whether time-consistent preferences impact on an individual’s decision to maintain 
an open savings account, equation 4.2 is regressed.
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Di = c2 + y4x4i + ysx3i + \i2i Eq 4.2
x4i represents a dummy variable and equals 1 if respondent ‘F answers with time 
consistency and equals 0 otherwise. Other variables are as previously specified.
Similar to the regression used in chapter 3 (equation 3.1), there may be omitted variables in 
equations 4.1 and 4.2 that also influence the dependent variable. As explained in chapter 3, 
this is a common limitation in other studies (see for example Meier and Sprenger 2008a).
4.5 Results
The following section considers the impacts of present-biased, future biased and time 
consistent preferences on maintaining an open savings account as well as heterogeneous 
results by gender. Directional influence and significance across all variables using the OLS 
model (tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9) are similar to the probit model (tables 4.7a, 4.8a and 4.9a).
As illustrated in answers to questions 1 and 2 in table 4.7, present-biased time preferences 
impact on the average person’s decision to maintain an open savings account by 15.1 
percent and 10.9 percent respectively74. These results are similar to the Ashraf el al. (2006) 
study that existing savers with present-biased time preferences are significantly more likely 
to open a commitment savings account.
74 The average of the two results suggest that present-biased time preferences impact on the average person’s 
decision to maintain an open savings account by approximately 13 percent.
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Table 4.7 - Determinants of Maintaining an Open Savings Account (Time Inconsistency Analysis)
OLS
Dependent Variable: Dummy equals 1 if respondent is a client and 0 if respondent is a non-client_______________
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
Present-Biased Time Inconsistency Dummy Variable A 0 .151** 0 .109* 0.070
(0.040) (0.055) (0.100)
Future-Biased Time Inconsistency Dummy Variable AA 0 .268** 0.041 0 .405* * *
(0.074) (0.114) (0.070)
Female 0.008 0.020 0.037
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
People over 55 0.033 0.033 0.035
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Number of Working Adults in Household ' 0.021 0.018 0.024
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Number of Children 0.007 0.007 0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Food Consumed " 0 .021** 0 .021** 0 .021**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Roof Quality AAA 0.027 0.032 0.036
(0.071) (0.069) (0.070)
Wall Quality AAA -0.005 -0.002 -0.022
(0.052) (0.054) (0.049)
Number of Bedrooms AAA 0.042 0.027 0.058
(0.085) (0.080) (0.082)
Interviewee’s Age 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Interviewee's Education Level AAAA 0 .066** 0 .063** 0 .047*
(0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
Observations 499 499 499
Adjusted RA2 0.026 0.008 0.032
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered 
at village level.
A Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question with present-biased time inconsistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise. 
AA Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question with future-biased time inconsistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise.
' Work is defined as any form of employment, be it part-time or full-time, that provides a source of income.
AAA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if 
walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 
bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and 
walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
a AAA years of primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and 
are hence as denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, 
panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more 
valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value 
of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence 
the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
* Significance at the 10 percent level; ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 4.7a - Determinants of Maintaining an Open Savings Account (Time Inconsistency Analysis)
Probit
Dependent Variable: Dummy equals 1 if respondent is a client and 0 if respondent is a non-client
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
Present-Biased Time Inconsistency Dummy Variable A 0 .398* * * 0 . 285* 0.179
(0.109) (0.146) (0.256)
Future-Biased Time Inconsistency Dummy Variable AA 0 .769** 0.108 1 .367* * *
(0.253) (0.302) (0.405)
Female 0.015 0.050 0.087
(0.128) (0.131) (0.134)
People Over 55 0.084 0.088 0.092
(0.100) (0.097) (0.101)
Number of Working Adults in Household ' 0.055 0.046 0.062
(0.047) (0.051) (0.054)
Number of Children 0.017 0.019 0.016
(0.041) (0.040) (0.043)
Food Consumed " 0 .056** 0 .054** 0 .055**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Roof Quality AAA 0.069 0.083 0.093
(0.185) (0.176) (0.184)
Wall Quality AAA -0.012 -0.002 -0.061
(0.133) (0.139) (0.129)
Number of Bedrooms AAA 0.113 0.073 0.149
(0.223) (0.209) (0.211)
Interviewee's Age 0.007 0.005 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Interviewee's Education Level AAAA 0 . 174** 0 . 163** 0 . 126**
(0.064) (0.058) (0.063)
Observations 499 499 499
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered 
at village level.
A Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question with present-biased time inconsistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise. 
AA Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question with future-biased time inconsistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise.
1 Work is defined as any form of employment, be it part-time or full-time, that provides a source of income.
AAA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if 
walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 
bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and 
walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
a a a a Years Qf primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5, 10 and 15 years respectively and 
are hence as denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, 
panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more 
valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value 
of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence 
the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
* Significance at the 10 percent level; ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Further answers to questions 1 and 3 suggest future-biased time preferences impact on the 
average person’s decision to maintain an open savings account by 26.8 percent and 40.5 
percent respectively75. It is uncertain why the influence of future-biased time preferences is 
much larger than the influence of present-biased time preferences. Additionally, 
comparisons with literature are not possible as there does not appear to be any study that 
considers the influence future-biased on human actions.
That people who exhibit present-biased time preference and are impatient for cash now 
want to ‘keep it out of hands way’ by depositing money in a bank is reasonable. However, 
is it rational that some people demonstrate patience for rewards now but are impatient for 
rewards in the future? Rubinstein (2005) argues affirmatively, citing an example of not 
eating an expensive chocolate in the near term and waiting to consume it in the distant term. 
Ashraf et al. (2006:647) provide another explanation, suggesting that people with future 
biased preferences are “flush with cash now, but foresees being liquidity constrained in six 
months”. Attema et al. (2009:27) also support the concept of future-biased time consistency 
by showing that informal discussion with subjects of his study “indicated that they did not 
mind a delay much at first, but after a long wait they disliked further delays more”. 
Additionally, there has been a steady rise in literature suggesting more people are likely to 
demonstrate future-bias than present bias (Holcomb and Nelson 1992; Schölten and Read 
2006; Sayman and Onculer 2007; Attema et al. 2009 and Takeuchi 2008).
Why do some Solomon Islanders in this study demonstrate future-biased time preferences? 
Potentially, these people may not need food or money immediately due to excess current 
capacity however they may believe food or money could become scarce due to future 
uncertainties. For example, people may have lumpy cash flows, either through remittances 
or through unstable income flows from SMEs which provides more money now but less 
money in the future. As such, in the distant term, it is reasonable to assume that they prefer 
the safety of an immediate reward as opposed to a delayed reward.
75 The average of the two results suggest that future-biased time preferences impact on the average person’s 
decision to maintain an open savings account by approximately 34 percent.
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Results to the majority of questions highlighted in table 4.7 reveal on average, households 
with higher value food consumption and a more educated survey respondent significantly 
impact on a survey respondent’s decision to maintain an open formal savings account by 
approximately 2.1 percent and 5.9 percent76 respectively.
It is reasonable that survey respondents who are more educated, and hence understand 
potential benefits from saving formally, are more likely to maintain open formal savings 
accounts (table 4.7a). Indeed, in Ashraf et al. (2006), higher education levels predict take- 
up of commitment savings facilities (although the measurements for education are not 
comparable between studies). Further, it is also reasonable to assume a survey respondent 
living in a wealthier household, as suggested by the higher value food items household 
members consume, is more likely to maintain an open savings account.
Ultimately when considering the answers to most questions, results suggest the average 
person who is time inconsistent is sophisticated enough to understand their self-control 
problems -  be they in the present or future -  and hence is more likely to maintain an open 
savings account. Further, table 4.8 illustrates across questions 1 and 3, time consistent 
preferences significantly impact on the average person’s decision not to maintain an open 
savings account by 18.1 percent and 18.7 percent respectively . Hence, the average person 
with time consistency is also sophisticated enough to understand their relatively higher level 
of self-control by being less likely to open a savings account (table 4.8a) .
Results in tables 4.9 and 4.9a reveal the influence of having present-biased time 
preferences, or future-biased time preferences, and being female is insignificant across the 
majority of questions when maintaining an open savings account. Thus unlike Ashraf et al.
1(1 6.5 percent is an average of the coefficients for interviewee’s education level across question 1 (0.066), 
question 2 (0.063) and question 3 (0.047).
77 The average of the two results suggest that time consistent preferences impact on the average person’s 
decision not to maintain an open savings account by approximately 18.4 percent.
78 When all specifications (present-biased time inconsistency, future-biased time inconsistency, patient time 
consistency and impatient time consistency) are included in a regression, people who are patiently time 
consistent and impatiently time consistent are significantly less likely to open savings accounts across answers 
to the first question. As explained in footnote 72, this is reasonable; people who are more consistent with their 
time preferences have more self-control and are hence less likely to require commitment devices. Across 
answers to the other two questions, patient time consistency and impatient time consistency do not 
significantly influence a person’s decision to open a savings account.
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(2006), female survey participants with present-biased time preferences are not more likely 
than male survey participants to engage in commitment devices.
Table 4.8 - Determinants of Maintaining an Open Savings Account (Time Consistency Analysis)
OLS
Dependent Variable: Dummy equals 1 if respondent is a client and 0 if respondent is a non-client
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
Time Consistency Dummy Variable A -0.181*** -0.088 -0.187**
(0.034) (0.055) (0.067)
Female 0.009 0.023 0.032
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049)
People Over 55 0.033 0.033 0.030
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039)
Number of Working Adults in Household ' 0.019 0.018 0.020
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Number of Children 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Food Consumed " 0.022** 0.021** 0.022**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Roof Quality AAA 0.029 0.031 0.040
(0.072) (0.069) (0.071)
Wall Quality AAA -0.007 -0.004 -0.019
(0.051) (0.052) (0.046)
Number of Bedrooms AAA 0.045 0.027 0.052
(0.084) (0.081) (0.080)
Interviewee's Age 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
interviewee's Education Level AAAA 0.065** 0.063** 0.054**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Adjusted RA2 0.026 0.010 0.020
Observations 499 499 499
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered 
at village level.
A Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question with time consistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise.
' Work is defined as any form of employment, be it part-time or full-time, that provides a source of income.
AAA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if 
walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 
bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and 
walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
a a a a Years 0f primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and 
are hence as denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, 
panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more 
valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value 
of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence 
the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
* Significance at the 10 percent level; ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 4.8a - Determinants of Maintaining an Open Savings Account (Time Consistency Analysis)
Probit
Dependent Variable: Dummy equals 1 if respondent is a client and 0 if respondent is a non-client
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
Time Consistency Dummy Variable A -0 .488* * * -0.231 -0 .498 * *
(0.096) (0.147) (0.190)
Female 0.018 0.056 0.079
(0.127) (0.131) (0.128)
People Over 55 0.085 0.087 0.075
(0.097) (0.098) (0.103)
Number of Working Adults in Household ' 0.051 0.046 0.053
(0.047) (0.052) (0.055)
Number of Children 0.016 0.016 0.012
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041)
Food Consumed " 0 .057* * 0 .054* * 0 .057* *
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Roof Quality AAA 0.076 0.081 0.103
(0.186) (0.176) (0.182)
Wall Quality AAA -0.018 -0.007 -0.046
(0.132) (0.133) (0.120)
Number of Bedrooms AAA 0.121 0.072 0.135
(0.221) (0-212) (0.208)
Interviewee's Age 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Interviewee's Education Level AAAA 0 . 170* * 0 . 162* * 0 . 142* *
(0.061) (0.058) (0.060)
Observations 499 499 499
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered 
at village level.
A Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question with time consistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise.
' Work is defined as any form of employment, be it part-time or full-time, that provides a source of income.
AAA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if 
walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 
bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and 
walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA a Years 0f primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and 
are hence as denoted 0 ,1  and 2 respectively in the data set.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, 
panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more 
valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value 
of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence 
the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
* Significance at the 10 percent level; ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 4.9 - Determinants of Maintaining an Open Savings Account (Gender Analysis)
OLS
Dependent Variable: Dummy equals 1 if respondent is a client and 0 if respondent is a non-client
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
Present-Biased Time Inconsistency Dummy Variable A 0.123 0.308 0.247
(0.342) (0.311) (0.397)
Future-Biased Time Inconsistency Dummy Variable AA 0.258 -0 . 525* 0 . 562* *
(0.285) (0.239) (0.228)
Female 0.010 0.000 0.035
(0.074) (0.072) (0.060)
Female * Present Biased Dummy Variable -0.011 0.085 0.101
(0.174) (0.174) (0.141)
Female * Future Biased Dummy Variable 0.011 0.091 -0.100
(0.137) (0.200) (0.157)
Interviewee's age * Present Biased Dummy Variable 0.000 -0.004 -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Interviewee's age * Future Biased Dummy Variable -0.001 0 .015* -0.005
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
interviewee's education level * Present Biased Dummy VariableAAAA 0.031 -0.062 -0.040
(0.087) (0.068) (0.141)
Interviewee's education level * Future Biased Dummy VariableAAAA 0.023 0.019 0.042
(0.123) (0.066) (0.156)
People Over 55 0.033 0.031 0.034
(0.040) (0.037) (0.040)
Number of Working Adults in Household ' 0.020 0.017 0.025
(0.019) (0.022) (0.021)
Number of Children 0.007 0.009 0.005
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Food Consumed " 0 .021 * * 0 . 020* * 0 . 020 * *
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Roof Quality AAA 0.027 0.030 0.039
(0.073) (0.070) (0.070)
Wall Quality AAA -0.005 -0.003 -0.026
(0.052) (0.053) (0.050)
Number of Bedrooms AAA 0.041 0.023 0.062
(0.088) (0.086) (0.085)
Interviewee's Age 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Interviewee's Education Level AAAA 0.060* 0 .076* * 0.047**
(0.032) (0.020) (0.019)
Adjusted RA2 0.014 0.005 0.023
Observations 499 499 499
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered 
at village level.
A Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question with present-biased time inconsistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise. 
AA Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question with future-biased time inconsistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise.
' Work is defined as any form of employment, be it part-time or full-time, that provides a source of income.
AAA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if 
walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 
bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and 
walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
AAA a Ye a r s  0 f  primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5, 10 and 15 years respectively and 
are hence as denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, 
panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more 
valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value 
of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence 
the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
* Significance at the 10 percent level; ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 4.9a - Determinants of Maintaining an Open Savings Account (Gender Analysis)
Probit
Dependent Variable: Dummy equals 1 if respondent is a client and 0 if respondent is a non-client
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
Present-Biased Time Inconsistency Dummy Variable A 0.256 0.811 0.632
(0.942) (0.824) (1.022)
Future-Biased Time Inconsistency Dummy Variable AA 0.521 -1.654** 2.174**
(0.922) (0.771) (0.828)
Female 0.023 -0.004 0.089
(0.189) (0.183) (0.154)
Female * Present Biased Dummy Variable -0.050 0.234 0.257
(0.461) (0.465) (0.362)
Female * Future Biased Dummy Variable 0.022 0.334 -0.856
(0.523) (0.560) (0.542)
Interviewee's age * Present Biased Dummy Variable 0.001 -0.011 -0.013
(0.021) (0.016) (0.021)
Interviewee's age * Future Biased Dummy Variable 0.001 0.046 -0.028
(0.020) (0.028) (0.019)
Interviewee's education level * Present Biased Dummy VariableAAAA 0.109 -0.158 -0.098
(0.235) (0.178) (0.369)
Interviewee's education level * Future Biased Dummy VariableAAAA 0.181 0.064 0.505
(0.432) (0.207) (0.733)
People Over 55 0.083 0.085 0.090
(0.106) (0.097) (0.105)
Number of Working Adults in Household ’ 0.053 0.047 0.067
(0.049) (0.057) (0.055)
Number of Children 0.017 0.021 0.015
(0.041) (0.042) (0.044)
Food Consumed " 0 .055** 0 .051** 0 .053**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
Roof Quality AAA 0.070 0.078 0.106
(0.186) (0.177) (0.185)
WaW Quahty AAA -0.013 0.000 -0.069
(0.132) (0.134) (0.133)
Number of Bedrooms AAA 0.110 0.056 0.156
(0.229) (0.219) (0.219)
Interviewee's Age 0.007 0.005 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Interviewee's Education Level AAAA 0 .153* 0 .195* * * 0.119**
(0.081) (0.051) (0.048)
Observations 499 499 499
For all variables, the first row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered 
at village level.
A Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question with present-biased time inconsistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise. 
AA Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question with future-biased time inconsistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise.
' Work is defined as any form of employment, be it part-time or full-time, that provides a source of income.
AAA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if 
walls are made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 
bedrooms in the house and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the quality of roofs and 
walls, and the higher the number of bedrooms, the wealthier the household.
a AAA years Qf primary school, secondary school and tertiary school attendance are assumed to be 5,10 and 15 years respectively and 
are hence as denoted 0, 1 and 2 respectively in the data set.
" If any member of the household consumed any of the following items in the week prior to the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, 
panna, banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded for each item consumed. As they are considered more 
valuable, if any member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value 
of 2 is recorded for each item consumed. The total of the numbers recorded is used to calculate a number for 'food consumed'. Hence 
the higher the value of food consumed, the wealthier the household.
* Significance at the 10 percent level; ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
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4.6 Limitations
While this chapter has already noted potential bias due to omitted variables, there are other 
possible limitations to this study. These include potential bias due to the use of hypothetical 
as opposed to real rewards. Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukherji (2006:12) claim “most 
experiments presented in literature involve only hypothetical choices” and as such, people 
have little incentive to seriously think about their true preferences. The authors cite 
examples in the literature where field studies involving real monetary amounts present 
“much weaker evidence in favor of hyperbolic discounting” (Fernandez-Villaverde and 
Mukherji 2006:12) relative to experiments using hypothetical amounts.
Conversely Frederick and Loewenstein (2002:389) claim the use of hypothetical time 
preference questions and provision of real rewards “typically yield qualitatively similar 
results”. He cites the work of Camerer and Robin (1999) as well as Kirby and Marakovic 
(1995) as examples of literature that supports his argument. Nevertheless, Frederick and 
Loewenstein (2002:389) do admit “systematic differences have been observed in some 
studies” between real and hypothetical rewards.
For the purposes of this study, the potential differences in answers when asking hypothetical 
time preference questions and presenting participants with real rewards cannot be 
definitively ascertained. This remains a limitation of the study.
Additionally answers to hypothetical time preference questions may be biased as it is not 
easy to ensure that everyone really understands the instructions properly. To mitigate 
potential bias emanating from this, an approach similar to the one taken by Ashraf et al. 
(2006) is considered. Specifically, whether people with greater education are more likely to 
answer questions in a particular way relative to less educated individuals is analysed. 
Results in table 4.10 indicate the level of education does not predict answers to hypothetical 
time preference questions and as such it is less likely that the average person failed to 
understand instructions properly.
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Table 4.10 - Influence of Survey Respondent's Education Level on Answers to Hyperbolic Time Preferences
Survey Size: 499 
OLS
Dependent Variable: Equals 1 If Survey Respondent Answers Impatiently and 0 if Survey Respondent Answers Patiently
Answer to Answer to Answer to Answer to Answer to Answer to
Question 1 a Question 1 b Question 2a Question 2b Question 3a Question 3b
Female -0.03 -0.053 -0.028 -0.019 -0.017 -0.067
(0.062) (0.042) (0.076) (0.070) (0.056) (0.051)
People over 55 0.025 0.031 0.014 0.002 (0.044) -0.066**
(0.034) (0.036) (0.041) (0.035) (0.026) (0.027)
Number of Working Adults in Household ' 0.037* 0.018 0.022 0.014 -0.015 -0.039
(0.020) (0.018) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.025)
Number of Children (0.030) -0.038* (0.029) 0.000 (0.001) (0.007)
(0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.013) (0.018) (0.010)
Food Consumed " -0.028** -0.017 -0.025** -0.022* -0.023 -0.016
(0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Roof Quality AAA -0.128** -0.091* (0.058) (0.029) (0.034) 0.005
(0.057) (0.050) (0.056) (0.063) (0.045) (0.038)
Wall Quality AAA 0.035 -0.01 -0.022 0.035 0.011 0.008
(0.043) (0.035) (0.045) (0.033) (0.054) (0.050)
Number of Bedrooms AAA 0.028 0.096 0.025 (0.024) 0.109 0.098
(0.085) (0.068) (0.092) (0.085) (0.095) (0.097)
Interviewee's Education Level AAAA 0.039 0.018 0.028 0.052* -0.007 0.024
(0.036) (0.030) (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034)
Observations 499 499 499 499 499 499
Adjusted RA2 0.050 0.030 0.028 0.024 0.022 0.024
For all variables, the firs t row represents the coefficient while the second row (in parentheses) represents the standard error clustered at village 
level.
A Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question w ith  present-biased time inconsistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise.
AA Dummy Variable equals 1 if a person answers a question w ith  future-biased time inconsistency and 0 if a person answers otherwise.
' Work is defined as any form  of employment, be it part-time or fu ll-time, that provides a source of income.
AAA Roof Quality equals 1 if the roof is made from Copper and 0 if the roof is made from  Sago Palm or Timber. Wall Quality equals 1 if walls are 
made from Timber and 0 if walls are made from Sago Palms. The number of bedrooms equals 1 if there are greater than 3 bedrooms in the house 
and 0 if there are equal to or less than 3 bedrooms in the house. Hence the higher the  quality o f roofs and walls, and the higher the number of 
bedrooms, the wealth ier the household.
a AAA years Qf primary school, secondary school and te rtia ry school attendance are assumed to  be 5 ,10  and 15 years respectively and are hence as 
denoted 0 ,1  and 2 respectively in the data set.
"  If any member o f the household consumed any of the fo llow ing items in the week prior to  the survey; coconut, kasava, potato, taro, panna, 
banana, sugar, rice, fish, twistees, bread or eggs, a value of 1 is recorded fo r each item consumed. As they are considered more valuable, if any 
member of the household consumed milk, pork, beef or chicken in the week before the survey was undertaken, a value of 2 is recorded for each 
item consumed. The to ta l o f the numbers recorded is used to  calculate a number fo r 'food consumed'. Hence the higher the value of food 
consumed, the wealth ier the household.
* Significance at the 10 percent level; * *  Significance at the 5 percent level, * * *  Significance at the 1 percent level.
The focus on older people and male respondents may skew results towards this 
demographic. Indeed, the summary statistics reveal that the percentage of male respondents 
was approximately 57 percent while the average age of respondents was approximately 37 
years. Hence, it may be inappropriate to generalise these findings as those applicable to all 
potential savings account holders.
Further, this study only considers people who answered patiently and impatiently. Failure 
to consider the possibility that some people also answer ‘somewhat impatiently’ may reduce 
robustness of results.
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Finally, as with the study in chapter 3 and other quasi-experimental designs, there is the 
possibility that results may not be applicable to areas outside the study region. However, a- 
priori, there is nothing to suggest why such results are not representative of those across 
other areas of Guadalcanal.
4.7 Conclusion
Results of this chapter show people’s present-biased or future-biased time-inconsistent 
preferences, demonstrating their commitment problems, positively and significantly impact 
on their decision to maintain an open savings account. Hence when considering these 
results in isolation, they support both the hypothesis and the argument of chapter 3 that 
policy makers should further investigate the benefits of expanding access to micro-savings 
in Pacific Island countries.
However, the summary statistics reveal when categorising answers to hypothetical time 
preference questions between time-consistency and time-inconsistency, the large majority 
of clients surveyed demonstrate time-consistency. This implies that the desire for 
commitment devices by individuals with commitment problems should not be the primary 
reason for expanding access to formal savings facilities. Further, results show the average 
person with time-consistent preferences is less likely to maintain an open savings account.
Ultimately this study reveals a survey respondent, be they present-biased, future-biased or 
time consistent, are on average sophisticated enough to understand their respective level of 
self-control. Additionally, while literature as well as results of this study suggests time 
inconsistent preferences may predict certain behaviour, given the prevalence of time- 
consistency in many studies, the impacts of time consistency should also be investigated. 
Finally, this study does not explore whether people who access savings accounts save 
optimally. Further research regarding levels of actual savings would provide greater clarity 
on this issue.
142
Chapter 4 -  Impact o f Time Preferences on an Individual's Decision to Maintain an Open Savings Account
Appendix 4A
The following table illustrates answers to hypothetical questions categorised according to 
time preference for non-clients.
Table 4.A1 - Answers to  Hypothetical Questions Categorised According to Time Preference fo r Non-Clients
Sample Size: 268
A B C D E F
Patient now, Impatient now. Impatient now, Patient now,
Patient later Impatient later patient later (present- Im patient later
Total(patiently tim e (impatiently tim e biased time (future-biased tim e
consistent) consistent) inconsistent) inconsistent)
Question 1 43% 43% 11% 3% 100%
Question 2 38% 46% 11% 6% 100%
Question 3 47% 45% 8% 1% 100%
Average 43% 44% 10% 3% 100%
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Chapter 5 -  Impact of State-Run Newspapers on Political 
Opinions
5.0 Introduction
The role of newspapers in influencing political opinions and the drivers of newspaper bias 
have been widely documented. But what of newspaper bias in countries where the largest 
circulation of print-media is controlled by the government? To what extent can state-run 
newspapers be used as a propaganda tool to influence voter opinions and alter the 
democratic process? Such information is critical when ascertaining whether an incumbent 
government has effectively used state resources to promote policy agendas, particularly if 
“it is voters’ preferences rather than political institutions that determine policy outcomes” 
(Besley and Preston 2007:1473).
To date, there has been little research, and no experimental study, examining the 
relationship between state-run media and political opinions. This lack of research is 
concerning given that the state has some control over the media in many developing 
countries79.
The motivation of this study is to fill a void in literature by undertaking a randomised study 
on the impacts of state-controlled newspapers in a developing country. Sri Lanka, which is 
ranked 165th out of 173 countries for press freedom in the 2008 ‘reporters without borders 
annual index’ (RWB 2008), is a good candidate to estimate the impacts of state-run 
newspaper bias. It is considered one of the most dangerous places for journalists (Lawson 
2009) and has recently received negative international coverage for the murder and 
abduction of newspaper editors opposed to the government (Sirilal 2008). Indeed, a number 
of journalists have sought asylum in other countries while others have been held in 
detention by the government (Mihlar 2008).
This chapter investigates the question: “Does home delivery of state-run newspapers 
influence the political opinions of individuals to conform to the views of the state?” The
79 Examples are Pakistan, Malaysia, China, Thailand, Vietnam, Fiji, Bangladesh and Sudan.
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hypothesis is that home delivery of state-run newspapers will influence the political 
opinions of individuals to conform to the views of the state. A similar study by Gerber et 
al. (2009) experimentally considers the impact that two private newspapers with different 
ideologies have on voter actions in Washington D.C. This study will compare and contrast 
results from Gerber et al. (2009) while noting the clear differences across geography, 
interpretation of results and newspaper proprietorship between the two studies.
In May 2008, a baseline survey of 15 households randomly selected in each one of 56
on
separate villages (totalling 840 households) was undertaken . From these 56 villages, 28
o 1
were randomly selected. Further, 15 households within these 28 randomly selected 
villages were provided with intervention of ‘a home delivered state-run newspaper every 
weekday and Sunday for approximately 10 weeks’. After these 10 weeks, a second round
o n
survey asking 824 respondents in all households their opinions regarding topical issues in 
Sri Lanka was administered. Using baseline and second round survey data, impact is 
estimated by comparing individuals who received newspapers to individuals who did not
83receive newspapers .
This study is the first randomised study to consider the impact of newspaper bias on 
political opinions of individuals within a developing country. Results suggest that the 
hypothesis is partially correct; intervention influences the political opinions of people to 
conform to the views of the state across ‘positive issues’ (i.e. those that promote positive 
state actions) and across ‘negative issues’ (i.e. those that target opposition parties and other 
actors running against government policy). Conversely in most cases, intervention does not 
significantly influence the political opinions of people across ‘defensive issues’ (i.e. those 
that involve defending unpopular state actions). It is important to note that while results 
that are categorised into ‘positive’, ‘negative’ and ‘defensive’ issues, ‘home delivery of 
state-run newspaper’ is the only intervention in this study.
8U Data was provided by a local consulting firm, International Scholar Professional Services Pty Ltd. The 
author of this dissertation provided technical advice on the collection of the survey data.
81 These are the same 15 households that were surveyed during the baseline.
82 16 respondents from the baseline survey were not available for interview during the second round survey.
83 For comparative purposes, impact is also estimated when answers to survey questions are aggregated at 
village level.
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The structure of the remaining sections of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 provides 
important background information on the context of the study while section 5.2 explains the 
model. Section 5.3 describes the evaluation design while section 5.4 highlights the 
summary statistics. Section 5.5 discusses the results and section 5.6 presents some 
limitations. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.1 Background
The following section first provides a brief background of Sri Lanka and the district of 
Monaragala . It then considers how various issues are postured with a pro-government 
perspective in state-run newspapers. The issues highlighted in state-run newspapers form 
the basis of the survey questionnaire used in this study.
5.1.1 Country and District Background
Sri Lanka is a country with approximately 20 million people of whom approximately 82 
percent are Sinhalese, 7.9 percent are Sri Lankan Moors, 5.1 percent are Indian Tamil and 
4.3 percent are Sri Lankan Tamil (Census 2001a) '. The country had been in a state of civil 
war for approximately 30 years where an anti-government group, known as Tamil Tigers or 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was fighting for a separate homeland for the 
ethnic minority Tamils. Its fortunes have oscillated from holding approximately one-third 
of the country’s land mass to being ultimately eliminated as a conventional fighting force in 
2009.
This study focuses on 56 villages in the district of Monaragala in Eastern Sri Lanka. The 
district represents approximately 1.9 percent of the country’s population and has an
o / :
approximately 95 percent Sinhalese concentration (Census 2001b) . Its people have access 
to free education, free medical clinics and are able to participate in political elections. Of 
the districts surveyed in the Sri Lanka Household Income and Expenditure survey
84 Monaragala is sometimes spelt Moneragala.
8:1 Information was sourced from the Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics and relates to the 2001 
census. Note, this 2001 Census only covers non-conflict areas and consequently, the percentage of Tamil 
Citizens is under-represented. Hence the 20 million population figure is an estimate.
86 Information was sourced from the Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics and relates to the 2001 
census
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872006/2007 , Monaragala is the second poorest, its people have the second lowest 
ownership of televisions and the lowest ownership of personal computers. Hence electronic 
media access is low relative to other parts of the country.
Until late 2007, Monaragala was subject to several incursions by the Tamil Tigers. After 
the area was brought under government control, it was expected this province with a 94.5 
percent Singhalese population would be more favourable to the government. Indeed in 
2008 elections, in an adjoining district that previously also had strong Tamil Tiger presence, 
52.96 percent supported the government while 44.52 percent supported the main opposition 
(Elections 2008).
5.1.2 Content of State-Run Newspapers
The pro-government state-run newspapers distributed to households for the purposes of this 
study include the Dinamina paper during the weekdays, and its sister publication, the 
Siliumina paper on Sunday . These papers are written in Sinhala and command the largest 
circulation in the country of 75,000 per weekday and 265,000 every Sunday (ANCL 2008). 
Assuming that a newspaper is read on average by six ethnically Sinhalese people per day , 
this circulation translates into a readership of 2.13 percent and 7.54 percent of the rural 
Sinhalese population for the Dinamina and Silumina papers respectively90. The circulation
87 19 districts from a total of 26 were involved in the survey. The remaining 7 districts are all included within 
conflict zones and consequently were not surveyed.
88 Home delivery is an unusual mode of newspaper acquisition in rural areas and newspapers are generally 
purchased through street vendors. This is unlikely to influence the experimental analysis of the ITT effect as 
any substitution (if it exists) would on average, impact both treatment and control groups equally. Refer 
section 5.2 for more details.
89 There are 5 to 7 readers per copy for Indian newspapers (PCI 2010) and there are 6 readers per copy for a 
Singhalese newspaper, Rivira (Nation 2010). As there is no information on readers per copy for the Dinamina 
and Silumina papers, an estimate of 6 readers per copy was used.
90 The number of ethnically Sinhalese people according to the last census (in 2001) was 13,876,245 (Census 
2001a). In India, the distribution of newspapers between urban and rural areas was approximately 50-50 (NRS 
2006). Note data for this distribution does not appear to exist in Sri Lanka. Hence, assuming 50 percent of 
circulated newspapers reach the rural population and given that approximately 76 percent of Sri Lankans live 
in rural areas (UNESCAP 2004), an estimated readership figure for rural Sri Lankans is 2.13 percent and 7.54 
percent every weekday and Sunday respectively. Refer Appendix 5A for calculations.
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within the district studied could not be sourced91. The cost of the newspaper is minimal,
92representing less than 0.08 percent of the average rural monthly household income .
In 2008, there were several noteworthy issues in Sri Lanka reflected differently in state-run 
newspapers and pro-opposition newspapers. Again, while there is only one intervention, for 
the purpose of separating out results, the information contained in the newspapers are 
categorised into positive issues (those promoting positive actions of the state), negative 
issues (those targeting opposition parties and other actors running against government 
policy) and defensive issues (those defending unpopular implications of state actions).
In state-run newspapers, positive issues regularly focused on the government’s military
n o
victories against the Tamil Tigers . In 2002 a ceasefire was brokered which lasted until 
2007 when the government annulled it citing violations by the Tamil Tigers. Between 2007 
and 2009, a government offensive was launched to retake land held by the Tamil Tigers. 
On May 17th 2009, the Tamil Tigers admitted defeat and the civil war was officially over.
State-run newspapers also positively reported on international support for the government’s 
war against the Tamil Tigers94. While countries, particularly Western countries, urged the 
Tamil Tigers and government to return to the negotiating table, they rarely reprimanded 
military actions by the Sri Lankan government. Canada recently banned the Tamil Tigers, 
joining other major industrialised nations to do so. Further there have been arrests of Tamil 
Tigers operatives in the US, Canada, Italy, Australia and the EU which were uncommon 
prior to the 2002 ceasefire agreement.
When targeting the main political opposition (the UNP), the state-run newspapers engaged 
in negative reporting. For example two articles appearing in the state-run newspapers stated 
“UNP leader ... remains in this country but champions cause of terrorism” and “UNP-JVP 
plot to betray innocent people” (Dinamina, June 17th, 2008). Conversely on the same day, a
91 The circulation of newspapers per district was not available on the internet. When contacted, the newspaper 
stated that it did not have district circulation information available.
92 The average monthly household income is 24,039 rupees and the cost of the newspaper is 20 rupees (HIES 
2007).
93 Refer Appendix 5B for examples of newspaper articles.
94 Refer Appendix 5B for examples of newspaper articles.
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pro-opposition paper stated; “Though none go with me still I will fight: Ranil”95 (Daily 
Mirror, June 17,h 2008). This bias has previously been documented by an independent 
‘centre for policy alternatives’ study which noted 94 percent of political articles in state-run 
newspapers in the run up to the 2004 election had unfavourable articles relating to the 
opposition (CPA 2005).
The state-run newspapers also used negative reporting to portray International Non- 
Governmental Organisations as being pro-Tamil Tigers. They accused internationally 
funded Sri Lankan organisations, as well as the Economist, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International and Caritas of “invariably” presenting “a pro LTTE, pro-separatist spin” and 
being “highly critical of the elected Sri Lankan Government” (Dinamina, June 17th’ 2008). 
Conversely pro-opposition newspapers generally supported the contribution of International 
Aid Agencies. For instance one such paper quoted references from the US ambassador that 
“INGOs96 in Sri Lanka came under unjustifiable attack despite the good work they did in 
this country” (Daily Mirror, Sept 06, 2008).
Opposition newspapers, and to an extent, international media, cited the government’s poor 
treatment of journalists. Amnesty International claimed “at least 10 Sri Lankan media 
workers have been killed over the past two years, while others have been abducted, tortured 
or illegally detained” (Reuters, June 6th, 2008). Routinely the pro-opposition newspapers 
accused the government of being complicit in these crimes claiming for instance, “Govt 
launches war on media not terror -  UNP” (Daily Mirror, June 20th, 2008) and “Government 
urged to respect media rights” (Daily Mirror, June 23rd, 2008). This stance had largely been 
supported internationally with 29 media organisations around the world urging the United 
Nations to put pressure on the Sri Lankan government to protect journalists on June 22nd. 
Further, the international media organisation, “Agence Franchise de Presse”, claimed 
“media rights watchdogs describe Sri Lanka as one of the most dangerous places in the 
world for journalists after Iraq” (AFP, May 28, 2008).
95 ‘Ranil’ is the first name of the leader of the Sri Lankan opposition.
96 INGOs are International Non Governmental Organisations. They are referred to as International Aid 
Agencies throughout this chapter.
149
Chapter 5 -  Impact of State-Run Newspapers on Political Opinions
Conversely, state-run newspapers largely printed defensive articles on the government’s 
media record, citing opposition propaganda and hypocrisy. For instance, in the article titled 
“Media Freedom” (Dinamina, June 14th, 2008), the author claimed “the UNP’s attempts to 
position itself as the greatest supporter of media freedom and freedom of expression, faces a 
major challenge from its own contemptible record when in office”. Further, the country’s 
media minister insisted “the government was safeguarding media freedom by allowing 
media personnel to independently perform their duties” (Dinamina, June 7th, 2008) and 
highlighted his development of a committee for journalists to underscore their grievances 
(Dinamina, June 25th, 2008).
State-run newspapers rarely commented on international criticism relating to human rights 
violations or if they did, reported them with a defensive spin. For instance, on June 15th, 
despite Sri Lanka losing its seat on the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), 
the state-run newspaper praised the government for receiving 109 votes in support of its 
candidature for the council . Further, while on June 16th, the Paris-based aid organisation, 
Action Contre la Faim (ACF) claimed there was a “blatant lack of will of the Sri Lankan 
government to establish the truth” relating to the murder of 17 aid workers in 2006, there 
appeared to be no reference to this matter in the state-run newspaper in the same month.
State-run newspapers defended the government’s handling of the cost of living which had
QO
increased substantially from 2007 to June 2008 . They argued the country was suffering 
the consequences of a “global food crisis” and explained that the government has taken 
measures to limit its impact through state sponsored programs (Dinamina, 28lh May 2008). 
They also cited articles from international organisations supporting their case (Dinamina, 
28lh May, 2008). Conversely, the pro-opposition newspapers placed the blame largely on 
the government, contrasting the “50 percent increase” in essential items faced by the 
common people over the “last three months” with the “elected representatives roaming the 
streets in their BMWs and Range Rovers” (Daily Mirror, 23rd May, 2008).
97 Refer Appendix 5B for examples of newspaper articles.
9S Refer Appendix 5B for a description on how the cost of living has increased.
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Clearly, the state-run newspapers undertake positive, negative and defensive reporting 
across a range of issues. The newspaper reporting in relation to these issues form the basis 
of the questions asked during baseline and second round surveys as highlighted in table 5.1. 
The answers to these questions form the dependent variables of regressions estimated in 
section 5.2.
Table 5.1: Survey Questions
Survey Question 'i'___________________________________________________ Potential answers to survey question 'i'
1A 2A 3A 4A 5A
A Are International Aid Agencies pro-Tamil Tigers? Definitely Not
Unlikely to be 
Pro-Tamil 
Tigers
Uncertain Generally Pro- Tamil Tigers
Very Pro-Tamil 
Tigers
B How likely are you to support an opposition 
party in the next election?
Very Unlikely Unlikely Uncertain Likely Very Likely
C
How do you view the government's handling of 
the Cost of Living?
Very
Unfavourably
Somewhat
Unfavourably
Ok Somewhat
Favourably
Very Favourably
D
How do you view the government's handling of 
the civil war?
Very
Unfavourably
Somewhat
Unfavourably
Ok Somewhat
Favourably
Very Favourably
E
What is the level of international support given 
to the government against terrorism?
None Low Medium High Very High
F How do you view the government's human rights record?
Very
Unfavourably
Somewhat
Unfavourably Ok
Somewhat
Favourably Very Favourably
G
How do you view the government's treatment of 
journalists?
Very
Unfavourably
Somewhat
Unfavourably Ok
Somewhat
Favourably Very Favourably
Topics related to questions 'A' and ’B’ are considered ’negative issues', topics related to questions 'D' and 'E' are considered 'positive issues’ 
while topics related to questions ’C\ 'F  and 'G' are considered 'defensive issues’.
A Refers to the coding used when regressing equations 5.1 to 5.5
5.2 Model
There have been various theoretical models considering the source o f newspaper bias 
(Besley and Prat 2006; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Baron 2006; Groseclose and M ilyo 
2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). These models are based on different underlying 
assumptions o f the state of the world. For instance, literature argues that reporting bias in 
newspapers is influenced by journalists with specific career interests (Baron 2006), by 
tradeoffs between news signals received by media outlets and government bribes to media 
outlets (Besley and Prat 2006), when newspapers re-enforce the beliefs o f their audiences 
(Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005) and when readers feedback into news reporting 
(Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006).
151
Chapter 5 -  Impact of State-Run Newspapers on Political Opinions
However, when considering a state owned newspaper, media bias is driven by the views of 
the state. Hence, in this situation, reporting bias is assumed to be exogenously given. The 
model derived in this section adds to literature by being the first to consider bias from state- 
run newspapers. Subsequent analysis will test the validity of some aspects of this model.
The model of interest is v  = rz(s) + ql(o) where ‘v’ represents people’s political opinions 
(with higher values of ‘v ’ implying people conform to state views), ‘s ’ represents 
information sourced from home delivered state-run newspapers and ‘o’ represents 
alternative information sources (such as other media sources and word of mouth). z(s) and 
/(o) are functions that demonstrate how ‘s’ and ‘o’ influence political opinions of people in 
targeted villages while ‘r ’ is the probability a person will believe information from home 
delivered state-run newspapers and ‘q’ is the probability a person will believe information 
from alternative sources.
Given the randomised nature of this study, where the influence of q/(o) is considered 
statistically similar between the average treatment and control group member, the impact 
from home-delivery of state-run newspapers can be isolated. Hence, the model of interest 
is now v — rz(s).
Assuming that z '(s) > 0, then the more information sourced from state-run newspapers, the 
more likely people’s political opinions conform to those of the state. This study will 
partially test this assumption by determining if the views of people who received home 
delivered state-run newspapers conform with those of the state (i.e. the intent to treat effect), 
and then determining if people who received and regularly read" a home delivered state-run 
newspaper conform to the views of the state (i.e. the treatment on treated effect) to a greater 
degree than those who simply received a home-delivered state-run newspaper100.
99 During the second round survey, people who were home delivered newspapers (i.e. treatment group 
members) were asked whether they read newspapers 3 or more times a week. The 298 people who answered 
‘yes’ were considered regular readers while the 115 people who answered ‘no’ were considered irregular 
readers. Readership levels of treatment group members pre-intervention and control group members are 
unknown. However, assumptions about readership levels are made later in this section.
100 It is assumed greater readership implies that greater information is gathered.
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To test the intent to treat (ITT) effect, the OLS fixed effects model described in equation 5.1 
is regressed.
Yjvt = a jv + YiTimet X Treatmentv+ ß1Timet + Hjvt Eq 5.1
YjVt represents an ordinal measure (from 1 to 5) from the answer to question T  (in table 5.1) 
for individual ‘j ’ in village V  at time V (where t=l for the baseline survey and t=2 for the 
second round survey). ajV is a fixed effect for individual ‘j ’ in village V . Timet is a 
dummy that takes value 0 at time 1 and 1 at time 2. When considering the ITT effect, 
Treatmentv represents a dummy variable that equals 1 if the village is a treatment village 
and 0 if the village is a control village.
Despite random assignment, 56 villages may not be a sufficiently large sample to ensure 
that observable and unobservable characteristics of the average treatment and control group 
member have a statistically similar influence on answers to survey questions. Hence, 
equation 5.1 eliminates potential noise created by characteristics within the error term by 
subtracting baseline data from second round data using an OLS fixed effects approach101.
If the results of the fixed effects OLS estimation are similar to the results of an OLS 
estimation using only second round data, then it can be assumed that observable and 
unobservable characteristics that influence the dependent variable are statistically similar 
between the average control group member and treatment group member. The approach of 
using only second round survey data in OLS estimations is popular as collecting baseline 
data is an unnecessary cost if randomisation is undertaken appropriately (see for example 
the OLS model used in Gerber et al. 2009). Hence, for comparative purposes an OLS 
estimation using only second round data is also regressed. Refer equation 5.2.
YjV2 = a + y2Treatm entv + Ej v 2  Eq 5.2
101 Note, an ordered probit fixed effect model produces biased coefficients (Neyman and Scott 1948). Also 
note that a fixed effects model is the same as a first difference model over one time period (Wooldridge 2001).
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Yjv2 represents an ordinal measure (from 1 to 5) gathered from the answer to question T  (in 
table 5.1) for individual j ’ in village V  at time ‘2’102. To determine if the OLS model 
produces coefficients with the same directional and statistical influence as a linear 
probability model, equation 5.2 is also regressed using an ordered probit model.
Additionally, as randomisation was undertaken at village level, some may argue answers to 
questions should be grouped at the village level. Hence equation 5.3 is also regressed.
Yvt — av + y3Timet X Treatmentv+ß3Timet + +Hvt Eq 5.3
Yvt represents an ordinal measure gathered for the average answer to question ‘i’ (in table 
5.1) across all individuals in village V  at the baseline survey (t=l) and the second round 
survey (t=2). av is a fixed effect for village V . Treatmentv represents a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the village is a treatment village and 0 if the village is a control village.
To test the treatment effect on the treated (i.e. the influence of intervention amongst people 
who regularly read the newspaper ), the following assumption is made; in the absence of 
intervention, people in treatment and control villages do not regularly read the newspaper. 
Given that the district being investigated is the poorest and the estimated readership is very 
low as a percentage of the Sinhalese population (4.84 percent104), this is a reasonable 
assumption.
Due to random assignment, if control villages did receive intervention, it is assumed that the 
correlation between regular readership and intervention would be the same as that 
experienced in the treatment group. Hence, living in a treatment villages is an appropriate 
instrument to estimate regular readership levels. Note the practice of using treatment
102 In equation 5.2 there are no independent variables that are fixed effects and the only potential fixed effects 
are contained in the error term. Hence, equation 5.1 which eliminates any potential fixed effects in the error 
term produces estimators that are at least as unbiased and efficient as those produced in equation 5.2.
103 Refer footnote 99 for a definition of regular readership.
104 This number is the average of 2.13 and 7.54 which were numbers previously illustrated in Section 5.1.2. It 
assumes each newspaper is read on average by six people. The calculation of 4.84 percent is illustrated in 
Appendix 5A.
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villages as instruments is undertaken in other randomised studies (Ashraf et al. 2006; Gine 
et al. 2009).
The first wave of an instrumental variables (IV) regression is as follows:
Regular ReadershipjVt = ajV + y4Timet X Treatmentv + ß4Timet + C0jvt Eq 5.4
Regular ReadershipjVt represents a dummy variable that equals 1 if a treatment village 
respondent regularly reads the newspaper and 0 if a treatment group respondent irregularly 
reads the newspaper or the respondent lived in control villages (i.e. because it is assumed no 
control village respondents are regular readers).
The second wave is as follows:
YjVt = ajV + y5Timet X Regular R e a d e r s h ip + ßsTimet + (;Jvt Eq 5.5
All variables are as previously described. When analysing the treatment effect on the 
treated (TOT), an Instrumental Variables (IV) fixed effects model is used.
Importantly, if the assumption that control group members do not read newspapers is 
violated, the IV estimate produced refers to the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), 
not the IV-TOT. The IV-LATE estimates the impact of reading newspapers among people 
who have received home delivered newspapers105 -  regardless of whether people read 
newspapers through other sources (i.e. such as purchases through street vendors). The IV- 
TOT estimates the impact of reading newspapers among people who have received home 
delivered newspapers -  assuming that people do not read newspapers through other sources. 
Clearly, the IV-LATE effect is not as useful as the IV-TOT effect. As such, results relating 
to the IV-TOT effect should be interpreted with caution given the assumption that control 
group members do not read any newspapers -  home delivered or through street vendors.
105 Recall, it was confirmed that neither treatment nor control group members received home-delivered 
newspapers.
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Note that Gine, Karlan and Zinman (2009) issue a similar caution when using an IV-TOT 
approach in their analysis.
Reconsider equations 5.1. and 5.5 and the questions in table 5.1. If coefficients and y5 in 
equations 5.1 and 5.5 respectively demonstrates a significant directional impact that favours 
the view of the state and |y5| > |yx |, then z'(s') > 0  is accurate to an extent106. This
107would imply that y^nd y5 are positive for all T
5.3 Evaluation Design
The following section describes the experimental design used in this study.
In May 2008, 15 households were randomly selected in each of the 56 villages surveyed 
in the Monaragala district. The households in 28 selected villages were then assigned to the 
treatment group while the households in the remaining 28 villages were assigned to the 
control group. Treatment households were home delivered newspapers every weekday and 
Sunday for 10 weeks (i.e. received intervention). Impact of intervention is measured by 
comparing treatment groups to control groups at both an individual level and at a village 
level.
Village selection into treatment and control groups was undertaken sequentially; there was 
approximately an 80 percent chance that a village selected was of a different type to the 
previous village selected (i.e. in 46 instances a control village was followed by a treatment
106 Cleady, to test the accuracy of z (s) > 0 in its entirety, the influence of a variety of readership levels on 
political opinions of people has to be estimated. This model only considers three levels of readership; those 
who do not read state-run newspapers (control group members), those who irregularly read state-run 
newspaper (115 people within treatment groups) and those who regularly read state-run newspapers (298 
people within treatment groups who read home delivered state-run newspapers at least 3 times a week).
107 As illustrate in table 5.1, question B is “How likely are you to support an opposition party in the next 
election?” where a higher value on the 5 point scale denotes more likely. Hence the intervention of state-run 
newspapers would influence the perceptions of individuals to converge to those of the state if people are less 
likely to support an opposition party at the next election (i.e. y is negative and the answers to question B are 
of a lower value on the 5 point scale). Nevertheless, to make the analysis easier in the following section, 
answers to the question “How likely are you to support an opposition party in the next election?” is converted 
to its negative; “How likely are you to NOT support an opposition party in the next election?”. Hence in the 
results section 5.5, a positive y implies a more pro-government stance.
108 A simple flick of a coin was used to determine if households (within a selected village) were selected for 
the survey (heads implied a household would be surveyed while tails implied a household would not be 
surveyed).
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village or vice versa) and approximately a 20 percent chance that a village selected was of a 
similar type to the previous village (i.e. in 5 instances, a treatment village was followed by 
another treatment village while in 5 other instances, a control village was followed by a 
control village)109. Hence in 10 instances, a control village was located next to a control 
village and a treatment village. The minimum distance between villages was 1.8 km. 
Critically, no treatment villages were selected based on an a-priori belief that individuals in 
these villages would be more or less susceptible to newspaper bias.
Village selection was undertaken in this particular way to enable estimation of potential 
inter-village spillover effects caused by the sharing of newspapers between people in 
different villages. Under this experimental design, control village positioning followed two 
patterns; the first pattern involved 17 control villages being situated next to 2 treatment 
villages while the second pattern involved 11 control villages being situated next to only 1 
treatment village110. However, if a traditional experimental approach was taken (i.e. village 
selection into treatment and control groups was determined on a 50 percent probability 
basis), more than two distinct patterns could exist. For instance, a control village could be 
surrounded by 2 control villages. The spillover effect, if any, on such villages may be 
different to the spillover effect if a control village was located next to a control village and a 
treatment village. Hence in this study, spillover bias can be measured by comparing the 
impact of intervention using all treatment villages and the 11 control villages selected that 
follow the first pattern, to the impact of intervention using all treatment villages and the 17 
control villages that follow the second pattern. Analysis using a traditional randomisation 
technique would create more ‘patterns’ and hence complicate the analysis of spillover 
bias* 111.
Admittedly, there may be legitimate arguments that the benefits from undertaking a 
traditional randomised approach outweigh the benefits of undertaking a more complicated 
analysis of spillover bias. To reduce doubts about the validity of the design, a fixed effects
109 Refer Appendix 5C for a map of Monaragala and a more detailed explanation of the randomisation process.
110 Recall in 10 instances, a control village was located next to a control village and a treatment village. This 
implies that in these 10 instances, a control village was only located next to one treatment village. 
Additionally, the final selected control village was only located next to one treatment village. Hence a total of
11 control villages were only located next to one treatment village. Refer Appendix 5C for further details.
111 Refer section 5.5.3 for consideration of spillover bias.
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analysis is undertaken, as well as a comparison of dependent variables at baseline to 
demonstrate similarity in answers between the average treatment and control group member 
pre-intervention . Further, similarity of results between the fixed effects model and the 
OLS model using second round survey data only (which is traditionally used in randomised 
studies) are also illustrated.
To reduce spillover bias caused by the sharing of newspapers at an intra-village level, 
different households within the same village were not selected as treatment and control 
groups. Further, control group members indicated they did not receive a home delivered 
newspaper during the intervention period, thus reducing the likelihood of substitution bias.
The same questions asked in the baseline were asked during the second round survey. In 
total there were 840 responses to questions highlighted in table 5.1 during the baseline 
survey. In the second round survey there were 824 responses; only 16 households in 7 
separate treatment villages and 9 separate control villages did not participate . Bias due to 
program dropout is unlikely to significantly alter results as dropout rates are approximately 
the same across groups and only represent 2.3 percent of the survey sample. Note, people’s 
reading patterns prior to intervention were not considered.
Unlike the study in chapter 3, program placement was random and all program participants 
were selected during the baseline survey. Hence bias related to non-random program 
placement and selection bias is not problematic. Further, the fixed effects approach 
eliminates the influence of time-invariant effects while the 10 week study period is 
reasonably short to assume that time-variant effects are unlikely to be problematic114. Thus, 
unlike analysis undertaken in both chapters 3 and 4, the study in this chapter does not suffer 
from omitted variable bias.
112 The baseline comparison is illustrated in Summary Statistics section 5.4.
113 During the baseline survey, interviewees were informed they would be approached to undertake another 
survey in approximately 3 months time. This potentially supported the high response rate during the second 
round.
114 Fixed effect models with much longer intervention periods do not explicitly consider the impacts of time- 
variant characteristics on dependent variables (see for example Banerjee et al. 2006).
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As with the case in chapters 3 and 4, there was a preference to interview older males as 
South Asian families are traditionally patriarchal with the eldest son having significant 
authority over his siblings (Ahmed and Lemkau 2000). If no male of appropriate age was 
present, an older female respondent was selected. Further, if an older person would be 
present at a later time during the day, interviewers would revisit the homes. The 
enumerators confirmed that all surveyed people could read by asking them to read a consent 
form out loud. That everyone selected could read is reasonable as the literacy rate in 
Monaragala is 86 percent (Census 2001b). All respondents were ethnically Singhalese 
which is not surprising as they form the largest ethnic block in the district115.
5.4 Summary Statistics
The summary statistics of people surveyed, illustrated in table 5.2, reveals 58 percent of 
respondents were male and were on average, 39 years old in control villages. In treatment 
villages, 61 percent of respondents were male and were on average, 40 years old. This 
difference in age and sex is insignificant between the average control group individual and 
treatment group individual.
Table 5.2: Balance Test for Age and Sex 
_____ Mean, T-statistic, F-Statistic
Control Treatment
T-stat F-Stat 
P-Value P-Value
Age 38.99 39.79 0.189 0.792
(8.737) (8.894)
SexA 57.62% 61.19% 0.293 1.000
(0.495) (0.488)
Observations 420 420
APercentage of Male Respondents
Age is represented by mean value. Values in parenthesis represents the standard error.
The t-test estimates the null hypothesis that the average treatment group village is statistically similar to the average control group 
village across a particular variable. The ANOVA F-test estimates the null hypothesis that all villages are statistically similar to each 
other across a particular variable.
More importantly, table 5.3 illustrates answers to survey questions were insignificantly 
different between the average treatment and control group member at the individual level 
during the baseline survey.
115 Refer Section 5.1.1 Country and District Background.
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Table 5.3: Balance Test for Answers to  Survey Questions at Baseline 
Mean, T-statistic, F-statistic
ControlA Treatm entA
T-stat
P-Value
F-Stat
P-Value
A Are International Aid Agencies pro-Tamil Tigers? 3.331 3.460 0.144 0.582
(1.144) (1.114)
B Flow likely are you to  support an opposition party in the next election? 3.202 3.250 0.551 0.924
(1.084) (1.066)
C Flow do you view the government's handling of the cost of living? 2.212 2.202 0.891 0.882
(0.992) (1.016)
D Fiow do you view the government's handling o f the civil war? 3.752 3.779 0.693 0.948
(0.971) (0.989)
E What is the level o f international support given to  the government against terrorism ? 3.017 3.071 0.533 0.825
(1.140) (1.115)
F Flow do you view the country’s human rights record? 3.388 3.464 0.378 1.000
(1.111) (1.127)
G Flow do you view the government's handling of journalists? 3.114 3.100 0.843 0.711
(1.022) (1.020)
Observations 420 420
A The firs t row  fo r each question V represents the average answer to  question 'i' illustrated in table 1 for the sample frame. The second row 
(in parenthesis) represents the standard error.
The t-test estimates the null hypothesis tha t the average treatm ent group village is statistically sim ilar to  the average control group village 
across a particular variable. The ANOVA F-test estimates the null hypothesis tha t all villages are statistically sim ilar to  each other across a 
particular variable.
* *  Significance at the 5 percent level.
* Significance at the 10 percent level.
Table 5.4 breaks down the answers to questions A to G (illustrated in table 5.1), gathered 
during the baseline survey, across control and treatment group members. The data 
demonstrates the degree to which people conformed to the government view pre­
intervention.
Results for question ‘A ’ suggest that approximately the same number of people believe that 
International Aid Agencies are generally pro-Tamil Tigers (approximately 21 percent), very 
pro-Tamil Tigers (approximately 27 percent) or are uncertain (approximately 25 percent). 
This may suggest that people’s views largely conform to the strong anti-International Aid 
Agency sentiment promoted in the government media.
Results for question ‘B ’ suggest many people are uncertain as to whom they are going to 
vote for the in the next election (approximately 30 percent) while more people appear to be 
pro-opposition (approximately 41 percent) than pro-government (approximately 29
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percent)116. This is surprising as the results of the presidential election in Monaragala (in 
2005) indicated that the incumbent president achieved 56 percent of the vote (Elections 
2005). Further, given the popularity of the incumbent party at the time of the study, it 
would be expected that there would be a greater percentage of people stating they were pro­
government relative to pro-opposition. A potential explanation is that of the 246 people in 
this experiment who stated they were uncertain of how they would vote in the next election, 
the majority would vote for the government.
Results for question ‘C’ indicates that the vast majority of people view the government’s 
handling of the cost of living very unfavourably (approximately 27 percent) or somewhat 
unfavourably (approximately 39 percent). This is not surprising considering the significant 
increase in the cost of living since 2007 . Clearly, these views do not represent a position
that would be favoured by the government.
116 Pro-government supporters are considered those who answered unlikely or very unlikely when asked 
whether they would support an opposition party in the next election while pro-opposition supporters are 
considered those who answered likely or very likely when asked whether they would support an opposition 
party in the next election.
117 Refer Appendix 5B for further details.
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Results for question ‘D’ suggest that the majority of the people believe the government is 
handling the war somewhat favourably and very favourably (total of approximately 63 
percent). This is not surprising given the large military gains experienced by the 
government since the beginning of 2007.
Results for question ‘E’ suggest that people consider the level of international support for 
the government against terrorism with relatively even distribution across people who state 
there is ‘low’ support (approximately 28 percent), ‘medium’ support (approximately 24 
percent), ‘high’ support (approximately 20 percent) and ‘very high’ support (approximately 
18 percent). As only approximately 11 percent of people consider international support for 
terrorism is ‘very low’, the perceptions of survey respondents are more skewed towards 
those favoured by the government.
Results for question ‘F’ highlight that people view the government’s human rights record 
relatively evenly across people who view the record ‘somewhat unfavourably’ 
(approximately 21 percent), ‘ok’ (approximately 21 percent), somewhat favourably 
(approximately 26 percent) and very favourably (approximately 25 percent). Very few 
people view the government’s human rights record very unfavourably (approximately 6 
percent) which may suggest that more people are likely to adhere to the government’s 
preferred position on its human rights record.
Results for question ‘G’ suggest the government’s treatment of journalists is almost evenly 
split between people who believe they are treated somewhat unfavourably (approximately 
28 percent), treated ‘ok’ (approximately 28 percent) and treated somewhat favourably 
(approximately 31 percent). While the government would ideally like more people to 
believe that journalists are treated favourably, this data implies that pre-intervention, both 
domestic and international criticism relating to the rights of journalists was not overly 
effective.
Table 5.5a reveals the change in answers from the baseline survey to the second round 
survey for control group members. It shows the average control group member’s belief that 
the government is effectively handling the cost of living has significantly reduced by 12.97
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percent and the average control group member’s belief that the government is effectively 
handling the war has significantly increased by 3.90 percent. Across the remaining 
questions, the average answers are statistically the same between the survey periods.
Table 5.5a: Change in Answers to  Survey Questions of Control Group Members 
Mean, T-statistic, Percentage Change
Base!ineA Second RoundA
T-stat
P-Value
Percentage
ChangeAA
A Are International Aid Agencies pro-Tamil Tigers? 3.328 3.353 0.788 0.73%
(1.307) (1.288)
B How likely are you to  support an opposition party in the next election? 3.190 3.170 0.815 -0.61%
(1.176) (1.202)
C How do you view the governm ent's handling of the cost of living? 2.214 1.927 0.000 -12.97%
(0.987) (0.894)
D How do you v iew the governm ent's handling of the civil war? 3.740 3.886 0.028 3.S0%
(0.941) (0.957)
E W hat is the level of in ternational support given to  the governm ent against 3.039 3.071 0.721 1.04%
(1.300) (1.241)
F How do you view the country's human rights record? 3.388 3.331 0.505 -1.69%
(1.234) (1.241)
G How do you view the governm ent’s handling o f journalists? 3.127 3.085 0.571 -1.32%
(1.038) (1.057)
Observations 411 411
Only Respondents who answered in both the baseline and second round survey were included in the analysis
A The f irs t row  for each question T  represents the average answer to  question V illustrated in tab le 1 fo r the  sample fram e. The second row  (in 
parenthesis) represents the standard error.
AA Percentage change refers to  the percentage change in the average answer from  the baseline survey to  the second round survey.
As illustrated in table 5.5b, the change in answers from the baseline survey to the second 
round survey across treatment group members is more pronounced. The average treatment 
group member’s belief that the government is effectively handling the cost of living has 
significantly reduced by 14.84 percent, slightly more than that experienced by control 
group members. The significant increase of 8.14 percent in the average treatment group 
member’s belief that the government is effectively handling the war is more pronounced 
than the 3.9 percent increase experienced by the average control group member. Further, as 
opposed to control group members, the average treatment group member’s view that the 
government receives greater international support against terrorism has significantly 
increased by 9.97 percent and the average treatment group member’s likely support for an 
opposition party in the next election has significantly reduced by 9.36 percent.
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Table 5.5b: Change in Answers to Survey Questions of Treatment Group Members 
Mean, T-statistic, Percentage Change
T-stat Percentage
BaselineA Second RoundA
P-Value ChangeAA
A Are International Aid Agencies pro-Tamil Tigers? 3.462 3.613 0.072 4.34%
(1.241) (1.153)
B How likely are you to support an opposition party in the next election? 3.232 2.930 0.000 -9.36%
(1.134) (1.098)
C How do you view the government's handling of the cost of living? 2.203 1.877 0.000 -14.84%
(1.034) (0.874)
D How do you view the government’s handling of the civil war? 3.780 4.087 0.000 8.14%
(0.977) (0.843)
What is the level of international support given to the government against
terrorism? 3.085 3.392 0.000 9.97%
(1.246) (1.128)
F How do you view the country's human rights record? 3.458 3.337 0.169 -3.50%
(1.274) (1.254)
G How do you view the government's handling of journalists? 3.097 3.104 0.921 0.23%
(1.041) (1.050)
Observations 413 413
Only Respondents who answered in both the baseline and second round survey were included in the analysis
A The first row for each question 'i' represents the average answer to question V illustrated in table 1 for the sample frame. The second row (in 
parenthesis) represents the standard error.
AA Percentage change refers to the percentage change in the average answer to question 'i' from the baseline survey to the second round survey.
5.5 Results
This section presents aggregate results, heterogeneous results, results from the analysis of 
spillover effects and a summary of results. Recall, while this study only estimates the 
impact of one intervention (i.e. home delivery of state-run newspapers), the results will be 
categorised under ‘positive issues’, ‘negative issues’ and ‘defensive issues’.
5.5.1 Aggregate Results
OLS results from impact of intervention across intent to treat results (ITT) at a fixed effects 
individual and village level, the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) results at a fixed effects 
individual level and ITT cross-sectional estimates at an individual level are highlighted in 
tables 5.6a to 5.6c.
The ITT results and the TOT results in table 5.6a illustrate intervention (i.e. home delivery 
of state-run newspapers) significantly increases the average person’s belief that the 
government is handling the civil war successfully by 0.162 and 0.224 points respectively on 
a 5 point scale and significantly increases the average person’s belief that the government is 
supported internationally against terrorism by 0.276 and 0.382 points respectively on a 5
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point scale. Hence intervention appears to influence political opinions of individuals to 
conform to those of the state across ‘positive issues’.
Table 5.6a: Impacts from Intervention across Entire Sample 
Results across Positive Issues (i.e. issues that promote positive state actions)
Dependent Variable: Answer to question D Dependent Variable: Answer to question E
Government's handling of the civil war
(5 point scale, higher on the scale implies a more pro­
government stance)
Level of International support given to the government 
against terrorism
(5 point scale, higher on the scale implies a more pro­
government stance)
Individual 
level 
(OLS, FE)
Village level 
(OLS, FE)
Individual 
level 
(IV, FE)A
Individual 
level 
(OLS) AA
Individual 
level 
(OLS, FE)
Village level 
(OLS, FE)
Individual 
level 
(IV, FE)A
Individual 
level 
(OLS) AA
Time Period 2*Treat Dummy (ITT) 0.162*** 0.176*** 0.202** 0.276** 0.264** 0.322***
(0.043) (0.037) (0.063) (0.096) (0.100) (0.083)
Time Period 2*Regular Readers (TOT) 0.224*** 0.382**
(0.060) (0.133)
Time Period 2 0.146*** 0.133*** 0.146*** 0.032 0.055 0.032
(0.029) -0.028 (0.031) (0.087) -0.094 (0.068)
Mean Dependent Variable 3.875 3.875 3.875 3.987 3.137 3.137 3.137 3.232
Observations 1,648 1,648 1,648 824 1,648 1,648 1,648 824
RA2 (Within) 0.131 0.759 0.119 0.025 0.282 0.018
RA2 (Overall) 0.020 0.284 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.178 0.011 0.018
ITT refers to Intent to Treat while TOT refers to Treatment effect on the Treated. FE refers to Fixed Effects and IV refers to Instrumental Variables. 
Standard errors not corrected for robustness in parenthesis. Robust standard errors and standard errors clustered at village level produce coefficients 
with the same or higher level of significance. Time Period 2 equals 0 if data was collected in the first time period and equals 1 if data was collected in the 
second time period. The Treatment Dummy equals 0 if a village did not receive intervention and equals 1 if a village received intervention. Note that the 
treatment dummy is 'differenced' away in fixed effects calculations. The number of observations do not include any observations from the 16 people who 
did not answer survey questions in the second round survey.
A Assignment to treatment is used as an instrument for regular readership in IV regressions. Regular Readership equals zero if the survey respondent was 
not a regular reader and equals 1 if the survey respondent was a regular reader.
AA This regression is only undertaken using second round data.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 10 percent level.
Further, the ITT results and TOT results in table 5.6b suggest intervention significantly 
increases the average person’s belief that International Aid Agencies are pro-Tamil Tigers 
by 0.126 and 0.174 points respectively on a 5 point scale and significantly increases the 
average respondent’s belief that they would not vote for an opposition party by 0.283 and 
0.392 points respectively on a 5 point scale. Hence intervention also appears to influence 
political opinions of individuals to conform to those of the state across ‘negative issues’.
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Table 5.6b: Impacts from Intervention across Entire Sample 
Results across Negative Issues (issues that target opposition parties and actors with an anti-government platform)
Dependent Variable: Answer to question A Dependent Variable: Answer to question B
Pro-Tamil Tigers bias of International Aid Agencies
(5 point scale, higher on the scale implies a more 
pro-government stance)
Likely to not support an opposition party in the next 
election
(5 point scale, higher on the scale implies a more pro­
government stance)
Individual 
level 
(OLS, FE)
Village 
level 
(OLS, FE)
Individual 
level 
(IV, FE)A
Individual 
level 
(OLS) AA
Individual level Village level 
(OLS, FE) (OLS, FE)
Individual 
level 
(IV, FE)A
Individual 
level 
(OLS) AA
Time Period 2*Treat Dummy (ITT) 0.126*** 0.128** 0.260** 0.283*** 0.291*** -0.241**
(0.034) (0.038) (0.085) (0.046) (0.048) (0.080)
Time Period 2*Regular Readers (TOT) 0.174*** -0.392***
(0.048) (0.066)
Time Period 2 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.019 0.031 -0.019
(0.020) -0.02 (0.024) (0.027) 0.033 (0.034)
Mean Dependent Variable 3.439 3.439 3.439 3.483 3.139 3.139 3.139 3.050
Observations 1,648 1,648 1,648 824 1,648 1,648 1,648 824
RA2 (Within) 0.046 0.371 0.029 0.096 0.629 0.043
RA2 (Overall) 0.006 0.0949 0.004 0.011 0.010 0.163 0.006 0.011
ITT refers to Intent to Treat while TOT refers to Treatment effect on the Treated. FE refers to Fixed Effects and IV refers to Instrumental Variables. 
Standard errors not corrected for robustness in parenthesis. Robust standard errors and standard errors clustered at village level produce coefficients 
with the same reported level of significance. Time Period 2 equals 0 if data was collected in the first time period and equals 1 if data was collected in the 
second time period. The Treatment Dummy equals 0 if a village did not receive intervention and equals 1 if a village received intervention. Note that 
the treatm ent dummy is ’differenced' away in fixed effects calculations. The number of observations do not include any observations from the 16 
people who did not answer survey questions in the second round survey.
A Assignment to treatm ent is used as an instrument for regular readership in IV regressions. Regular Readership equals zero if the survey respondent 
was not a regular reader and equals 1 if the survey respondent was a regular reader.
AA This regression is only undertaken using second round data.
*** Significance at the 1 percent level, ** Significance at the 5 percent level, *** Significance at the 10 percent level.
These results support the majority of literature that indicates newspaper bias impacts on 
individual opinions (Dalton et al. 1998; Besley and Burgess 2002; Dietrich, Heider, 
Matschinger and Angermeyer 2006).
Conversely, as illustrated in table 5.6c, intervention does not appear to alter people’s 
political opinions across the majority of ‘defensive issues’. The only exception is that ITT 
and TOT results suggest intervention significantly increases the average person’s belief that 
the government is treating journalists favourably by 0.049 points and 0.067 points 
respectively on a 5 point scale. Further even given this exception, the impact of 
intervention on people’s perceptions regarding the government’s treatment of journalists is 
smaller in terms of magnitude and significance relative to the impact of intervention on 
political opinions across ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ issues.
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Hence at an aggregate level, the hypothesis that home delivery of state-run newspapers will 
impact the political opinions of individuals in villages within a developing country is only 
applicable across ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ issues.
Results in tables 5.6a and 5.6c demonstrate the time effect significantly influences a variety 
of estimations. In particular, table 5.6a illustrates that over the survey period, the average 
person is significantly more likely to believe the government is handling the civil war 
effectively by 0.146 points on a 5 point scale. This is reasonable due to the military 
victories secured by the government during this period . Further, table 5.6c highlights 
that due to the time effect, the average person is significantly less likely to believe that the 
government is handling the cost of living effectively, maintaining a favourable human 
rights record and treating journalists favourably by 0.287 points, 0.058 points and 0.041 
points respectively on a 5 point scale. This is also reasonable as during the survey period, 
the cost of living increased significantly and alleged human rights violations as well as 
alleged harassment of journalists were noted in opposition media119.
In all instances, the TOT results are 1.38 (or the 413 treatment group members interviewed 
during the second round survey divided by the 298 regular readers) times greater than the 
value of the ITT results. Hence impact of intervention is felt most greatly among those 
who regularly read state-run newspapers. These results are consistent with other studies 
that show TOT results are larger than ITT results (Gine, Karlan and Zinman 2009; Ashraf 
et al. 2006).
The OLS village level results are similar in statistical significance and directional influence 
to the OLS individual level results. Hence there appears to be little variation in results 
when grouping answers to survey questions at the village level and individual level.
Tables 5.6a to 5.6c include cross-sectional estimates where only individual level second 
round data for control group and treatment group members are used. Results suggest that 
overall, directional influences and level of significances are similar between the individual 
OLS cross-sectional estimates and individual OLS fixed effects estimates (albeit not to the
llx Refer Section 5.1 Background Information.
119 Refer Section 5.1 Background Information.
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same level as between the results from the individual OLS fixed effects estimates and 
village level OLS fixed effects estimates). Hence this implies that in the large majority of 
cases, on average, observable and unobservable characteristics captured in the error term of 
the cross-sectional OLS regression are statistically similar between treatment and control 
group members. Appendix 5D illustrates that the directional influences and level of 
significances are similar between the OLS cross-sectional estimates and ordered probit 
cross-sectional estimates at the individual level.
It is interesting to compare the aggregate results of this study with those of Gerber et al. 
(2009) which focus on how home delivery of newspapers impacts on voters’ election 
choices in the Washington DC area of the United States. In the Gerber et al. (2009) study, 
the impact of reading a liberal leaning newspaper (i.e. pro-Democratic newspaper) was to 
increase the probability of actually voting for the Democratic candidate by 11.2 percentage 
points (p < 0.014). In this study, to get a sense of magnitudes, the 5 point scale that 
determines whether a person was pro-government or pro-opposition is now reduced to a 2 
point scale. Thus, as illustrated in table 5.6d, if those people who answered ‘uncertain’ 
when asked “How likely are you to support an opposition party in the next election?” were 
considered pro-government, then the impact of receiving state-run newspapers (i.e. the ITT 
effect) is to increase the probability of voting for the government at the next election by 
13.8 percentage points (p < 0.000). Alternatively, if those people who answered ‘uncertain’ 
when asked the same question were considered pro-opposition, then the impact of receiving 
state-run newspapers is to increase the probability of voting for the government at the next 
election, by 7.3 percentage points (p < 0.000). Hence the true value for this study is likely 
to exist somewhere in the vicinity of 7.3 percentage points and 13.8 percentage points .
120 Refer Appendix 5E for the results of two 3 x 3  transition matrices, where the change from ‘pro- 
government’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘pro-opposition’ stances between time 1 and time 2 is illustrated for control 
group members and treatment group members. Analysis shows that the strongest influences intervention had 
was to limit an increase in the number of ‘uncertain’ people becoming ‘pro-opposition’ supporters and to 
increase the number of ‘pro-opposition’ supporters becoming ‘pro-government’ supporters.
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Table 5.6d: Impacts of Intervention on Political Preferences Across Entire Sample
Dependent Variable: Answer to question B
Likely to not support an opposition party in the next election
(2 point scale, higher on the scale implies a more pro-
government stance)
Individual level (OLS, FE) Individual level (IV, FE)A
Panel A
Time Period 2*Treatment Dummy (ITT) 0.138***
(0.022)
Time Period 2*Regular Readers (TOT) 0.191***
0.032
Time Period 2 -0.022 -0.022
(0.016) (0.016)
Observations 1648 1648
RA2 (Within) 0.064 0.002
RA2 (Overall) 0.010 0.003
Panel B
Time Period 2*Treatment Dummy (ITT) 0.073***
(0.020)
Time Period 2*Regular Readers (TOT) 0.101***
0.028
Time Period 2 0.01 0.01
(0.014) (0.014)
Observations 1648 1648
RA2 (Within) 0.039 0.012
RA2 (Overall) 0.005 0.001
ITT refers to Intent to Treat while TOT refers to Treatment effect on the Treated. FE refers to Fixed Effects and IV refers to Instrumental Variables.
Standard errors not corrected for robustness in parenthesis. Robust standard errors and standard errors clustered at village level produce coefficients with 
the same reported level of significance. Time Period 2 equals 0 if data was collected in the first time period and equals 1 if data was collected in the second 
time period. The Treatment Dummy equals 0 if a village did not receive intervention and equals 1 if a village received intervention. Note that the treatment 
dummy is 'differenced' away in fixed effects calculations. The number of observations do not include any observations from the 16 people who did not 
answer survey questions in the second round survey.
A Assignment to treatment is used as an instrument for regular readership in IV regressions. Regular Readership equals zero if the survey respondent was not 
a regular reader and equals 1 if the survey respondent was a regular reader.
Panel A assumes that people who answered uncertain when asked "How iikely are you to support an opposition party in the next election?" are pro­
government supporters. Hence, if survey respondents answered very unlikely or unlikely when asked the question, the Dependent Variable = 0 (and 1 
otherwise).
Panel B assumes that people who answered uncertain when asked "How likely are you to support an opposition party in the next election?" are pro­
opposition supporters. Hence, if survey respondents answered very unlikely, unlikely or uncertain when asked the question, the Dependent Variable = 0 (and 
1 otherwise).
Note that the negative coefficient implies the impact of reading a state-run newspaper is to decrease the probability of voting for the opposition at the next 
election. This is interchangeable with "the impact of reading a state-run newspaper is to increase the probability of voting for the government at the next 
election".
* * *  Significance at the 1 percent level, **  Significance at the 5 percent level, * * *  Significance at the 10 percent level.
The impact of reading state-run newspapers or liberal leaning newspapers on political 
opinions appears to be similar across these two areas in the United States and Sri Lanka. 
However, as a caveat to this result, there are important differences between these two 
studies. Most obviously, people in Monaragala have less access to alternative media 
sources relative to people in Washington DC (recall that Monaragala has the second lowest 
ownership of televisions and the lowest ownership of personal computers in Sri Lanka). 
Further, Gerber et al. (2009) estimate the impact of private newspapers while this study 
estimates the impact o f state-run newspapers. Finally, Gerber et al. (2009) estimate the 
actual impact on voter outcomes while this study estimates the probable impact on voter 
outcomes. Hence, the results o f the two studies are not completely comparable.
171
Chapter 5 -  Impact of State-Run Newspapers on Political Opinions
Consider a situation where everyone in Sri Lanka received state-run newspapers. Given the 
circulation of the Sinhalese, Tamil and English state-run newspapers on Sundays is 510,000 
(ANCL 2008), the country’s population is approximately 20 million and assuming that on 
average six people read each newspaper , the implication is that 85 percent of the 
population do not have access to state-run newspapers. Assume in the 2005 presidential 
election everybody received state-run newspapers, the probability of voting for the 
government as suggested by results in table 5.6d were translated into actual votes and 
results were replicated to all voters across Sri Lanka. Under these assumptions, the 
incumbent party’s candidate would have increased his vote share from 50.3 percent by 
approximately 6.2 percentage points or 11.3 percentage points given the impact of 
receiving state-run newspapers is to increase the probability of voting for the government at 
the next election by 7.3 percentage points or 13.8 percentage points respectively.
Now consider the impact on voting share in the 2005 presidential election if the state-run 
newspaper had been abolished and results of this study were replicable to that time period. 
Assuming six people read every newspaper circulated, the Sinhala, Tamil and English state- 
run newspapers would reach approximately 15.3 percent of the entire population. 
Assume also that the proportion of readers was the same among voters and non-voters and 
as a result of the state-run newspaper being abolished, those voters who did not vote for the 
government voted for the opposition candidate instead. Under these assumptions, the 
incumbent party candidate’s voting share would reduce from 4,887,152 votes by a net 
amount of approximately 299,143 votes or 569,177 votes124 if the impact of regularly
reading a newspaper (i.e. the TOT effect “ ) was to increase the probability of voting for the
126government at an election by 10.1 percentage points or 19.1 percentage points 
respectively. Given that the incumbent party candidate won the 2005 presidential election
121 It is estimated there are 6 readers per copy for Sinhalese Newspapers (refer footnote 89).
I2’ 6.2 percentage points and 11.7 percentage points are calculated as 85 percent x 7.3 percentage points and 
85 percent x 13.8 percentage points respectively.
122 Refer Appendix 5F, reference point T , for calculation.
124 Refer Appendix 5F, reference point ‘k \  for calculation.
125 The TOT results are used instead of the ITT results as it is assumed an average of 6 people actually read a 
newspaper on a regular basis.
12(1 Refer Appendix 5F, reference point ‘a’, for calculation.
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by only 180,786 votes, the impact of state-run newspapers on voters’ political opinions can 
be influential in determining election outcomes.
5.5.2 Heterogeneous Results
The following considers heterogeneous results across gender, political affiliations and age. 
Gender
Table 5.6e illustrates due to intervention, the average female is significantly more likely to 
believe that the government receives international support against terrorism and views the 
government’s human rights record favourably by 0.242 points and 0.152 points respectively 
on a 5 point scale. Further, the average female who receives intervention is significantly 
less likely to believe that the government is treating journalists favourably by 0.096 points 
on a 5 point scale. Hence overall, intervention does not appear to have a significantly 
different influence over males or females.
Political Affiliations
Table 5.6f illustrates that in general, intervention does not have significantly different 
influences across pro-opposition, uncertain and pro-government voters across answers to 
survey questions illustrated in table 5.1127. The only exception is that the more pro­
opposition a person is, the significantly more likely (at the 10 percent level) they are to 
believe that international aid agencies are pro-Tamil Tigers by 0.07 points on a 5 point 
scale. This could be attributed to the fact people are likely to read news that conforms to 
their views (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that 
across an issue, the impacts of exposure of state-run newspapers on pro-opposition 
supporters, who may not access such information often, are more pronounced than the 
exposure of state-run newspapers to pro-government supporters, who may already be aware 
of the government stance on particular issues.
Age
Table 5.6g highlights that intervention does not significantly influence people’s political 
opinions across different age groups.
127 Question ‘B ’ is omitted as the answers to question ‘B ’ were used to determine if people were ‘pro- 
government’, ‘uncertain’ in their political leanings or ‘pro-opposition’.
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5.5.3 Analysis of Spillover Effects between Villages
As discussed in section 5.3, there is the possibility information from people who received 
home delivered newspapers was shared between members of different villages. For 
instance, it is possible that while treatment group members lived in separate villages to 
control group members, people residing in the same areas may be able to discuss political 
developments as highlighted in newspapers. If this is the case, spillover bias may exist.
To account for this, the study makes use of the particular nature of the experimental design. 
Recall that 17 control villages are located next to two treatment villages and 11 control 
villages are only located next to one treatment village “ . If dummy variable coefficients 
are consistently greater when estimating regressions using data from the 11 control villages 
and treatment villages versus data from the 17 control villages and treatment villages, then 
spillover bias may exist. Table 5.7 indicates that spillover bias is not problematic with 
coefficients of dummy variables being similar when undertaking these two regressions.
5.5.4 Summary of Results
Overall, results indicate at an aggregate level, the hypothesis that home delivery of state- 
run newspapers will impact the political opinions of individuals in villages to conform to 
the views of the state is only applicable across results categorised as ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ issues. Further the impact of regularly reading a home delivered newspaper 
(TOT effect) more greatly influences the political opinions of individuals to conform to the 
views of the state than receiving a home delivered newspaper (ITT effect). Hence at an 
aggregate level, in reference the model developed in section 5.2, z '(s) > 0 applies across 
positive and negative issues129. Intervention does not have a significant impact on political 
opinions across the majority of ‘defensive issues’.
Differences across age, gender and political preferences are not very pronounced across 
answers to the majority of questions. Additionally, bias due to the spillover of information 
in state-run newspapers from treatment villages to control villages does not appear to be 
problematic.
128 The next closest villages refer only to those considered in this experiment.
129 As a caveat to this result, refer footnote 106.
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5.6 Limitations
The following outline some potential limitations of this study. Firstly, it is difficult to 
generalize results to all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka and other areas of the country as the 
study only focuses on villages close to a main road in a recently cleared conflict area and 
only among people who read Sinhala.
Secondly, the focus on older people and males may skew results towards this demographic. 
Indeed, the summary statistics reveal that the percentage of male respondents was 
approximately 60 percent while the average age of respondents was approximately 39 
years. Hence, it may be inappropriate to generalise these findings as those applicable to all 
potential voters.
5.7 Conclusion
The results of this study show how home delivery of state-run newspapers can influence 
political opinions of individuals across ‘positive issues’ (i.e. those that promote positive 
state actions) and across ‘negative issues’ (i.e. those that target opposition parties and other 
actors running against government policy). Conversely, intervention does not influence 
political opinions of individuals to conform to the views of the state (or incidentally, to 
conform to anti-government views) across ‘defensive issues’ (i.e. those that involve 
defending unpopular state actions). Hence the intervention may simply confirm existing 
political views maintained by individuals across ‘defensive issues’.
This study reveals that state controlled print media can be a powerful tool for an incumbent 
government. Critically, in countries such as Sri Lanka, where the presidential candidate of 
the incumbent party won the election by 180,786 people (less than 1 percent of the popular 
vote in 2005), such control over state media institutions appears very important. The 
ramifications of this study are further exacerbated when considering the President’s gains in 
the 2005 election were largely felt across remote villages much like the ones investigated in 
this study. Indeed, analysis reveals that under certain assumptions, if the state-run 
newspaper was abolished prior to the 2005 election, then the incumbent government’s 
candidate would not have won the presidency. Even if these assumptions are violated,
179
Chapter 5 -  Impact of State-Run Newspapers on Political Opinions
results still suggest that home delivery of state-run newspapers influences the political 
opinions of individuals to conform to those of the state. Hence, the Sri Lankan government 
may be encouraged to provide state-sponsored home delivered newspapers to individuals.
If results from this study mirror results of similar studies in wider Sri Lanka and those of 64 
countries ranked with media considered ‘not free’ (Freedomhouse 2008), tax payer funded 
state-run media may play a significant part in biasing voter opinions and influencing 
subsequent elections of government officials. Consequently, the policy implications are 
broad. For instance, incumbent governments in countries with state-run institutions may be 
encouraged to increase expenditure and outreach of state controlled media to generate extra 
votes. Alternatively, the results of this study may encourage aid agencies to support 
development of independent media organisations to counter bias from state-run media.
What of the private media? In countries where state-run media exists in conjunction with 
liberal censorship laws, the profit motives of private media may counteract the propaganda 
motives of state-run media. Conversely, in countries with draconian censorship laws, 
private media may be intimidated into silence or compliance with state directives. The 
exact nature of this relationship between private and state-run media and the ultimate 
impact they have on voter opinions warrants further research.
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Appendix 5A
Table 5.A1: Calculation fo r the Average Estimated Readership among Rural Singhalese
Comments
Calculations
Silumina (Sunday Dinamina
Newspaper) (Weekday
Newspaper)
Reference
Total Circulation 265,000 75,000 a ANCL (2008)
In India, the distribution o f newspapers between urban and rural 
was approximately 50-50 (NRS 2006). Note data for this distribut
Estimated circulation into rural areas 132,500 37,500 b does not appear to  exist in Sri Lanka. Hence circulation in rural a 
approximated at 0.5 x ’a'
There are 5 to  7 readers per copy fo r Indian newspapers (PCI 201 
and there were 6 readers per copy for a Singhalese newspaper (f
Estimated readers per copy 6 6 c 2010). As there is no information on readers per copy fo r the 
Dinamina and Silumina papers, an estimate of 6 readers per copv 
used.
Estimated rural readership 795,000 225,000 d = b x c
Ethnically Singhalese population 13,876,245 13,876,245 e (Census 2001a)
Rural Singhalese population (%) 76% 76% f
UNESCAP (2004)
Rural Singhalese population 10,545,946 10,545,946 g = e x f
Estimated readership among rural 
Singhalese (%)
7.54% 2.13% h
= d/g
Average estimated readership among 
rural Singhalese
4.84%
'
= average h
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Appendix 5B
Cost of Living
The cost of living (COL), particularly the cost of rice, has increased substantially from 
2007. To illustrate, in the first three quarters of 2006 and 2007, the amount spent on rice 
consumption and net exports in Sri Lanka was 35,191 million rupees and 38,725 million 
rupees respectively (QNA 2007). This increased to 870,250 million rupees for the first 
three quarters in 2008 (QNA 2007). Additionally, the cost of living increased during the 
survey period. The consumer price index, rose by 3.7 percent from May to June 2008, 
compared with a 1.8 percent change between April and May 2008 and 1.7 percent change 
between March and April (QNA 2007).
Examples of positive reporting in state-run newspapers relating to military victories 
against the Tamil Tigers
31 May 2008: “Forces capture strategic Tiger base”
6 June 2008: “Army destroys LTTE artillery gun”
12 June 2008: “Forces poised to regain Mullaitivu, capture Prabhakaran”
29 June 2008: “Forces capture Tigers' strategic 54 Base”
Examples of positive reporting in state-run newspapers relating to International 
Support for the government against the Tamil Tigers
30fh April 2008: “UK arrests three Tiger suspects”
5th May 2008: “World Tamil Movement; 'A foreign branch of the LTTE in Canada'”
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) control the Montreal-based World Tamil 
Movement as one of their "foreign branches," in charge of raising funds for the war effort
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and spreading propaganda, according to documents seized by the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP).
16th May 2008: “India extends LTTE ban, raises vigilance”
17th June, 2008: “Canada Bans World Tamil Movement listing it as a terrorist front for 
LTTE”
16th July 2008: “Melbourne Business College Director is a LTTE Terrorist”
Examples of defensive reporting in state-run newspapers relating to International 
displeasure at Sri Lanka relating to human rights abuses
29th May 2008: “LTTE, some political groups behind plan says Govt”
Minister Rambukwella emphasised that losing a seat at the UN Human Right Council was 
not a defeat and does not prove that Sri Lanka is violating human rights. The UNHRC was 
established in 2005 and Sri Lanka served a two year term. Since Sri Lanka gained over 50 
percent votes we are eligible to contest for the UNHRC seat in the next term.
He said "when a country contests for the second time to win the same position there will be 
less support. Sri Lanka garnered 101 votes out of 192 votes, the number of votes obtained 
indicates a clear vote of confidence by UN Member States in Sri Lanka’s ability and 
competence to serve as a council member," Minister Rambukwella said.
He pointed out that a huge contest had taken place for the UNHRC seat in the Asia region 
compared to the other regions. "Five groups contested for the UNHRC seat and there was a 
heated contest between six countries in the Asian region to select four countries for the 
council.
Spain was defeated by a vote in the European region contesting three countries for two 
seats in the council. Does this mean that Spain too has violated human rights ?," he asked.
30th April 2008: “Uma Oya project strengthens Lanka-Iran ties”
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Appendix 5C
The highlighted section of figure 5.1 illustrates where the district of Monaragala is situated 
within Sri Lanka.
Figure 5.1: Map of Sri Lanka
Colombo
The selection of treatment and control villages proceeded as follows. To determine 
whether the initial village was a treatment village (T) or a control village (C), the random 
number generator in Microsoft Excel was utilised. Specifically the command 
“randbetween( 1,56)” was used. If the number was between 1 and 28, then a control village 
was selected while a number between 29 and 56 would imply a treatment village was 
selected. In this experiment, the random number generator first returned a number between 
29 and 56, suggesting a treatment village should be the initial village. For the selection of 
the next village, the command “randbetween(l,55)” was used. Notice that the command 
has changed from “randbetween(l,56)” to “randbetween(l,55)” as the number of villages 
has reduced from 56 to 55.
Recall, the experimental design requires in 5 instances, a control village will follow a 
control village and in 5 other instances, a treatment village will follow a treatment village. 
Hence in 10 instances, a village will be of the same type as a previous village. The random 
number generator is now used for a fresh purpose. When using the command 
“randbetween(x,y)’\  if the random number generator produced a number between x and 10,
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then the next village would be of similar type to the previous village (i.e. T followed by a T 
or C followed by a C). If the random number generator produced a number between 11 and 
y, then the next village would be of different type to the previous village (i.e. T followed by 
a C or C followed by a T). Initially x = 1 and y = 55. Every time a village is selected that 
is different to the previous village, the next random number generator command has the ‘y’ 
in “randbetween(x, y) subtracted by 1. Every time a village is selected that is the same as 
the previous village, the next random number generator command has the ‘x’ in 
“randbetween(x, y) added by 1.
Consider the case of this experiment. When using the command “randbetween(l,55)’\  the 
number returned was between 11 and 55, and as the first village was T, the next village 
chosen was ‘C \ The next command used was “randbetween(l,54)’\  The number returned 
was between 11 and 54 and hence the next village selected was T. Using this technique, 
subsequent villages were ‘C’, ‘T \ ‘C’, ‘T \ ‘C \ ‘T \ ‘C’, T ’, ‘C \ The pattern thus far is 
T, C, T, C, T, C, T, C, T, C.
After the tenth village was selected, the command “randbetween(l,46)” was used and the 
random number generator returned a number between 1 and 10. Hence the next village 
selected was a control village. Thus the pattern is now T, C, T, C, T, C, T, C, T, C, C. 
When selecting the subsequent village, the command becomes “randbetween(2,45)”. If a 
number between 2 and 10 is returned, the next village is the same as the previous village. 
As the number was between 11 and 46, the subsequent village selected was T. The pattern 
is now T, C, T, C, T, C, T, C, T, C, C, T.
If 10 villages of the same type have been located next to each other using the random 
number generator (i.e. 5 pairs of control villages or 5 pairs of treatment villages), then the 
next village following this village will always be different, regardless of what the random 
number generator suggests. For example, say 10 treatment villages have already been 
located next to each other. Then anytime a treatment village is selected, the next village 
would be a control village. In the experiment, this occurred after the 50th village was 
selected. If 10 control villages have already been located next to each other, then anytime a
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control village is selected, the next village would be a treatment village. In the experiment, 
this occurred after the 52nd village was selected.
The treatment and control villages were selected as follows; T, C, T, C, T, C, T, C, T, C, C, 
T, C, T, T, C, T, C, T, C, C, T, T, C, T, C, C, T, C, T, C, T, C, T, C, T, T, C, T, C, C, T, 
C, T, T, C, T, C, T, T, C, C, T, C, T, C. Refer Figure 5.2:
Figure 5.2: Surveyed Villages in Monaragala
AiaduOa
iMefigama,
‘BadaUtS.jbura) T
T ntafa
Tammatuila
KjUaragama
Scvanagala
/  ' A
SiyamSatandtrwa
20 ___»1 1 40 Kfloma
The district of Monaragala is separated into 11 administrative divisions spanning a total 
area of 7,133 sq kilometres . Villages surveyed were located in 6 of these administrative 
divisions. Given the war in Sri Lanka at the time this survey was conducted, detailed maps 
of the area are prohibited from being published.
130 Provinces of Sri Lanka 2008, < http://www.statoids.com/ulk.html>, viewed 07-09-09.
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Appendix 5E
The following transition matrix illustrates the transition from a pro-government, uncertain 
or pro-opposition stance from time 1 to time 2 across control group members.
Table 5.E l - Transition Matrix (Control Group members)
Pro-government Uncertain Pro-Opposition
Pro-government 91% 6% 3%
Uncertain 11% 71% 18%
Pro-Opposition 1% 9% 90%
Observations = 411 Control Group Members
The following transition matrix illustrates the transition from a pro-government, uncertain 
or pro-opposition stance from time 1 to time 2 across treatment group members.
Table 5.E2 - Transition Matrix (Treatment Group members)
Pro-government Uncertain Pro-Opposition
Pro-government 95% 5% 0%
Uncertain 13% 87% 0%
Pro-Opposition 14% 14% 72%
Observations = 413 Treatment Group Members
Results suggest one of the strongest influences o f intervention was to lim it an increase in 
the number of ‘uncertain’ people becoming ‘pro-opposition’ supporters. To illustrate, 
tables 5.E l and 5.E2 reveal that the transition of people who were initia lly uncertain to pro­
opposition is greater among control group members (18 percent) relative to treatment group 
members (0 percent).
Results also suggest a strong influence of intervention was to increase the number of ‘pro­
opposition’ supporters becoming ‘pro-government’ supporters. To illustrate, tables 5.E2 
and 5.E1 show that the transition of people who were initially pro-opposition to pro­
government is greater among treatment group members (14 percent) relative to control 
group members (1 percent).
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The transition of people who were initially pro-government is approximately the same 
between control group members and treatment group members.
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This dissertation has provided examples of three different evaluations using survey level 
data. Clearly, the third experimental evaluation is the most rigorous. Unlike the first quasi- 
experimental evaluation, there is no need to justify why non-random program placement 
and selection bias is unlikely to be problematic. Further, as opposed to the first and second 
evaluations, it does not suffer from omitted variable bias. Hence, where practical, 
evaluations should follow an experimental approach to achieve the most rigorous results.
The following outlines the major contributions of the three evaluations to literature and 
suggestions for future research.
6.1 Contribution
Each of the three evaluations has demonstrated that micro-savings, time preferences and 
state-run newspaper bias significantly impact on individual or household behaviour in 
developing countries. The main contributions from each of the three chapters of the 
dissertation are as follows:
Chapter 3 -  Impact From Access to Formal Savings Facilities.
• While the majority of prior studies focus on measuring welfare due to increased 
wealth from using formal savings facilities, this study is the first to measure welfare 
impacts due to formal savings facilities being used as a payment tool and 
reallocation tool.
• This study is the first to demonstrate that access to formal savings facilities in a 
Pacific Island country improves welfare by reducing the difficulty associated with 
paying for ‘lumpier’ items. It is also the first to demonstrate that formal savings 
facilities used as commitment devices generate greater welfare gains relative to 
when formal savings facilities are used as reallocation devices.
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Chapter 4 -  Impact of Time Preferences on an Individual’s Decision to Maintain an Open 
Savings Account.
• This study is the first to consider the impacts of future-biased time preferences and 
time consistent preferences on human behaviour.
• This study is also the first to demonstrate that an individual with present-biased time 
preferences or future-biased time preferences are more likely to maintain an open 
savings account than an individual with time consistent preferences.
Chapter 5 -  Impact of State-Run Newspapers on Political Opinions
• While previous studies have focused on impacts of multiple newspapers with 
opposing views, this study focuses on impacts of a state-controlled newspaper 
which presents the views of the incumbent government.
• This study is the first experiment on this topic undertaken in a developing country.
• This study is also the first to demonstrate that home delivering a state-controlled 
newspaper significantly influences some political opinions of individuals in a 
developing country to conform to the views of the state.
6.2 Future Research
The results and conclusions of this dissertation have provided scope for future research. In 
relation to the first evaluation, greater investigation into the potential welfare impacts of 
accessing formal savings facilities in Pacific Island countries can be undertaken. These 
may focus on using actual dollar amounts to disaggregate the extent to which interventions 
impacts the welfare of people who have committed to saving more, relative to those who 
have saved less. Additional research may also be warranted to determine if individuals 
believe the welfare benefits of anonymity and safety, in relation to accessing formal savings 
facilities, are a sufficient trade-off to the convenience of keeping cash at home.
Future research may also involve undertaking a randomised evaluation to estimate the 
welfare impacts from access to formal savings facilities. For example, at time 1, a baseline 
survey of households in a sample of villages in the Solomon Islands could be undertaken. 
These villages would not have previous access to formal savings facilities nor should they
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experience any spillover effects from other villages with access to formal savings facilities. 
The researcher could then convince ANZ Bank to randomly provide savings facilities to 
half the number of villages from the pool of villages that completed the baseline survey. 
Approximately a year later, at time 2, a second round survey could be undertaken. A fixed 
effects model or given the randomised nature of the evaluation, a cross-sectional model 
using only second round data, could be regressed to estimate the impact of intervention.
In relation to the second evaluation, future research may involve gathering dollar values to 
investigate whether people with present-biased time preferences commit to saving more 
relative to those with constant time preferences. Another interesting avenue of research is 
to specifically ask additional questions to determine if individuals with present-biased 
preferences, as suggested by hypothetical time preference questions, demonstrate 
sophistication. For instance, they may be asked how much money they would take if they 
were offered a loan at the prevailing market interest rate. Controlling for other variables, if 
the majority of people with present-biased time preferences take lower value loans relative 
to people with constant time preferences, then it can be argued, in relation to provision of 
credit, that most people are sophisticated enough to understand their level of self-control 
and act accordingly. Finally, further research into whether the majority of people are time- 
consistent or time-inconsistent may be undertaken. If results support those of this study, 
and other recent studies (Ashraf et al. 2006; Meier and Sprenger 2008a), then there is 
justification to focus greater resources into understanding the influences of time- 
consistency relative to time-inconsistency.
In relation to the third evaluation, additional research can be undertaken on the impacts of 
other media, such as television and radio, in influencing individual political opinions. 
Impacts of other variables, such as ethnicity, economic status, percentage of people in a 
village with children in the army and education, can also be regressed to determine the 
impact of these variables on individual political opinions. Further, it would be interesting 
to ascertain whether state-controlled media is more or less likely to impact people within 
more developed urban areas relative to people in the less developed rural areas investigated 
in this study. This would provide evidence of the relative susceptibility of people in 
different economic and educational demographics to state-controlled newspaper bias.
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